Banking in Europe

Author(s):  
John Goddard ◽  
Philip Molyneux ◽  
John O. S. Wilson

This chapter focuses on the evolution of the banking industry in the European Union since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the present day. We provide an overview of developments in the regulation, financial integration, and the structure and performance of the European banking industry. A brief discussion of the global financial crises and their resultant impact on European banks together with coverage of the later Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is also presented, along with structural reforms, and the ongoing progress in creating a fully integrated banking and financial services industry throughout the Eurozone. A major challenge for the industry relates to restoring profitability back to pre-crises levels. At present, many banks remain encumbered by regulatory demands that, while helping their solvency, act as a drag on performance. Given the regulatory and economic environment under which European banks currently operate, their performance will be subdued for some time to come.

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-37
Author(s):  
Constanze Lehleiter

AbstractThe European Union (EU) has faced not only the international financial crisis, but also the European banking and the sovereign debt crisis. A lack of efficient regulations and supervision were a serious cause of recent developments. As a reaction, the EU finally implemented a framework covering both micro- and macro-prudential policies. Measures such as the new capital requirements, the deposit guarantee schemes, the green paper on shadow banking and, most importantly, the new approach for a macro-prudential supervision are headed towards crisis prevention. However, the challenge is to define regulations enhancing financial stability, which, at the same time, do not prevent institutions from generating reasonable financial risks and do not reduce growth. In that regard, the presented measures still have deficits which have to be faced. Furthermore, coordination between various authorities and the European Commission remains another challenge.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Μαρία-Ελένη Αγοράκη

Corporate governance has become a leading topic of research, considering its importance as an implement for transparency in financial markets and corporations. On the other hand, the role of the banks is fundamental in any economy that urges for strong corporate governance. Banks are “special” financial institutions posing unique corporate governance challenges. However, very little attention has been paid to the corporate governance of banks. Recent scandals in the financial sector have brought corporate governance at the forefront of academic and supervisory attention. Banks’ versatile role in the economic system has caught regulatory and supervisory interest around the world in an effort to inspire high quality corporate governance standards. Board structure, in the sense of board size and composition, and its impact on corporate performance constitutes an indispensable and, at the same time, prevalent theme of the corporate governance discussion. This thesis examines corporate governance issues in the European banking industry. More specifically, it examines the relationship between board structure and performance, on a sample of 57 large European banks, over the period 2002-2006. The board structure mechanisms applied, are the size of the board of directors and the percentage of non-executives on the board. In addition, this study employs different measures of firm financial performance both market-based and accounting based. Control variables for the bank size and risk as well as for the different corporate governance system are included in the models. The empirical analysis also incorporates a number of bank-specific variables. […]


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-216
Author(s):  
Matteo De Poli ◽  
Pierre de Gioia Carabellese

With the birth of the Single Supervisory Mechanism came the emergence of a new regime of supervision of the banking industry in the Eurozone. The allocation of enforcement powers between the European Central Bank and the National Competent Authorities is the corollary of the unified supervision, which reverberates from the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and it is ultimately the main theme of this contribution. More specifically, the architecture of the enforcement, principally shaped by the SSM and its principles and rules, is assessed and analysed in this paper against the background of the general theory of enforcement, as developed in the legal literature. The enforcement discourse in the European Union banking sector is debated alongside its interaction with the related aspects of the regulation and supervision and the way these three notions have been integrated and codified in the European Union after the 2011 sovereign debt crisis.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evangelos Vasileiou

Effective Market Discipline (MD) puzzles financial economists and regulators for decades, while the recent bail-in legislation for European banks extremely raises the need for even stronger MD. It may not be exaggeration to say that a new regime for the European banking market is born after the aforementioned decision. This paper’s objective is the broader MD examination, using variables that are not usually included in MD studies, but concern the European Union (EU) and the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the last years. In particular, apart from banking, deposit insurance and pure macroeconomic indicators, we also include governance and sovereign debt indices. The new regime may need a new MD approach. We choose Greece to implement our assumptions, because it is the country with the most severe economic, sovereign and governance problems in the EU. We employ data for the period 2002-10. The empirical evidence supports that market discipline is superficial, while there is ample evidence that MD is directly influenced by the poor governance performance and the excessive government debt. Greek authorities have to make major structural reforms in order to create the conditions for long-term stability, while our analysis points out some EMU’s shortfalls.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nicoletta Layher ◽  
Eyden Samunderu

This paper conducts an empirical study on the inclusion of uniform European Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts issued from member states of the European Union, introduced as a regulatory result of the European sovereign debt crisis. The study focuses on the reaction of sovereign bond yields from European Union member states with the inclusion of the new regulation in the European Union. A two-stage least squares regression analysis is adopted in order to determine the extent of impact effects of CACs on member states sovereign bond yields. Evidence is found that CACs in the European Union are priced on financial markets and that sovereign bond yields do respond to the inclusion of uniform CACs in the European Union.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyong An

Abstract Eurobonds, dubbed as Coronabonds in the context of the current coronavirus crisis, are being hotly debated among the euro area member states amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The debate is in many ways a retread of the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012. As China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience is comparable with the introduction of Eurobonds in the European Union (EU) in terms of institutional mechanism design, we review our previous series of studies of China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience to shed some light on the Eurobonds debate. We obtain three key lessons. First, the introduction of Eurobonds in EU is likely to soften the budget constraint of the governments of the euro area member states. Second, it is also likely to strengthen the moral hazard incentives of the governments of the euro area member states to intentionally overstate their budget problems. Finally, the magnitudes of the moral hazard effects generated by the introduction of Eurobonds in EU are likely larger than their respective counterparts in China.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Alhadab ◽  
Bassam Al-Own

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of equity incentives on earnings management that occurs via the use of loan loss provisions by using a sample of 204 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2011. Design/methodology/approach The authors use the data of 39 European banks to test the main hypothesis. Several valuation models and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for executives’ compensation and the determinant factors of loan loss provisions. Findings The empirical results reveal that earnings management that occurs via discretionary loan loss provisions is associated with equity incentives in the banking industry. In particular, European banks’ executives with high equity incentives are found to manage reported earnings upwards by reducing loan loss provisions. The results therefore show that income-increasing earnings management via discretionary loan loss provisions is widely practised by the executives of European banks and that this is partly motivated by executives’ compensation. Practical implications The findings of this paper present important implications for regulators in the European Union, who should take further steps to reform the regulatory environment to monitor and mitigate the earnings management practices that occur via the manipulation of loan loss provisions. Earnings management practices do not just negatively affect subsequent performance but are also found to lead to firms’ failure. Thus, regulators should take the necessary reforms to protect the wealth of stakeholders (investors, creditors, etc.). Originality/value This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the European banking industry. The study sheds more light on an issue of great interest to a broad audience that does not receive much attention in the prior research, thus opening new avenues for future research.


2015 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Galpin

The European Union has been in its biggest ever crisis since the onset of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2010. Beyond the political and economic dimensions, the crisis has also sparked discussions about Germany's European identity. Some scholars have argued that Germany's behavior in the crisis signals a continuation of the process of “normalization” of its European identity toward a stronger articulation of national identity and interests, that it has “fallen out of love” with Europe. This article will seek to reassess these claims, drawing on detailed analysis of political and media discourse in Germany—from political speeches through to both broadsheet and tabloid newspapers. It will argue that the crisis is understood broadly as a European crisis in Germany, where the original values of European integration are at stake. Furthermore, the crisis is debated through the lens of European solidarity, albeit with a particular German flavor of solidarity that draws on the economic tradition of ordoliberalism. Rather than strengthening expressions of national identity, this has resulted in the emergence of a new northern European identity in contrast to Greece or “southern Europe.”


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