The Oxford Handbook of Virtue

This volume provides a representative overview of philosophical work on virtue. It is divided into seven parts: conceptualizations of virtue, historical and religious accounts, contemporary virtue ethics and theories of virtue, central concepts and issues, critical examinations, applied virtue ethics, and virtue epistemology. Forty-two chapters by distinguished contributors offer insights and directions for further research. The volume is unique in bringing together work on virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, thereby providing an overview of the most recent thinking on virtue in the field of philosophy. It explores writing on virtue in the work of western historical figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume, Nietzsche, Kant, and the utilitarians, and includes chapters on Islamic, Christian, Buddhist, and Confucian and Neo-Confucian approaches to virtue ethics. Chapters on neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and alternatives to it, such as sentimentalism, are also included, as well as work in applied virtue ethics in areas such as medical ethics, business ethics, environmentalism, jurisprudence, sexual ethics, and communication ethics. Objections to virtue ethics and central virtue ethical themes, such as motivation, are also addressed. Chapters on key virtue epistemological themes are also featured in the volume, and a nod toward the emerging field of applied virtue epistemology is given.

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Crerar ◽  
Teresa Allen ◽  
Heather Battaly

Intellectual virtues are qualities that make us excellent thinkers. There are different analyses of exactly which qualities count as intellectual virtues: virtue responsibilists have emphasized praiseworthy character traits, such as open-mindedness and intellectual humility, while virtue reliabilists have emphasized reliable skills and faculties, such as vision, memory, and skills of logic. Importantly, all agree that intellectual virtues are (i) excellences, as opposed to defects; and (ii) distinctively intellectual and not, or not simply, moral. In other words, intellectual virtues are qualities that make us excellent (and not defective) as thinkers, not (or not simply) as people in general. This bibliography provides an overview of philosophical work on the intellectual virtues. It includes articles and books addressing responsibilist and reliabilist analyses of the structure of intellectual virtue; analyses of individual intellectual virtues; the application of intellectual virtue to education and other professional fields; the role of intellectual virtues in epistemology; and, finally, the structure of intellectual vice. It also includes some historical sources on intellectual virtue, though its focus is contemporary. Analyses of intellectual virtue (and of individual intellectual virtues) have developed in tandem with the epistemological subfield of virtue epistemology, which employs the notion of intellectual virtue in an account of knowledge. These analyses also frequently draw on virtue ethics, especially in the Aristotelian tradition. Some of the sources cited touch upon connections between intellectual virtue and these fields, though a fuller treatment of these topics can be found in the corresponding bibliographies on Virtue Epistemology and Virtue Ethics.


1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erich H. Loewy

Virtue ethics attempts to identify certain commonly agreed-upon dispositions to act in certain ways, dispositions that would be accepted as ‘good’ by those affected, and to locate the goodness or badness of an act internal to the agent. Basically, virtue ethics is said to date back to Aristotle, but as Alisdair MacIntyre has pointed out, the whole idea of ‘virtue ethics’ would have been unintelligible in Greek philosophy for “a virtue (arete) was an excellence and ethics concerned excellence of character; all ethics was virtue ethics.” Virtue ethics as a method to approach problems in medical ethics is said by some to lend itself to working through cases at the bedside or, at least, is better than the conventional method of handling ethical problems. In this paper I want to explore some of the shortcomings of this approach, examine other traditional approaches, indicate some of their limitations, and suggest a different conceptualization of the approach.


2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 432-446
Author(s):  
Herman Paul

Abstract In response to Anton Froeyman’s paper, “Virtues of Historiography,” this article argues that philosophers of history interested in why historians cherish such virtues as carefulness, impartiality, and intellectual courage would do wise not to classify these virtues unequivocally as either epistemic or moral virtues. Likewise, in trying to grasp the roles that virtues play in the historian’s professional practice, philosophers of history would be best advised to avoid adopting either an epistemological or an ethical perspective. Assuming that the historian’s virtuous behavior has epistemic and moral dimensions (as well as aesthetic, political, and other dimensions), this article advocates a non-reductionist account of historical scholarship, which acknowledges that the virtues cherished by historians usually play a variety of roles, depending on the goals they are supposed to serve. Given that not the least important of these goals are epistemic ones, the articles concludes that virtue ethical approaches, to the extent that they are focused on the acquisition of moral instead of epistemic goods, insufficiently recognize the role of virtue in the pursuit of such epistemic aims as knowledge and understanding.


2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 725-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy L. Fort

Abstract:This paper is a response to a recent colloquy among Professors David Messick, Donna Wold, and Edwin Harman. I defend Messick’s naturalist methodology, which suggests that people inherently categorize others and act altruistically toward certain people in a given person’s in-group. This paper suggests that an anthropological reason for this grouping tendency is a limited human neural ability to process large numbers of relationships. But because human beings also have the ability to modify, to some extent, their nature, corporate law can organize small mediating institutions within large corporations in order to take ethical advantage of this grouping tendency. Within a corporate law taking seriously a mediating institution’s formulation of business communities, a virtue ethics approach can be integrated with a naturalist approach in a way that fosters ethical business behavior while mitigating the dangers of ingrouping tendencies.


Author(s):  
Linda Zagzebski

‘Virtue epistemology’ is the name of a class of theories that focus epistemic evaluation on good epistemic properties of persons rather than on properties of beliefs. The former or some interesting subset of the former are called intellectual virtues. Some of these theories propose that the traditional concepts of justification or knowledge can be analysed in terms of intellectual virtue, whereas others maintain that these traditional concepts are defective or uninteresting and it is desirable to replace them with the notion of an intellectual virtue. In all these theories, epistemic evaluation rests on some virtuous quality of persons that enables them to act in a cognitively effective and commendable way. Simple reliabilism may be treated either as a precursor to virtue epistemology or as an early form of it. Later versions add requirements for virtue intended to capture the idea that it is a quality which makes an epistemic agent subjectively responsible as well as objectively reliable. Proponents of virtue epistemology claim a number of advantages. It is said to bypass disputes between foundationalists and coherentists on proper cognitive structure, to avoid sceptical worries, to avoid the impasse between internalism and externalism and to broaden the range of epistemological enquiry to include such neglected epistemic values as understanding and wisdom. Some theorists argue that the real virtue of virtue epistemology is the way it permits us to redefine the central questions of epistemology. In addition, since virtue epistemology can be blended with virtue ethics, it holds out the promise of a unified theory of value.


Author(s):  
Giorgio Mion ◽  
Renzo Beghini

Purpose This paper aims to present and discuss an interdisciplinary educational approach to business ethics, based on a virtue ethics framework and the common good paradigm. This approach addresses the challenges that businesses face in building legitimacy and creating shared values. Design/methodology/approach The paper presents a case study of an experience of an interdisciplinary postgraduate course, discussing both the design of the program and its first results. Findings The paper focuses on the theoretical and practical reasons for the interdisciplinary nature of business ethics education and contributes to the literature on business ethics education as well as training and educational practices in academic and professional contexts. Practical implications This paper can positively influence business education practices by sharing a replicable educational model and fostering virtuous practices that contribute to renewing the perception of the purpose of firms. Social implications Improving business ethics education can positively affect the social performance of firms contributing to the common good. Originality The paper presents an innovative interdisciplinary educational program that, to the best of our knowledge of the current literature, can be consider an original contribution.


Philosophia ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-406
Author(s):  
J. S. Blumenthal-Barby

2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman

Abstract:Solomon argues that, although recent research in social psychology has important implications for business ethics, it does not undermine an approach that stresses virtue ethics. However, he underestimates the empirical threat to virtue ethics, and his a priori claim that empirical research cannot overturn our ordinary moral psychology is overstated. His appeal to seemingly obvious differences in character traits between people simply illustrates the fundamental attribution error. His suggestion that the Milgram and Darley and Batson experiments have to do with such character traits as obedience and punctuality cannot help to explain the relevant differences in the way people behave in different situations. His appeal to personality theory fails, because, as an intellectual academic discipline, personality theory is in shambles, mainly because it has been concerned with conceptions of personality rather than with what is true about personality. Solomon’s rejection of Doris’s claims about the fragmentation of character is at odds with the received view in social psychology. Finally, he is mistaken to think that rejecting virtue ethics implies rejecting free will and moral responsibility.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kleio Akrivou ◽  
Manuel Joaquín Fernández González

There is a need of deeper understanding of what human beings are for facing adequately global challenges. The aim of this article is to point to the possible contributions that transcendental anthropology would represent for complementing and expanding the valuable, but still incomplete solutions put forward by personalist virtue ethics to face these challenges. In particular, the question of the moral motivation and the complex relations between virtue and freedom are addressed, taking as a starting point the understanding of the uniqueness of the personal act-of-being and the transcendentality of human freedom, which is in dialogue with human nature and society, but ultimately not subdued to none of them. Some implications of the transcendental anthropology in the field of interpersonal communication ethics are put forward.


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