Actions

1975 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-144
Author(s):  
Lawrence H. Davis

What distinguishes actions of persons from other events? Too big a question; we make a customary substitution: what distinguishes a person's raising his arm from a person's arm rising? In each case, the arm rises. But in the former, we have something in addition. Let us say that in the former case, the person causes the arm's rising. Our problem then is to interpret this notion of causation by an agent.It can be done, I believe, in terms of the notion of causation of events by other events-events which may not be “mental,” contrary to one common view. My account of agent causation is presented in the concluding section of this paper. I set the stage (or clear it) for this account by first examining rivals of three types: one asserting that agent causation is or involves a causal concept which cannot be interpreted further, but which we all understand well enough; one which invokes causation by mental events of certain kinds; and one which avoids all reference to causation.

1988 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia I. Wolfe ◽  
Suzanne D. Blocker ◽  
Norma J. Prater

Articulatory generalization of velar cognates /k/, /g/ in two phonologically disordered children was studied over time as a function of sequential word-morpheme position training. Although patterns of contextual acquisition differed, correct responses to the word-medial, inflected context (e.g., "picking," "hugging") occurred earlier and exceeded those to the word-medial, noninflected context (e.g., "bacon," "wagon"). This finding indicates that the common view of the word-medial position as a unitary concept is an oversimplification. Possible explanations for superior generalization to the word-medial, inflected position are discussed in terms of coarticulation, perceptual salience, and the representational integrity of the word.


Author(s):  
Lukmanul Hakim

The arrival of Islam in Malay Archipelago to this day is still a debate, because no data and facts have been found to be scientifically justified, but also because of the unilateral nature of the various theories. There is a strong tendency, certain theories emphasize only the specific aspects, while ignoring the other aspects. Therefore, most of the theories that exist in certain aspects fail to explain the coming of Islam, and the process of Islamization. This paper aims to analyze the theory of the arrival of Islam in the Malay Archipelago world. The method used is historical method. Until now there are at least four theories that discuss the theory of the arrival of Islam in the Malay Archipelago world. The four theories are Gujarat theory, Mecca theory, Persian theory and fourth theory (Chinese). Each of these theories has the strengths and weaknesses and certainly these four theories have a common view of Islam as a religion developed in the archipelago through a peaceful way and Islam does not recognize mission as practiced by Christians and Catholics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 59-68
Author(s):  
Peter Takáč

AbstractLookism is a term used to describe discrimination based on the physical appearance of a person. We suppose that the social impact of lookism is a philosophical issue, because, from this perspective, attractive people have an advantage over others. The first line of our argumentation involves the issue of lookism as a global ethical and aesthetical phenomenon. A person’s attractiveness has a significant impact on the social and public status of this individual. The common view in society is that it is good to be more attractive and healthier. This concept generates several ethical questions about human aesthetical identity, health, authenticity, and integrity in society. It seems that this unequal treatment causes discrimination, diminishes self-confidence, and lowers the chance of a job or social enforcement for many human beings. Currently, aesthetic improvements are being made through plastic surgery. There is no place on the human body that we cannot improve with plastic surgery or aesthetic medicine. We should not forget that it may result in the problem of elitism, in dividing people into primary and secondary categories. The second line of our argumentation involves a particular case of lookism: Melanie Gaydos. A woman that is considered to be a model with a unique look.


EMPIRISMA ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Limas Dodi

According to Abdulaziz Sachedina, the main argument of religious pluralism in the Qur’an based on the relationship between private belief (personal) and public projection of Islam in society. By regarding to private faith, the Qur’an being noninterventionist (for example, all forms of human authority should not be disturb the inner beliefs of individuals). While the public projection of faith, the Qur’an attitude based on the principle of coexistence. There is the willingness of the dominant race provide the freedom for people of other faiths with their own rules. Rules could shape how to run their affairs and to live side by side with the Muslims. Thus, based on the principle that the people of Indonesia are Muslim majority, it should be a mirror of a societie’s recognizion, respects and execution of religious pluralism. Abdul Aziz Sachedina called for Muslims to rediscover the moral concerns of public Islam in peace. The call for peace seemed to indicate that the existence of increasingly weakened in the religious sense of the Muslims and hence need to be reaffi rmed. Sachedina also like to emphasize that the position of peace in Islam is parallel with a variety of other doctrines, such as: prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and so on. Sachedina also tried to show the argument that the common view among religious groups is only one religion and traditions of other false and worthless. “Antipluralist” argument comes amid the reality of human religious differences. Keywords: Theology, Pluralism, Abdulaziz Sachedina


Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin

This chapter lays out the book’s central question: Assuming agency reductionism—that is, the thesis that the causal role of the agent in all agential activities is reducible to the causal role of states and events involving the agent—is it possible to construct a defensible model of libertarianism? It is explained that most think the answer is negative and this is because they think libertarians must embrace some form of agent-causation in order to address the problems of luck and enhanced control. The thesis of the book is that these philosophers are mistaken: it is possible to construct a libertarian model of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework that silences that central objections to libertarianism by simply taking the best compatibilist model of freedom and adding indeterminism in the right junctures of human agency. A brief summary of the chapters to follow is given.


Author(s):  
Maristella Botticini ◽  
Zvi Eckstein

Circa 1000, the main occupations of the large Jewish community in Muslim Spain and of the small Jewish communities in southern Italy, France, and Germany were local trade and long-distance commerce, as well as handicrafts. A common view states that the usury ban on Christians segregated European Jews into money lending. A similar view contends that the Jews were forced to become money lenders because they were not permitted to own land, and therefore, they were banned from farming. This article offers an alternative argument which is consistent with the main features that mark the history of the Jews: the Jews in medieval Europe voluntarily selected themselves into money lending because they had the key assets for being successful players in credit markets. After providing an overview of Jewish history during 70–1492, it discusses religious norms and human capital in Jewish European history, Jews in the Talmud era, the massive transition of the Jews from farming to crafts and trade, the golden age of the Jewish diaspora (ca. 800–ca. 1250), and the legacy of Judaism.


October ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 157 ◽  
pp. 63-89
Author(s):  
Aurelie Verdier

Against the common view that appropriation—of images, words, and machines—was the surest mark of Francis Picabia's modernism, Verdier posits that Picabia's constant reuse of visual and textual material was a melancholic symptom. Many of Picabia's pronouncements were, in fact, the very condemnation of his own system opposing the hand and the machine. Drawing from this analysis, Verdier argues that Picabia's art was never unambiguously modern nor reactionary; it was instead what Freud called “reactional.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gordon

AbstractWhen libertarian political philosophy attracted wide public notice in the 1970s, a common view was that the distinctive individual rights advocated in libertarian theory required grounding in a theory of ethics. Recently, this view has come under challenge. It has been argued that resort to such grounding in ethical theory is unneeded. An appeal to common sense intuitions suffices to justify libertarianism. First, a brief account of libertarianism will be presented. Then, some examples of the older, pro-grounding position will be discussed. Then, the principal defense of the newer view, Michael Huemer’s The Problem of Political Authority, will be examined. This discussion constitutes the substance of the present paper. The principal contention of the present article will be that the argument to libertarianism from intuitions does not succeed. In conclusion, it will be suggested that a return to the earlier, grounding view is indicated for philosophers who wish to defend libertarianism.


Res Publica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Guillery

AbstractA common objection to a proposal or theory in political philosophy is that it is not feasible to realise what it calls for. This is commonly taken to be sufficient to reject a proposal or theory: feasibility, on this common view, operates as a straightforward constraint on moral and political theory, whatever is not feasible is simply ruled out. This paper seeks to understand what we mean when we say that some proposal or outcome is or is not feasible. It will argue that no single binary definition can be given. Rather, there is a whole range of possible specifications of the term ‘feasible’, each of which selects a range of facts of the world to hold fixed. No single one of these possible specifications, though, is obviously privileged as giving the appropriate understanding of ‘feasibility’ tout court. The upshot of my account of feasibility, then, will be that the common view of feasibility as a straightforward constraint cannot be maintained: in order to reject a moral theory, it will not be sufficient simply to say that it is not feasible.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document