Political Clientelism

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan C. Stokes
Keyword(s):  
Vote Buying ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Material Goods ◽  
Swing Voters ◽  
Political Clientelism

This article studies political clientelism. In the first section, the term clientelism can be defined as giving material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you/will you support me? This section includes definitions of vote buying and patronage. The two waves of studies of clientelism and the link between clientelism and commitment are discussed in the subsequent sections. In the latter half of the article, the discussion tries to determine if clients are swing voters or core supporters, and looks at the causes and consequences of clientelism.

Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage

2021 ◽  
pp. 095162982110615
Author(s):  
Vladimir Shchukin ◽  
Cemal Eren Arbatli
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Public Investment ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Machines ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Patronage Politics ◽  
Equilibrium Amount ◽  
State Investment

Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote-buying are clientelistic practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, before the election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment that can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects the income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show that when the politician can use both clientelistic instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost for clientelism in terms of foregone future taxes declines. As a result, the equilibrium amount of public investment is typically lower when both tools are available than otherwise.

Political Clientelism in Mexico: Bridging the Gap between Citizens and the State

2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Turid Hagene
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Mexico City ◽  
The State ◽  
The Political ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Public Employment ◽  
Conceptual Clarity ◽  
Political Clientelism

AbstractThis article explores practices of political clientelism in a native village in Mexico City during recent elections (2006, 2012), aiming to create more conceptual clarity and to demonstrate the usefulness of ethnographic approaches. Seen from the clients' and the brokers' perspective, political clientelism and vote buying are two different practices, carried out in different ways, with different degrees of legitimacy. The problem-solving network studied here bridges the gap between the citizen and the state, while the political operators hope to be rewarded with public employment. In this case, one candidate-patron changed parties a few months before the 2012 elections, and the electoral statistics provide indications of the numerical effectiveness of his clientelist network. Multiparty competition, instead of undermining clientelist practices, appears to “democratize” them.

scholarly journals Testing Models of Distributive Politics using Exit Polls to Measure Voters’ Preferences and Partisanship

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 845-875 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentino Larcinese ◽  
James M. Snyder ◽  
Cecilia Testa
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Federal Spending ◽  
Us States ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Strategic Manipulation ◽  
Swing Voters

This article tests several hypotheses about distributive politics by studying the distribution of federal spending across US states over the period 1978–2002. It improves on previous work by using survey data to measure the share of voters in each state that are Democrats, Republicans and Independents, or liberals, conservatives and moderates. No evidence is found that the allocation of federal spending to the states is distorted by strategic manipulation to win electoral support. States with many swing voters are not advantaged compared to states with more loyal voters, and ‘battleground states’ are not advantaged compared to other states. Spending appears to have little or no effect on voters’ choices, while partisanship and ideology have large effects.

scholarly journals Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenju Kamei
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Interdependent Preferences ◽  
Strategic Behaviors ◽  
Swing Voters

Abstract Clientelism is frequently observed in our societies. Various mechanisms that help sustain incomplete political contracts (e.g., monitoring and punishment) have been studied in the literature to date. However, do such contracts emerge in elections with secret ballots when the interactions are one-shot? How does repetition affect the evolution of incomplete political contracts? Using an incentivized experiment, this article finds that even during one-shot interactions where monitoring is not possible, candidates form incomplete contracts through vote buying and promise-making. The candidates’ clientelistic behaviors are heterogeneous: some target swing voters, whereas others offer the most to loyal voters, or even opposition voters. These tactics distort voting behaviors as well as election outcomes. Repeated interactions significantly magnify candidates’ offers and deepen clientelistic relationships. These results underscore the possibility that clientelism evolves due to people’s strategic behaviors and interdependent preferences, without relying on alternative mechanisms (JEL C92, D72).

Electoral Handouts as Information

2016 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 454-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Kramon
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Data ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
The Future ◽  
Material Benefits ◽  
Machine Politics

Why is vote buying effective even where ballot secrecy is protected? Most answers emerge from models of machine politics, in which a machine holds recipients of handouts accountable for their subsequent political behavior. Yet vote buying is common in many contexts where political party machines are not present, or where parties exert little effort in monitoring voters. This article addresses this puzzle. The author argues that politicians often distribute electoral handouts to convey information to voters. This vote buying conveys information with respect to the future provision of resources to the poor. The author tests the argument with original qualitative and experimental data collected in Kenya. A voter's information about a candidate's vote buying leads to substantial increases in electoral support, an effect driven by expectations about the provision of clientelist benefits beyond the electoral period. The results, showing that the distribution of material benefits can be electorally effective for persuasive reasons, thereby explain how vote buying can be effective in the absence of machine politics.

Electoral Clientelism and Vote Buying

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anand Murugesan
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
The Political ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Political Commitment ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Empirical Methods ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Commitment Problem

Political competition between parties to win electoral support is a distinguishing feature of democratic forms of government. Parties seek to attract electoral support with programmatic promises (public goods, services) for the benefit of all citizens as well as targeted redistribution in several countries, broadly termed as “clientelistic linkages.” Cash, gifts and nonmaterial goods such as jobs, exclusive access to public services are forms of clientelistic goods discussed in the literature. Studies on clientelism have spiked since the last quarter of the 20th century in several disciplines including political science and economics. The studies have clarified the definitions and distinguished between the various forms of clientelism while shedding light on how parties decide to adopt the clientelistic approach, the form of benefits offered, whether groups or individuals are targeted for clientelistic benefits, the mechanisms that solve the political commitment problem inherent in clientelistic relationships, and the correlates and consequences of clientelism. The section on theory outlines a spatial model that predicts when political parties will target swing or core supporters for redistributive benefits. The advances in empirical methods for studying clientelism and vote buying, including experimental methods have provided evidence that politicians target swing or core supporters and at times adopt mixed strategies favoring both groups. The burgeoning empirical literature has clarified the effectiveness of vote-buying as well as anti-vote buying campaigns. A direct relationship between poverty and vote buying is now contested and it is evident that further research, particularly those tying up theory with empirical findings is required to understand clientelism and vote buying.

scholarly journals Vote Buying in the 2018 Governorship Election in Ekiti State, Nigeria

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cletus Famous Nwankwo
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
The Law ◽  
Buying In

AbstractThis paper aims to comment on the manifestation of vote buying regarding voter turnout and voter choices in the 2018 Ekiti governorship election in Nigeria and its implications. The article notes that vote-buying might not have significantly influenced voter turnout, but it changed voters’ choices as the two major political parties in the election resorted to a massive monetary inducement for electoral support at the poll. Even though the election was decided by secret balloting, the advent of “see and buy” shows that politicians are stepping up their games to manipulate elections. The paper thus argues for institutional electoral reform and strengthening the enforcement of the law.

scholarly journals Pathways of Electoral Clientelism in University Student Elections in Ghana: An Exploratory Study

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-171
Author(s):  
Kwaku Abrefa Busia ◽  
Alice Amegah ◽  
Francis Arthur-Holmes
Keyword(s):  
Student Leadership ◽  
Student Leaders ◽  
University Student ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Kwame Nkrumah ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Food And Beverage ◽  
Group Interviews ◽  
The University

Recent studies on student politics and governance have shown that electoral clientelism (EC) in university student elections is often facilitated by clientelist relations between student leaders and political parties. However, there is a dearth of empirical research investigating the various forms of electoral clientelism, as manifested through vote-buying practices in campus electoral politics in African universities. This article, therefore, investigates the multifaceted and changing dynamics of vote-buying in student electoral processes in Ghanaian universities. The study adopted a qualitative approach based on semi-structured interviews with 15 student leaders, 4 university staff working with student leadership, and 4 focus group interviews involving students at the University of Ghana and Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology. From our finding, we argue that electoral clientelism takes place in five crucial ways in university student elections in Ghana. These include the provision of direct cash payments, exchanging electoral support for student government positions and appointments, provision of food and beverage consumables, award of student-related business contracts, and provision of educational materials and souvenirs.

Vote Buying

2019 ◽  
pp. 173-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabela Mares ◽  
Lauren E. Young
Keyword(s):  
Personal Attributes ◽  
Policy Position ◽  
The Political ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
European Elections ◽  
East European ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Electoral Support

Vote buying, the offer of particularistic rewards to voters in exchange for electoral support at the ballot box, is the form of clientelism that has been analyzed most extensively in previous studies. Chapter 7 documents the presence of this clientelistic strategy in East European elections. It documents important differences between vote buying and clientelistic strategies that politicize state resources relating to the types of brokers used in these exchanges, the goods offered to voters, and the identity of the voters targeted by these strategies. It is shown that the use of this strategy creates opportunities for candidates to send voters signals about their personal attributes and policy position, which lower the political audience costs incurred by candidates who use this strategy.

Factors and Resources: Identity, Difference, or Opposition?

2010 ◽  
pp. 135-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Grebnev
Keyword(s):  
Energy Resources ◽  
Material Goods ◽  
Information Energy

The article tries to distinguish theoretical notions of factors and resources in economics and to consider paired connections between factors (labor, capital, and land) and resources (information, energy, matter). The author traces the logic of transition from scarcity of direct reproducible material goods via limitations of non-reproducible indirect goods (energy resources) to limiting of individuals creative opportunities as a factor of survival of humanity.

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