Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage

2021 ◽  
pp. 095162982110615
Author(s):  
Vladimir Shchukin ◽  
Cemal Eren Arbatli

Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote-buying are clientelistic practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, before the election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment that can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects the income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show that when the politician can use both clientelistic instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost for clientelism in terms of foregone future taxes declines. As a result, the equilibrium amount of public investment is typically lower when both tools are available than otherwise.

Author(s):  
Radek Jurčík

Public cooperation is aimed at ensuring the functioning of public administration. Some forms of cooperation are subject to a regulatory regime for European procurement directives, some forms of cooperation within the public and private sector is not subject to this regime. In this article we analyze the types of cooperation with regard to their character. The aim will be to identify the types of cooperation, their frequency, the need to use the legal regime of public investment, and other distinctive features affecting the modes of cooperation within the public administration and the implementation of public policies.


1991 ◽  
Vol 30 (4II) ◽  
pp. 721-729
Author(s):  
Khwaja Sarmad

In developing countries the rapid growth of the public sector during the past few decades was viewed as an important means for accelerating the pace of economic growth. In most developing countries the public sector now accounts for a prominent share of total production and investment. But the contribution of the public sector to growth has been much below expectations. In many cases public enterprises require large subsidies from the government and impose a significant fiscal burden on the economy, which leads to the notion that the private sector is much more productive than the public sector. However, little empirical work has been done in this field so that the proposals that emphasize the private sector vis-a-vis the public sector rest largely on theoretical considerations. Recent work by Khan and Reinhart (1990) is an important exception. Using cross-section data for the seventies of 24 developing countries they show that the arguments favouring the private sector in adjustment programmes have empirical support. Khan and Reinhart estimate a growth model in which the effect of private and public investment on growth is separated. A comparison of the marginal productivities of the two types of investment allows them to conclude that "all in all, there does seem to be some merit in the key role assigned to private investment in the development process by supporters of market -based strategies". [Khan and Reinhart (1990), p. 25.]


Author(s):  
Anand Murugesan

Political competition between parties to win electoral support is a distinguishing feature of democratic forms of government. Parties seek to attract electoral support with programmatic promises (public goods, services) for the benefit of all citizens as well as targeted redistribution in several countries, broadly termed as “clientelistic linkages.” Cash, gifts and nonmaterial goods such as jobs, exclusive access to public services are forms of clientelistic goods discussed in the literature. Studies on clientelism have spiked since the last quarter of the 20th century in several disciplines including political science and economics. The studies have clarified the definitions and distinguished between the various forms of clientelism while shedding light on how parties decide to adopt the clientelistic approach, the form of benefits offered, whether groups or individuals are targeted for clientelistic benefits, the mechanisms that solve the political commitment problem inherent in clientelistic relationships, and the correlates and consequences of clientelism. The section on theory outlines a spatial model that predicts when political parties will target swing or core supporters for redistributive benefits. The advances in empirical methods for studying clientelism and vote buying, including experimental methods have provided evidence that politicians target swing or core supporters and at times adopt mixed strategies favoring both groups. The burgeoning empirical literature has clarified the effectiveness of vote-buying as well as anti-vote buying campaigns. A direct relationship between poverty and vote buying is now contested and it is evident that further research, particularly those tying up theory with empirical findings is required to understand clientelism and vote buying.


2020 ◽  
pp. 5-16
Author(s):  
L.N. Babkina ◽  
О.V. Skotarenko

The article analyzes the construction of a hierarchy of twelve groups of goals implemented in regional systems of state investment management and, focused on the implementation of the strategic goal — to increase the level of investment attractiveness of regions. The results of the analysis showed that: in nine groups of goals out of the twelve studied, methodological approaches were applied and the required rules for building a hierarchy of goals were observed; fragments of the target orientation model of the public investment management system in the region can be considered only two groups of goals, which contain three levels of hierarchy-goals-programs, goals-plans and current specific activities; in all groups of goals, there are no criteria for achieving goals-programs and goals-plans, and the results of current specific activities; there are three groups of regions, in the first of which management systems are focused on achieving three goals-programs, in the second group they implement two goals-programs, and in the third group they implement one goal-program. A more detailed analysis of successfully implemented goals-plans in some environments, such as industrial and educational, in some regions will allow you to extend this experience to other territories.


2019 ◽  
pp. 109-123
Author(s):  
I. E. Limonov ◽  
M. V. Nesena

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of public investment programs on the socio-economic development of territories. As a case, the federal target programs for the development of regions and investment programs of the financial development institution — Vnesheconombank, designed to solve the problems of regional development are considered. The impact of the public interventions were evaluated by the “difference in differences” method using Bayesian modeling. The results of the evaluation suggest the positive impact of federal target programs on the total factor productivity of regions and on innovation; and that regional investment programs of Vnesheconombank are improving the export activity. All of the investments considered are likely to have contributed to the reduction of unemployment, but their implementation has been accompanied by an increase in social inequality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (7) ◽  
pp. 1522-1533
Author(s):  
A.V. Larionov

Subject. This article deals with the issue of improving the public investment allocative efficiency. Objectives. The article aims to develop an approach to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public investment in the economy. Methods. The study is based on a panel data regression with random effects. Conclusions and Relevance. All sectors of the economy have different demand for investment resources attracted, determined by operational and technological aspects. The results of the study can be used to develop an effective system of public investment.


Author(s):  
Yuskar Yuskar

Good governance is a ware to create an efficient, effective and accountable government by keeping a balanced interaction well between government, private sector and society role. The implementation of a good governance is aimed to recover the public trust for the government that has been lost for the last several years because of financial, economic and trust crisis further multidimensional crisis. The Misunderstanding concept and unconcerned manner of government in implementing a good governance lately have caused unstability, deviation and injustice for Indonesia society. This paper is a literature study explaining a concept, principles and characteristics of a good governance. Furthermore, it explains the definition, development and utility of an efficient, effective and accountable government in creating a good governance mechanism having a strong impact to the democratic economy and social welfare. It also analyzes the importance of government concern for improving democratic economy suitable with human and natural resources and the culture values of Indonesia.


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