A Theory of Collateral for the Lender of Last Resort*

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dong Beom Choi ◽  
João A C Santos ◽  
Tanju Yorulmazer

Abstract We consider a macroprudential approach to analyze the optimal lending policy for the central bank, focusing on spillover effects that policy exerts on money markets. Lending against high-quality collateral protects central banks against losses, but can adversely affect liquidity creation in markets since high-quality collateral gets locked up with the central bank rather than circulating in markets. Lending against low-quality collateral creates counterparty risk but can improve liquidity in markets. We illustrate the optimal policy incorporating these trade-offs. Contrary to what is generally accepted, lending against high-quality collateral can have negative effects, whereas it may be optimal to lend against low-quality collateral.

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
Paulo Rupino Cunha ◽  
Paulo Melo ◽  
Helder Sebastião

We analyze the path from cryptocurrencies to official Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), to shed some light on the ultimate dematerialization of money. To that end, we made an extensive search that resulted in a review of more than 100 academic and grey literature references, including official positions from central banks. We present and discuss the characteristics of the different CBDC variants being considered—namely, wholesale, retail, and, for the latter, the account-based, and token-based—as well as ongoing pilots, scenarios of interoperability, and open issues. Our contribution enables decision-makers and society at large to understand the potential advantages and risks of introducing CBDCs, and how these vary according to many technical and economic design choices. The practical implication is that a debate becomes possible about the trade-offs that the stakeholders are willing to accept.


Author(s):  
Елена Федулова ◽  
Elena Fedulova ◽  
Светлана Кононова ◽  
Svetlana Kononova ◽  
Александр Матросов ◽  
...  

Subject. The article is devoted to the implementation of investment activities of central banks. Goal and objectives. The article reveals the content and gives a comparative analysis of the investment activity of central banks in the different countries of the world. It defines the role of the central bank and its status in the country's financial and economic policy. Methodology. The methodological basis of the research is the general scientific method of cognition, as well as comparative, systemic and logical-structural analysis. Results. The analysis allowed the authors to structure the investment activity of central banks and to explain its individual components. The article gives a detailed analysis of motives for conducting currency intervention, instruments of investing in the foreign exchange market, as well as the role of the central bank as a lender of last resort and the crisis state of the economy as an impetus to the development of refinancing of credit institutions. It reviews various methods of refinancing and the effectiveness of their application in various economic conditions. Conclusions and significance. The research has allowed the authors to identify new tendencies, features and some contradictions of investment activity of central banks in the national economy.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil ◽  
Alessio Fotia

AbstractIn this chapter we review the function of the central bank as lender of last resort (LOLR), starting from the understanding of financial crises developed in the previous chapter. We recall long-established LOLR principles: proactive lending, inertia of the central bank risk control framework, and risk endogeneity. Because of its systemic role, a central bank should not tighten its collateral framework in a crisis, as restrictive policies are likely to not only increase the overall damage done by a crisis to society, but to even increase central bank losses. We explain in more detail the main reasons why a central bank should act as LOLR: prevent negative externalities from fire sales; its unique status as institution with unlimited liquidity; its status as a risk-free counterparty making others accept to deliver collateral to it even at high haircuts; and its mandate to preserve price stability. We distinguish three different forms of LOLR: elements built into the regular operational framework; readiness to relax parameters in a crisis; and provision of emergency liquidity assistance to individual firms. We then discuss what could be the optimal propensity of a central bank to engage in LOLR activities and outline possible trade-offs. Last but not least, we develop a bank-run model which highlights the role of asset liquidity and central bank eligible collateral. We calculate through a model variant with binary asset liquidity and uniform central bank collateral haircut, but then also introduce a model variant with continuous asset liquidity and haircuts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 591-595
Author(s):  
PETER DIETSCH

Delegation to independent agencies can reap real benefits for policy-making. In the case of monetary policy, it shores up the credibility of the central bank. However, the discretion of IAs needs to be constrained to ensure their legitimacy. This letter focuses on one potential constraint, namely, the idea that IAs should not make choices on distributional trade-offs. Given that monetary policy today has significant distributive consequences, if this constraint were respected, the independence of central banks would have to be repealed. This would be just as undesirable as a monetary policy whose distributive consequences remain unchecked. Instead, this letter encourages the search for alternative solutions and puts forward three possible institutional arrangements to manage the tension between the distributive consequences of monetary policy on the one hand and central bank legitimacy on the other.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 340-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Maria Lastra

The name “lender of last resort” owes its origins to Sir Francis Barings, who in 1797 referred to the Bank of England as the “dernier resort” from which all banks could obtain liquidity in times of crisis.1 The lender of last resort (“LOLR”) role of the central bank remains a major rationale for most central banks around the world, in both developed and developing countries.2 While other central bank functions have recently come under fire (e.g. banking supervision), the importance of having the LOLR under the umbrella of the central bank is seldom contested.3 It is the immediacy of the availability of central bank credit (the central bank being the ultimate supplier of high-powered money) that makes the LOLR particularly suitable to confront emergency situations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-38
Author(s):  
Bryane Michael ◽  
Svitlana Osaulenko

Abstract What role could unconventional monetary policy – and particularly unconventional policies like private asset purchases under a quantitative easing or lender of last resort scheme – play in influencing economic growth directly? A wide literature in economics explores the pros and cons of using these policies. However, most studies also point to the uncertain and antagonistic legal basis for such purchases. In this paper, we show how the statutory mandate for nominal GDP targeting could best put in place the legal foundations for such asset purchases. We review the legislative and regulatory bases for private securities purchases made by central banks in a sample of countries. We discuss – if legislators and policymakers wanted to – how they might introduce clearer mandates to make such purchases into their public law. We finally show how legal authorizations for GDP targeting might (and probably should) provide for such authorisations. Our discussion sheds light on the fascinating and almost completely ignored area of public law, namely central bank law.


Author(s):  
Zekayi Kaya ◽  
Erkan Tokucu

During the historical process, application of the monetary policies and the roles of the central banks have changed within the framework of the developments in the world economy, problems encountered and the economic policies as a solution to these problems. The financial crises after 1990 and the recent financial crisis as the biggest experienced one after 1930s, caused an increase in the importance of the task of providing financial stability besides price stability and in this context in the function of “lender of last resort” of the central bank. The crisis required using new policy instruments in addition to interest rate instrument which was not sufficient enough in providing financial stability and the roles of the central banks in providing financial stability changed. In this study, applications of monetary policies and the changing role of the central banks will be examined. Within this framework, traditional and non-traditional instruments will be explained and the problems that can be confronted by a central bank when providing price stability besides financial stability will be remarked.


2010 ◽  
pp. 70-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Andryushin ◽  
V. Kuznetsova

The article considers the problem of realization of central banks function of the lender of last resort in the situation of liquidity deficit. It shows that the classic definition of the last resort credits principles is not adequate to the tasks which central banks have to solve during liquidity crisis.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 628-668
Author(s):  
Sara Elisa Dietz

The latest financial crises in Europe and the United States have reminded us of the importance of the role of central banks as Lender of Last Resort. This article examines the current legal framework in the European Union with regard to the allocation of Lender of Last Resort competence, which until now has been exercised by the national central banks in the Eurozone. The new Emergency Liquidity Assistance Agreement 2017 sustains this institutional design, leaves the Emergency Liquidity Assistance competence with the national central banks and specifies the cooperation between the European Central Bank and the national central banks with regard to the veto-option of the European Central Bank to national Emergency Liquidity Assistance operations. Against this background, the paper discusses whether the current legal competence structure of the European and Monetary Union would also allow for more authority of the European Central Bank with regard to Emergency Liquidity Assistance powers. The paper concludes there is a sufficient legal basis in the monetary policy and financial stability mandate of the European Central Bank to allow it to grant Emergency Liquidity Assistance at least with regard to ‘significant’ banks, as defined under the current European Banking Supervision regime.


2019 ◽  
pp. 136-154
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

The recent central banking literature often argues that the LOLR function would be the key feature defining a ‘modern’ central bank. This chapter argues that this view may appear too radical (despite the enormous benefits of the LOLR) as the appearance of the LOLR does not change the nature of central banking (which is primarily associated with the issuance of central bank money). After providing an overview of the roles of central banks for financial stability, the chapter focuses on one early LOLR episode, namely the measures of the Hamburger Bank, Bank of Amsterdam and Bank of England in the European debt crisis of 1763. It is shown that in particular the Hamburger Bank acted as systemic lender of last resort, comparable to what modern central banks did in 2008.


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