Comparing the institutional constructive trust with the remedial constructive trust

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (9) ◽  
pp. 919-938
Author(s):  
David K L Raphael
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
High Court Of Australia

Abstract The concept of the Institutional Constructive Trust was first recognised in Australia in 1907 by the most senior court, i.e. the High Court of Australia, in Black v S Friedman & Co. This arose in a decision involving stolen funds. Its importance was addressed in the State of Victoria in Nolan v Nolan where what was in issue involved the Limitations Act of the State of Victoria. It must be appreciated that in the Commonwealth of Australia, State Acts can, and sometimes do, differ. In 1985, in Muschinski v Dodds, Deane J of the Australian High Court placed different emphasis on the court’s ability to recognise and construe such a trust and gave it the imprimatur of “Remedial Constructive Trust”. The latter, whilst adopted in New Zealand and Canada, has had what might fairly be described as its critics in the UK and, indeed the UK Supreme Court in FHR European Venture LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC has stated at [47] that the remedial constructive trust is not part of the law of the UK.

scholarly journals Who are we Trying to Protect? The Role of Vulnerability Analysis in New Zealand's Law of Negligence

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Scott William Hugh Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
City Council ◽  
High Court ◽  
North Shore ◽  
The Law ◽  
High Court Of Australia ◽  
Negligence Law ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Consistent Application

New Zealand has incorporated ideas of vulnerability within its law of negligence for some years. It has not, however, clarified what is meant by vulnerability or the role the concept plays within the broader duty of care framework. Several obiter comments in Body Corporate No 207624 v North Shore City Council (Spencer on Byron) suggest the concept ought not to be part of the law due to its uncertain and confusing nature. Subsequent cases have, however, continued to use the concept, and continue to use it despite both its historically ill-defined nature and the additional uncertainty added by Spencer on Byron. This article argues that vulnerability can and ought to be a part of New Zealand negligence law. With a consistent application of a single test for vulnerability – that established in the High Court of Australia in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd – vulnerability can be conceptually certain and provide useful insight into the issues posed by the law of negligence.

scholarly journals ACCESSORY LIABILITY: PERSISTING IN ERROR

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (01) ◽  
pp. 7-11
Author(s):  
Beatrice Krebs
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
South Australia ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Criminal Enterprise ◽  
High Court ◽  
Joint Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Bodily Injury ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
High Court Of Australia

IN Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, the High Court of Australia (HCA) declined to follow the Privy Council and UK Supreme Court (UKSC) in abolishing the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise, as PAL is known in South Australia. Under the Australian doctrine, liability for murder is imposed where an individual “is a party to an agreement to commit a crime and foresees that death or really serious bodily injury might be occasioned by a co-venturer acting with murderous intention and he or she, with that awareness, continues to participate in the agreed criminal enterprise” (at [1]). This reflects the very position that was abandoned in Jogee [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681 Ruddock v The Queen UKPC 7 as a “wrong turn” of the English common law.

Commitment and Cooperation on High Courts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Alarie ◽  
Andrew J. Green
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
High Courts ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Indian Supreme Court ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
High Court Of Australia

This chapter sets out and justifies the building blocks of commitment and cooperation. These two dimensions allow the authors to situate high courts relative to each other. They use them to focus on the five main high courts in their study, namely, the US Supreme Court, the UK Supreme Court (and its predecessor House of Lords), the Supreme Court of Canada, the High Court of Australia, and the Indian Supreme Court. This chapter provides both a preliminary assessment of how these courts sit relative to each other along these two dimensions and a brief overview of the key design choices made by each of these courts.

Cross-fertilisation of Constitutional Ideas

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Butler
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk

This chapter discusses the New Zealand courts' jurisprudence in regard to the interpretative provisions — sections 4, 5, and 6 — of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. It not only gives an overview of the relevant New Zealand case law but also compares the courts' approaches to those of their UK counterparts, in particular the UK Supreme Court (formerly, the House of Lords) in regard to section 3 of the UK Human Rights Act 1998. It is argued that the perceived difference in the approaches can be explained by different contexts rather than different methodology. The chapter thereby questions the view held in New Zealand that the UK courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are more activist than the New Zealand courts.

Australia—Victoria

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Ruck Keene ◽  
Mary Sealy
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
State Level ◽  
The State ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
High Court Of Australia ◽  
Adult Protection ◽  
Administrative Tribunal

Australia is a common law country. Australia is a federation of five states and two territories. Laws affecting adults in need of protection are generally made at state level. In Victoria, adult protection matters are decided by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘VCAT’) in its Guardianship List. VCAT is the lowest court body—with Magistrates, County, and Supreme Court the hierarchy within the state. The High Court of Australia is the highest appellate court.

scholarly journals Are essay mills committing fraud? A further analysis of their behaviours vs the 2006 fraud act (UK)

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Draper ◽  
Callum Reid-Hutchings
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Lead Author ◽  
Contract Cheating ◽  
The Law ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
Recent Action ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Advertising Standards

AbstractMany strategies have been proposed to address the supply of bespoke essays and other assignments by companies often described as ‘Essay Mills’ with the act of supply and use being invariably described as ‘contract cheating’. These proposals increasingly refer to the law as a solution in common with other action. In this article, the lead author revisits work undertaken in 2016 as a result of recent legal and extra-legal developments to assess whether the UK Fraud Act (2006) might now be used to tackle some of the activities of the companies involved, by comparing their common practises, and their Terms and Conditions, with the Act. It was previously found that all sites have disclaimers regarding the use of their products but there were some obvious contradictions in the activities of the sites which undermined those disclaimers, for example plagiarism-free guarantees for the work. In this article, we ask and consider the question whether this is still the case having regard to the impact of a change in the law by the UK supreme court and recent action of the UK Advertising Standards Authority. We also consider whether a call for a new offence to be created which specifically targets the undesirable behaviours of these companies is still justified.

FROM OPPORTUNITY TO OCCASION: VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (01) ◽  
pp. 14-18
Author(s):  
Desmond Ryan
Keyword(s):  
New South ◽  
Close Connection ◽  
High Court ◽  
Vicarious Liability ◽  
South Wales ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
High Court Of Australia

IN Prince Alfred College Incorporated v ADC [2016] HCA 37, the High Court of Australia (HCA) has once again considered the appropriate test for establishing vicarious liability of employers for the wrongful acts of their employees. The decision will be of interest to tort lawyers in the common-law world for at least four reasons. First, the Court looked afresh at the test for vicarious liability in the context of intentional wrongdoing and has accordingly clarified the confusion arising from its earlier decision in New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4; (2003) 212 C.L.R. 511. Secondly, the Court expressed very strong disagreement with the decision of the UK Supreme Court handed down just months earlier in Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11; [2016] A.C. 677. The Court apparently regarded Mohamud as having in effect abandoned the Lister qualification that mere opportunity was not enough to satisfy the close connection test (Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd. [2001] UKHL 22; [2002] 1 A.C. 215). Thirdly, the Court appears to have interpreted the relevant English authorities as espousing a Caparo-like criterion of fairness and justice as a separate stage of the close connection test (Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605). That interpretation is questionable. Finally, the Court has articulated a new test in Australian law for vicarious liability reasoning based on whether the employment provided the “occasion” for the wrongdoing to be committed. This prompts a reflection on the difference between “occasion” and “opportunity”, and how this new test is to be applied in practice.

Unifying and defining ‘dishonesty’ in the law of trusts

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 429-444
Author(s):  
Zixin Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legal Contexts ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk

Abstract In this article, I argue that ‘dishonesty’ should be unified and defined in the law of trusts. I argue: (1) the UK Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos was correct to reject the Ghosh test for dishonesty and to endorse the Royal Brunei test for all legal contexts; (2) the present law on trustee exemption clauses is inconsistent with Ivey, and Walker v Stones must accordingly be overruled; (3) the subjective factors relevant to dishonesty are reducible to a person’s intentions and beliefs; and (4) ‘dishonest’ assistance of a breach of trust should be defined more precisely in terms of what knowledge is required to hold a defendant liable.

scholarly journals Freedom of speech issues in Peach v Toohey and a hypothetical variant of that case

2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-152
Author(s):  
Patrick Keyzer
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Right To Know ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
High Court Of Australia

The purpose of this article is to consider the tensions within Australian free speech jurisprudence based on a hypothetical variant of the facts of the decision of the Supreme Court of the Northen Territory in Peach v Toohey. In particular, this article briefly explores the competing legal interests  that operate when journalists seek access to restricted areas, in this case aborginal land, in the course of an investigation. After considering the case and the issues it raises the author develops a hypothetical that draws out some of the deeper tensions in this area of the law. The article concludes with proposals for new apporoaches to the test developed by the High Court of Australia in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation for the balancing of freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs—including the public right to know — against other legitimate objectives such as the maintence of property rights and the privacy interests that can be associated with propety rights. 

A Note on Mandela v Executors, Estate Nelson Mandela 2018 (4) SA 86 (SCA) and the Conundrum around the Customary Marriage between Nelson and Winnie Mandela

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Eastern Cape ◽  
High Court ◽  
Nelson Mandela ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.

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