A single ‘weight-lifting’ game covers all kinds of games

Game theory has been studied extensively to answer why cooperation is promoted in human and animal societies. All games are classified into five games: the Prisoner's Dilemma, chicken game (including hawk–dove game), stag hunt game and two trivial games of either all cooperation or all defect, which are studied separately. Here, we propose a new game that covers all five game categories: the weight-lifting game. The player choose either to (1) carry a weight (cooperate: pay a cost) or (2) pretend to carry it (defect: pay no cost). The probability of success in carrying the weight depends on the number of cooperators, and the players either gain the success reward or pay the failure penalty. All five game categories appear in this game depending on the success probabilities for the number of cooperators. We prove that this game is exactly equivalent to the combination of all five games in terms of a pay-off matrix. This game thus provides a unified framework for studying all five types of games.

Download Full-text

Detecting Defectors When They Have Incentives to Manipulate Their Impressions

Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science ◽

10.5178/lebs.2010.5 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 1 (1) ◽

pp. 19-22 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Toko Kiyonari

Keyword(s):

Prisoner's Dilemma ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽

Hard Core ◽

Coordination Game ◽

The Other ◽

Monetary Incentives ◽

Not Given ◽

Stag Hunt ◽

Stag Hunt Game ◽

Monetary Gain

We examined if naive observers can distinguish defectors from cooperators even when defectors may be motivated to present themselves positively. In Study 1, 150 participants played a “semi-sequential” Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) with real monetary incentives, half as first players and half as second players. First players decided to cooperate or defect, and second players made the same decision without knowing the first player’s choice. The first player was given a chance to present a video message to the second player before the latter made their decision. After the PDG, players played a separate one-shot, semi-sequential Stag Hunt Game (SHG), a coordination game where cooperation is the best choice insofar as the other also cooperates. In this game, the first player was not given a chance to send a video message. When the players had incentives to hide intentions or manipulate impressions of themselves, even motivated judges (whose monetary gain depended on the accuracy of cheater/cooperator detection) could not distinguish defectors from cooperators in either the PDG or SHG. However, they were able to discriminate “hard-core defectors” who defected in both games. In Study 2, however, in which judges had no monetary incentives to detect targets’ choices, participants were unable to discern even hard-core defectors. The contents of the messages did not provide help discerning defectors.

Download Full-text

Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks

Games ◽

10.3390/g12030060 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (3) ◽

pp. 60

Author(s):

Dario Madeo ◽

Chiara Mocenni

Keyword(s):

Prisoner's Dilemma ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽

Stag Hunt ◽

Balanced Development ◽

Cooperative Strategies ◽

Partial Cooperation ◽

Stag Hunt Game ◽

Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, characterized by two concurrent natural mechanisms: the temptation to defect and the fear to be betrayed by others. Few results are available for analyzing situations where only the temptation to defect (Chicken game) or the fear to be betrayed (Stag-Hunt game) is present. In this paper, we analyze the emergence of full and partial cooperation for these classes of games. We find the conditions for which these Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and we show that the partial one is also globally stable. Furthermore, in the Chicken and Stag-Hunt games, partial cooperation has been found to be more rewarding than the full one of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This result highlights the importance of such games for understanding and sustaining different levels of cooperation in social networks.

Download Full-text

Applying principles from the game theory to acute stroke care: Learning from the prisoner’s dilemma, stag-hunt, and other strategies

International Journal of Stroke ◽

10.1177/1747493016631725 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 11 (3) ◽

pp. 274-286 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Gustavo Saposnik ◽

S Claiborne Johnston

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Acute Stroke ◽

Prisoner's Dilemma ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽

Stroke Care ◽

Acute Stroke Care ◽

Stag Hunt ◽

The Game Theory

Download Full-text

The Superiority of Quantum Strategy in 3-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma

Mathematics ◽

10.3390/math9121443 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 9 (12) ◽

pp. 1443

Author(s):

Zhiyuan Dong ◽

Ai-Guo Wu

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Prisoner's Dilemma ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽

Quantum Game ◽

Final State ◽

The Game Theory ◽

Initial States ◽

Quantum Strategy ◽

Selection Of

In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.

Download Full-text

The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Cooperation in the Rat

Psychological Reports ◽

10.2466/pr0.1984.55.3.687 ◽

1984 ◽

Vol 55 (3) ◽

pp. 687-696 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

Rick M. Gardner ◽

Terry L. Corbin ◽

Janelle S. Beltramo ◽

Gary S. Nickell

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Visual Communication ◽

Prisoner's Dilemma ◽

Human Subjects ◽

Cooperative Behavior ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽

The Other ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽

Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽

Cooperative Behaviors

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.

Download Full-text

Cooperative n-person Prisoner's Dilemma on a Network

Contributions to Game Theory and Management ◽

10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.11 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 14 ◽

pp. 122-126

Author(s):

Aleksandra L. Grinikh ◽

◽

Leon A. Petrosyan ◽

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Cooperative Game ◽

Prisoner's Dilemma ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽

Pairwise Interaction ◽

Network Interaction ◽

The Game Theory

In the paper n-person prisoner's dilemma on the network is investigated. A cooperative game with the pairwise interaction of players is constructed. The model is a modification of the classic 2-person prisoner's dilemma problem in the game theory. Network interaction provide an ability to take into account the in uence only to the adjacent players from the whole set of players. The feature of the game is found that allows to make a decision about necessity of playing dominated strategy by a few players. This solution is based on the number of the adjacent players. The work is a continuation of the paper published earlier by Grinikh A.L. and Petrosyan L.A. in 2021.

Download Full-text

Designing Practices, Institutions, and Processes

Re-Reasoning Ethics ◽

10.7551/mitpress/9780262037693.003.0008 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 193-220

Author(s):

Barry Hoffmaster ◽

Cliff Hooker

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Prisoner's Dilemma ◽

Institutional Design ◽

Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽

The Third ◽

Ethical Design ◽

Design Solutions

Ethics is embedded in the practices and institutions of society. Three examples illustrate the communal importance of ethical design. First is the distinction between Fights, Games, and Debates as successively more ethical and more intelligent institutional designs for handling conflict. The second is the Prisoner’s Dilemma in game theory, whose best solution is to step outside the game and change the surrounding institutional design. The third is an account of the ethical and effective institutional design solutions for various situations, especially of mediation for those that invoke the notion of ‘polycentric’ problems.

Download Full-text