Platitudes and Counterexamples
This article explains the conception of causation as a natural relation in more detail. It outlines some of the features of our use of the causal concept that do not fit with the idea of causation as a natural relation between events. It then outlines the correct explanation of these features, replacing the metaphysical conception of causation with a conception of causation in terms of a contrastive difference-making relation, where the contrasts are determined contextually on the basis of what are often normative considerations.
2021 ◽
pp. 030913332199181
2015 ◽
Vol 43
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pp. 127-146
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Keyword(s):
1975 ◽
Vol 1
(2)
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pp. 129-144
2016 ◽
Vol 10
(3)
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pp. 370-381
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Keyword(s):