Lender of Last Resort

Author(s):  
Xavier Freixas ◽  
Bruno M. Parigi

The global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe have redefined the functions of the lender of last resort (LOLR). First, they have placed the LOLR at the intersection of monetary policy, fiscal policy, supervision, and regulation of the banking industry. Second, they have given regulatory authorities the additional responsibility of monitoring the interbank market. Third, they have extended the LOLR role to cover the possible bailout of non-bank institutions, including sovereign countries. This chapter explores the link between the theoretical models of the banking industry and the unprecedented policies displayed in the aftermath of the crisis. We begin by examining the justification of LOLR in a simplified framework where only liquidity shocks arise, to move to a setting where liquidity shocks cannot be disentangled from solvency ones. We then study contagion in the interbank market and systemic risk, two pathologies due to the imperfections of the financial markets, and we discuss the issues raised by the implementation of the LOLR policy within the safety net.

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Rodríguez ◽  
Carlos Carrasco

The paper analyses the monetary policy responses of the European Central Bank (ECB) to the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Our goals are on the one hand to explain chronologically the main measures in conventional and unconventional policies adopted by the ECB and on the other hand to analyse their effects on key interest rates, monetary aggregates and the money multiplier. The assessment is that the ECB?s monetary policy responses to the crisis have been ?too little, too late?, constrained by the institutional framework, which prevents the ECB from acting as a true central bank with the role of lender of last resort.


Author(s):  
Maria Petmesidou

Greece developed a pension-heavy, clientelist, hybrid Mediterranean welfare state with many gaps in coverage. The global financial crisis of 2008 triggered a severe sovereign debt crisis, compelling the country to accept three bailout packages with stringent conditions as to spending cuts, privatization, and openness to international competition. Severe austerity has caused a protracted recession: the economy lost more than a quarter of its GDP between 2008 and 2015. The Mediterranean refugee crisis impacted severely on the country. New parties of the extreme left (SYRIZA) and extreme right (Golden Dawn) have gained support. SYRIZA was elected on an anti-austerity platform but failed to deliver and a fourth rescue package is under negotiation. The more likely future direction consists in an ever-tighter austerity programme with the immizeration of large sections of the population. A move towards neo-Keynesian intervention and social investment seems unlikely, given the level of debt and the bailout conditions.


Author(s):  
Nauro F. Campos ◽  
Paul De Grauwe ◽  
Yuemei Ji

Structural reform policies move like the business cycle. There are moments when these are implemented with great fervour and others when they are put on the back burner or even dismantled. After the global financial crisis, and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, many countries were forced by creditor countries or were self-imposed to apply deep reforms to their product markets and especially to their labour markets. Now that Europe is recovering, the pressure to implement structural reforms has abated....


Author(s):  
Alexia Thomaidou ◽  
Dimitris Kenourgios

This chapter investigates the impact of the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis in ETFs across regions and segments. In particular, two tests are taking place, with the first one to examine if there is evidence of contagion effect and the second one to test the affection of risks in each pair of ETFs. The evidence across the stable period and the two crisis periods suggests the existence of the transmission of shocks from the Global Financial ETF to regional and sectoral ETFs. However, there is evidence that some of the ETFs remain less unaffected during both crises and some of them are immune. Moreover, the authors examine the impact of several control variables, which represent various risks, to the correlation of each pair of ETFs and the results show the influence of the interest rate risk and interbank liquidity risk during the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.


2019 ◽  
pp. 343-357
Author(s):  
Amy Verdun

This chapter provides an introduction to economic and monetary union (EMU). It describes the key components of EMU and what happens when countries join. EMU was the result of decades of collaboration and learning, which have been subdivided here into three periods: 1969–91, taking us from the European Council’s first agreement to set up EMU to Maastricht, when the European Council included EMU in the Treaty on European Union (TEU); 1992–2002, from when plans for EMU were being developed to the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates; and 2002 onwards, once EMU had been established, and euro banknotes and coins were circulating in member states. Next, the chapter reviews various theoretical explanations, both economic and political, accounting for why EMU was created and looks at some criticisms of EMU. Finally, the chapter discusses how EMU has fared under the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. These crises brought to the fore various imperfections in the design of EMU. This section discusses what changes have been made since 2009 to address those flaws and at what we may expect in the years to come.


2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (05) ◽  
pp. 1137-1164 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAMI DUA ◽  
DIVYA TUTEJA

This paper analyzes the impact of the Eurozone debt crisis on China and India. Using Markov-switching analysis, we discern regimes in economic growth as well as financial markets and study the impact of the global financial crisis and Eurozone crisis on the same. We identify vulnerability and robustness factors governing the degree of exposure and resilience to the crisis for both these economies. In view of strong trade and financial linkages, the Eurozone crisis may have marred prospects of recovery in the aftermath of the recent Great Recession in both China and India. China, however, is found to be more resilient to the crisis possibly due to stronger macroeconomic fundamentals.


2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-400
Author(s):  
Dejan Soskic

The global financial crisis that started in the U.S. had an immediate spillover to the rest of the world financial markets. Next, a decrease in real economic output throughout the developed world occurred simultaneously with high bailout costs for the salvaging of banks and other financial institutions. This vicious combination was at the core of the bank-sovereign interdependence and the sovereign debt crisis of the eurozone. As early as 2008, the G20 announced a thorough global reform agenda with an aim to tackle the root causes of the crises and to transform the system of global financial regulation. Some important reform steps have been made; still, more than six years on, the job is not finished. Where are we in terms of global financial reform, and are we close to creating a more secure global financial system significantly less prone to crisis and bailouts with taxpayers? money?


Equilibrium ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomas Heryan ◽  
Jan Ziegelbauer

The aim of the paper is to estimate, how the volatility of yields of the Greek bonds affects yields’ volatilities of bonds in selected European countries during the period of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. We obtained data for 10-year bonds in a weekly frequency from January 2006 till the end of December 2014. To make a comparison of pre-crisis period, we firstly investigate a bond yields’ volatility before 15th September 2008, when U.S. Leman Brothers bankrupted and the global financial crisis had been reflected in full. However, the period of the global financial crisis could also negatively affect the development of government bonds. Therefore, the period after Leman Brothers’ bankruptcy has been excluded and our crisis period starts after 23rd April 2010, when Greece asked the IMF for financial help and the sovereign debt crisis had been reflected in full. Volatility models GARCH (1,1), IGARCH (1,1) and TARCH (1,1) were used as an estimation method. To examine the risk premium of all GIIPS economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), we also compared the whole investigation with the developments of each spread against the yields of German government bonds. Our results clearly proved not only big differences between pre-crisis and crisis period, but also differences in output with the bond yield spreads. It was concluded that  there has been a higher impact of the Greek bond yields, as well as yield spreads volatility in 2010 and 2011, while it is on the lower level in pre-crisis period.


2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitris Kenourgios ◽  
Dimitrios Dimitriou ◽  
Aristeidis Samitas

Abstract This paper investigates the spread of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC) to different market capitalization segments across countries and regions. Specifically, it tests for capitalization-specific contagion across both crises and their phases by examining large, medium and small capitalization indices of G-20 equity markets. The analysis across stable and the two crisis periods shows the existence of a stronger largecap transmission channel for the majority of countries. On the other hand, the contagion dynamics across the phases of the two crises do not provide a clear pattern of a specific cap size-based contagion across all markets. However, there is evidence that the Pacific region and the three cap groups of some individual markets of different regions are less severely affected. Further, all three cap groups of developed markets are mostly affected during the last phase of the ESDC, while emerging and frontier markets show a more diverse pattern of contagion across the phases of both crises. Finally, the Lehman Brothers’ collapse triggers a dramatic increase of the infection rate, while the ESDC seems to be more contagious than the GFC. JEL classifications: F30; G15 Keywords: Capitalization-specific contagion; global financial crisis; Eurozone debt crisis; dynamic conditional correlation; FIAPARCH


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