The Role of the Central Bank of Ireland as an Independent Financial Regulator

2021 ◽  
pp. 682-701
Author(s):  
Blanaid Clarke
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Banking Crisis ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
The Body ◽  
Bank Reform ◽  
Regulatory Landscape ◽  
Transparency And Accountability

The chapter evaluates the extent to which the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) operates as an independent and accountable supervisor. The CBI was established pursuant to the Central Bank Reform Act 2010 as the body responsible for central banking and financial regulation in Ireland. The chapter explains the CBI’s functions and describes the national and EU regulatory landscape within which it operates. It compares the CBI to its predecessor, the Central Bank of Ireland and Financial Services Authority, which was criticized for perceived regulatory and supervisory failures in the lead up to the Irish Banking Crisis in 2008. In doing so, it identifies significant improvements in terms of the CBI’s independence, transparency, and accountability. The chapter also suggests further changes that might be considered in this context.

The Position Of The Bank Indonesia As The Lender Of Last Resort After The Enactment Of Law No. 9 Of 2016 On Prevention And Mitigation Of Financial System Crisis

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 08-11
Author(s):  
Theresia Anita Christiani
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Qualitative Data ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Paper Review

Objective - This paper explores the role of the Indonesian Central Bank as the Lender of the Last Resort. Methodology/Technique - This research uses normative juridical research and secondary data. Findings - The results indicate that the Bank of Indonesian, in coordination with the Financial Services Authority, still has the authority to grant short-term loans for banks with liquidity issues. Nevertheless, the Bank of Indonesia does not have authority to provide emergency finance facilities where the funding is granted at the government's expense. Novelty - This paper uses normative juridical research and qualitative data analysis. Type of Paper - Review. Keywords: Authority, Bank, Crises, Position, Prevention, Indonesia. JEL Classification: K10, K20.

scholarly journals Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability Indexes: a Survey

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florin Cornel Dumiter
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Aggregate Index ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Considerable Impact ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Transparency And Accountability

Abstract Recently, the remarkable trend upon central bank independence and the efficient monetary policy were seriously highlighted in the monetary economics field. Starting from 1990s’ central bank independence was at the core of policy making and central banking problems, because of the widespread economical, political, personal and budgetary autonomy of the central bank. Nowadays, we can observe an increasing trend upon central bank transparency, for evaluating more accurate the central bank’s performances by the wide public, mass-media and financial markets. Consequently, a central bank must encompass a high degree of accountability and responsibility, because of the final liability in case of failure. In this paper we present, analyze and assess the construction of the most important indices regarding central bank independence, transparency and accountability in a chronological manner, presenting also the advantages and disadvantages of these indices related to actual practices of central banks. Moreover, we analyze the analytical results of the empirical testing of these indices with a considerable impact upon the developed and developing country group. In regard with the empirical results of different authors, we suggest the importance and the necessity for constructing an aggregate index for measuring central bank independence, transparency and accountability, based on de jure stipulations and the actual practices of the central banks.

Individual accountability in Irish credit institutions—Lessons to be learned from the United Kingdom’s Senior Managers’ Regime

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-52
Author(s):  
Blanaid Clarke
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Banking Crisis ◽  
Public Concern ◽  
Senior Managers ◽  
Banking Reform ◽  
Intensive Supervision ◽  
Administrative Sanctions ◽  
Individual Accountability

This article examines the Senior Managers' Regime (SMR), the duty of responsibility and the offence relating to a decision causing a financial institution to fail introduced by the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 to give legislative effect to the recommendations of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. The Commission had examined impediments to accountability in the wake of the LIBOR scandal. The article explores the value of introducing similar requirements and regulations in Ireland as a means of improving individual accountability and allaying public concern in light of the Irish Banking Crisis and the more recent tracker mortgage scandal. It concludes that in cases of mismanagement which is not deliberate or reckless, the Central Bank of Ireland's model of proactive and intensive supervision and enforcement might benefit from the utilization of a SMR enhanced administrative sanctions procedure alongside its Fitness and Probity Regime. However, the introduction of an offence in Ireland relating to a decision causing a financial institution to fail, while appearing to respond to a public desire to improve accountability, would give rise to a number of significant challenges particularly in relation to enforcement.

scholarly journals Auditors and regulatory work (1987–2013)

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 2088-2113
Author(s):  
David Collins ◽  
Ian Dewing ◽  
Peter Russell
Keyword(s):  
Financial Services ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Documentary Sources ◽  
Recent Emergence ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Intensive Reading

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the jurisdictional expansion of audit into the area of UK financial regulation. The paper draws on the analytical framework of new audit spaces (Andon et al., 2014, 2015), which built on the concept of regulatory space (Hancher and Moran, 1989), and characterises this new audit space as regulatory work. Design/methodology/approach Through an intensive reading of a variety of publicly available documentary sources, the paper investigates the role of auditors and accountants in the reporting accountants’ and skilled persons’ regimes in the UK under the Banking Act 1987 and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Findings The paper identifies a new audit space characterised as regulatory work, which is made up of three distinct phases (and suggests the recent emergence of a fourth phase), and considers the extent to which these phases of regulatory work share common themes across new audit spaces identified by Andon et al. (2015) as independence, reporting, accreditation and mediating. Originality/value The paper identifies a further jurisdictional expansion of audit into a new audit space, characterised as regulatory work.

Central Bank Independence

2021 ◽  
pp. 39-67
Author(s):  
Patrick Njoroge ◽  
Désiré Kanga ◽  
Victor Murinde
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
First Century ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Personal Accountability

The chapter covers central bank independence broadly and makes use of rich literature to bring out key issues on central bank independence from the inception of central banking in 1668 to the twenty-first century. The chapter identifies four measures of central bank independence mainly focusing on legal characteristics. The findings of the study point to benefits associated with independence of central banks, including management of inflation. Also, it is found that delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank increases debt sustainability and fosters fiscal discipline. It is noted that central bank independence needs to be reconciled with the requirements of institutional and personal accountability of the governors. Further, the financial regulation role should be strengthened in the mandates of central banks as the objective of price stability does not necessarily foster financial stability.

LIQUIDITY, INTERBANK MARKET, AND THE SUPERVISORY ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK

2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Young Sik Kim
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
Interbank Market ◽  
Monitoring Cost ◽  
Delegated Monitoring ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Cash Reserves

This paper provides an explanation for the supervisory role of the central bank in a monetary general equilibrium model of bank liquidity provision. Under incomplete information on the individual banks' liquidity needs, individual banks find it optimal to invest solely in bank loans holding no cash reserves, and rely on the interbank market for their withdrawal demands. Using the costly state verification approach under uncertainty in aggregate liquidity demands, the supervisory role of the central bank as a large intermediary arises as an incentive-compatible arrangement by which banks hold the correct level of cash reserves. First, it takes up a delegated monitoring role for the banking system. Second, it engages in discount-window lending at a penalty rate, where the discount margin covers exactly the monitoring cost incurred. Finally, under the central banking mechanism, currency premium no longer exists in the sense that currency is worth the same as deposits having an equal face value.

scholarly journals To Democratize Finance, Democratize Central Banking

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 593-610
Author(s):  
David M. Woodruff
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
The State ◽  
Economic Power ◽  
Democratic Deliberation ◽  
The Public ◽  
Role Of The State ◽  
Public Character ◽  
Fiscal Austerity

Robert C. Hockett’s “franchise view” argues, convincingly, that the capacity of banks or quasi-bank financial entities to create money rests on the laws, regulations, and guarantees of the state under which they operate. Fred Block advocates the use of this insight as a beachhead for establishing the legitimacy of locally embedded, nonprofit lenders whose investments would be dedicated to public purposes. However, given the pervasive influence of “everyday libertarianism,” which fosters blindness to the public character of private economic power, this commentary warns of possible counterproductive consequences of this proposal unless it is fused to the democratization of central banking. An end to central bank independence would highlight the ineliminable role of the state in the market and make that role easier to reshape. It would also end the dynamic whereby monetary easing provides political cover for damaging fiscal austerity and thus lead to better democratic deliberation on the contours of policy.

Classical Political Economy and the Evolution of Central Banks: Endogenous Money and the Fiscal-Military State

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 660-667
Author(s):  
Matías Vernengo
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Karl Marx ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Alternative Theory ◽  
Endogenous Money ◽  
David Ricardo

The paper analyzes briefly the changing ideas on the role of money and banks from William Petty to Thomas Tooke, including the works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx. It analyzes the role of ideas in shaping the evolution of central bank regulation. Particular importance is given to the Bank of England’s inconvertibility period, from 1797 to 1821, and the ensuing debate in shaping Robert Peel’s Bank Act of 1844, which is often seen as the birth of modern central banking. The importance of the Say’s Law, and the inexistence of an alternative theory of the determination of output, is shown to play an essential role in the policy prescriptions of the so-called Bullionist authors, who won the debates that shaped central banking practices in the nineteenth century. The paper concludes with a brief analysis of what is a central bank according to the dominant (marginalist) mainstream of the profession, and what an alternative conception based on what may be termed classical-Keynesian political economy would be. JEL Classification: B10, N20, E58

Understanding the Role of Central Banks in the Financial System

2020 ◽  
pp. 40-64
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Monetary Policies

The main responsibility of the central banks is to implement monetary policies. In this framework, they define interest rates and the amount of the money in the financial system. Hence, it can be said that central banks have the critical role in the development of the financial system. Because of this situation, it is obvious that central banks should satisfy some requirements, such as independence, in order to contribute to the effectiveness of the financial systems. Parallel to this aspect, this chapter aims to understand the role of the central banks in the financial system. In this context, the purpose and historical background of the central banking are explained. In addition to this situation, the subject of the central bank independence is identified as well. In the final aspect, important accounts in the analytical balance sheet of the central bank are defined.

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