scholarly journals Scaling the phase-planes of social dilemma strengths shows game-class changes in the five rules governing the evolution of cooperation

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (10) ◽  
pp. 181085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiromu Ito ◽  
Jun Tanimoto
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Phase Plane ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Universal Scaling ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Scaling Parameters ◽  
Animal Societies

Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD–GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules have four different dilemma resolution (relaxation) mechanisms. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.

scholarly journals Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (8) ◽  
pp. 200891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiromu Ito ◽  
Jun Tanimoto
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Evolutionary Mechanism ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Chicken Game ◽  
The Difference

Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.

scholarly journals Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoshi Uchida ◽  
Hitoshi Yamamoto ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Tatsuya Sasaki
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Cognitive Distortion ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Parameter Values

Social dilemmas are among the most puzzling issues in the biological and social sciences. Extensive theoretical efforts have been made in various realms such as economics, biology, mathematics, and even physics to figure out solution mechanisms to the dilemma in recent decades. Although punishment is thought to be a key mechanism, evolutionary game theory has revealed that the simplest form of punishment called peer punishment is useless to solve the dilemma, since peer punishment itself is costly. In the literature, more complex types of punishment, such as pool punishment or institutional punishment, have been exploited as effective mechanisms. So far, mechanisms that enable peer punishment to function as a solution to the social dilemma remain unclear. In this paper, we propose a theoretical way for peer punishment to work as a solution mechanism for the dilemma by incorporating prospect theory into evolutionary game theory. Prospect theory models human beings as agents that estimate small probabilities and loss of profit as greater than they actually are; thus, those agents feel that punishments are more frequent and harsher than they really are. We show that this kind of cognitive distortion makes players decide to cooperate to avoid being punished and that the cooperative state achieved by this mechanism is globally stable as well as evolutionarily stable in a wide range of parameter values.

scholarly journals Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperation

2010 ◽  
Vol 365 (1553) ◽  
pp. 2627-2633 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. McNamara ◽  
Olof Leimar
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Environmental Influences ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Trait Variation ◽  
Social Sensitivity ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
Contingent Behaviour

In applying game theory to problems in biology, differences between individuals are often ignored. In particular, when analysing the evolution of cooperation it is often implicitly assumed that ignoring variation will produce predictions that approximate the solution when differences are included. This need not be true. As we demonstrate, differences are not innocuous noise, but can fundamentally change the nature of a game. Even small amounts of variability can stabilize cooperation by, for example, maintaining the need to deal with cheaters. Differences promote the need to learn about others in an interaction, leading to contingent behaviour that can reduce conflict, and to negotiated outcomes that may or may not be more cooperative than unconditional actions. Once there are mechanisms such as mutation and environmental influences that maintain variation within populations, whether cooperation evolves may depend on the variation in the cooperativeness trait. Variation means that it may be worth taking a chance that a partner is cooperative by being cooperative. When there are markets, so that individuals can break off interactions to seek a better partner, variation promotes choosiness and hence penalizes those uncooperative individuals, who are rejected. Variation promotes the need to monitor the previous behaviour of others, and once this social sensitivity exists, the need to maintain a good reputation can promote cooperation.

The Applications of Automata in Game Theory

2013 ◽  
pp. 204-217
Author(s):  
Sally Almanasra ◽  
Khaled Suwais ◽  
Muhammad Rafie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cellular Automata ◽  
Finite Automata ◽  
Computer Applications ◽  
Complex Environment ◽  
Different Types

In game theory, presenting players with strategies directly affects the performance of the players. Utilizing the power of automata is one way for presenting players with strategies. In this chapter, the authors studied different types of automata and their applications in game theory. They found that finite automata, adaptive automata, and cellular automata are widely adopted in game theory. The applications of finite automata are found to be limited to present simple strategies. In contrast, adaptive automata and cellular automata are intensively applied in complex environment, where the number of interacted players (human, computer applications, etc.) is high, and therefore, complex strategies are needed.

Assessing the Utilization of Automata in Representing Players' Behaviors in Game Theory

Game Theory ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 106-119
Author(s):  
Khaled Suwais
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cellular Automata ◽  
Finite Automata ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Direct Impact ◽  
Complex Environments ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Different Types ◽  
State Of Art

Representing players' strategies in game theory has a direct impact on the players' performance. The state of art shows that automata are one of the primary techniques used for representing players' strategies and behaviors. In this paper, the author will identify different types of automata and assess their utilization in the field of game theory. Is has been found that finite automata, adaptive automata, and cellular automata are widely adopted in game theory. The utilization of finite automata is found to be limited to represent simpler players' behavior. On the other hand, adaptive automata and cellular automata are intensively applied in complex environments, where the number of interacted players is large and therefore, representing complex behaviors are needed.

scholarly journals Ecological conditions alter cooperative behaviour and its costs in a chemically defended sawfly

2018 ◽  
Vol 285 (1884) ◽  
pp. 20180466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carita Lindstedt ◽  
Antti Miettinen ◽  
Dalial Freitak ◽  
Tarmo Ketola ◽  
Andres López-Sepulcre ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Chemical Defence ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Sawfly Larvae ◽  
Ecological Conditions ◽  
Pine Sawfly ◽  
Individual Survival ◽  
Abiotic Interactions ◽  
Number Of Individuals ◽  
Attack Intensity

The evolution of cooperation and social behaviour is often studied in isolation from the ecology of organisms. Yet, the selective environment under which individuals evolve is much more complex in nature, consisting of ecological and abiotic interactions in addition to social ones. Here, we measured the life-history costs of cooperative chemical defence in a gregarious social herbivore, Diprion pini pine sawfly larvae, and how these costs vary under different ecological conditions. We ran a rearing experiment where we manipulated diet (resin content) and attack intensity by repeatedly harassing larvae to produce a chemical defence. We show that forcing individuals to allocate more to cooperative defence (high attack intensity) incurred a clear cost by decreasing individual survival and potency of chemical defence. Cooperative behaviour and the magnitude of its costs were further shaped by host plant quality. The number of individuals participating in group defence, immune responses and female growth decreased on a high resin diet under high attack intensity. We also found some benefits of cheating: non-defending males had higher growth rates across treatments. Taken together, these results suggest that ecological interactions can shape the adaptive value of cooperative behaviour and maintain variation in the frequency of cooperation and cheating.

scholarly journals Dynamic network partnerships and social contagion drive cooperation

2018 ◽  
Vol 285 (1893) ◽  
pp. 20181973 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roslyn Dakin ◽  
T. Brandt Ryder
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Measures ◽  
Dynamic Networks ◽  
Dynamic Network ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Data Logging ◽  
Sources Of Variation ◽  
Positive Correlations ◽  
Multiple Membership

Both reciprocity and positive assortment (like with like) are predicted to promote the evolution of cooperation, yet how partners influence each other's behaviour within dynamic networks is not well understood. One way to test this question is to partition phenotypic variation into differences among individuals in the expression of cooperative behaviour (the ‘direct effect’), and plasticity within individuals in response to the social environment (the ‘indirect effect’). A positive correlation between these two sources of variation, such that more cooperative individuals elicit others to cooperate, is predicted to facilitate social contagion and selection on cooperative behaviour. Testing this hypothesis is challenging, however, because it requires repeated measures of behaviour across a dynamic social landscape. Here, we use an automated data-logging system to quantify the behaviour of 179 wire-tailed manakins, birds that form cooperative male–male coalitions, and we use multiple-membership models to test the hypothesis that dynamic network partnerships shape within-individual variation in cooperative behaviour. Our results show strong positive correlations between a bird's own sociality and his estimated effect on his partners, consistent with the hypothesis that cooperation begets cooperation. These findings support the hypothesis that social contagion can facilitate selection for cooperative behaviour within social networks.

scholarly journals Zur Dynamik prosozialen Verhaltens in einem asymmetrischen sozialen Dilemma: ein Beitrag zur experimentellen Spieltheorie / The Dynamics of Pro-social Behavior in an Asymmetric Social Dilemma: A Behavioral Game-Theoretic Approach

2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Vogt ◽  
Werner Raub ◽  
Jeroen Weesie ◽  
Vincent Buskens
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Prosoziales Verhalten ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Pro Social Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir prosoziales Verhalten im Sinne wechselseitiger Hilfeleistungen. Als formales Modell verwenden wir ein asymmetrisches wiederholtes Solidaritätsspiel zwischen zwei Akteuren. Wir modellieren Asymmetrie in drei Dimensionen: (1.) Nutzen, den ein Akteur aus der Hilfeleistung des anderen zieht, (2.) Kosten der eigenen Hilfeleistung und (3.)Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der ein Akteur Hilfe benötigt. Wir untersuchen die Effekte von Asymmetrie auf die Dynamik wechselseitiger Hilfeleistungen im Verlauf des Spiels. Wir nehmen an, dass die Häufigkeit, mit der sich die Akteure helfen, vom Nutzen und den Kosten der Hilfeleistungen sowie von der Wahrscheinlichkeit abhängt, Hilfe zu benötigen. Unser Beitrag zur Theoriebildung ist ein einfaches adaptives Verhaltensmodell für die Erklärung wechselseitiger Hilfeleistungen, das an das Forschungsprogramm der experimentellen Spieltheorie („behavioral game theory“) anschließt. Wir präsentieren zwei Varianten eines solchen Modells: eine sozialpsychologisch inspirierte Variante und eine Variante, die auf spieltheoretischen Verhandlungsmodellen beruht. Unser Modell ist robust in dem Sinn, dass beide Varianten zu ähnlichen Vorhersagen führen. Empirische Daten aus zwei Laborexperimenten bestätigen diese Vorhersagen.

scholarly journals Should we cooperate? Game theory insights for servitization

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Wagstaff ◽  
Jamie Burton ◽  
Judy Zolkiewski
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Oil Industry ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Qualitative And Quantitative Methods ◽  
Cooperative Approach ◽  
The Impact

PurposeAn abundance of literature suggests that organisations adopting a cooperative approach achieve greater rewards than those that act in opposition or isolation. An emerging body of work also highlights the multiple actors involved in servitization. Despite this, in some contexts the benefits of servitization are not apparent. This paper examines business relationships in the oil industry and how they affect levels of servitization.Design/methodology/approachA mixed method study employing qualitative and quantitative methods was used to fully explore the context. In the quantitative phase, 48 oil industry specialists responded to a scenario based on game theory. This aimed to determine if the relationships between their respective organisations are cooperative or adversarial. Abduction drove a second qualitative phase. This consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews used to explore the servitization level and influence of servitization on relationships and vice versa.FindingsThe statistical results suggest that all parties used adversarial strategies despite the publicised intent to work cooperatively. The interviews suggested that increasing (decreasing) servitization could increase (decrease) cooperation and, in turn, value co-creation but revealed nuances to this effect. It also adds to our understanding of the darker side of servitization by illustrating the impact of mimetic isomorphism.Originality/valueThe findings add to understanding of the complex dynamics around servitization by showing that it is only at advanced levels of servitization that cooperative behaviour is observed, and base and intermediate levels result in non-cooperative behaviour and thus illustrate the importance of adopting a multi-actor lens to explore servitization.

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