scholarly journals Consciousness and body image: lessons from phantom limbs, Capgras syndrome and pain asymbolia

1998 ◽  
Vol 353 (1377) ◽  
pp. 1851-1859 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
V. S. Ramachandran

Words such as ‘consciousness’ and ‘self’ actually encompass a number of distinct phenomena that are loosely lumped together. The study of neurological syndromes allows us to explore the neural mechanisms that might underlie different aspects of self, such as body image and emotional responses to sensory stimuli, and perhaps even laughter and humour. Mapping the ‘functional logic’ of the many different attributes of human nature on to specific neural circuits in the brain offers the best hope of understanding how the activity of neurons gives rise to conscious experience. We consider three neurological syndromes (phantom limbs, Capgras delusion and pain asymbolia) to illustrate this idea.

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tereza Touskova ◽  
Petr Bob

AbstractAccording to recent research, disturbances of self-awareness and conscious experience have a critical role in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, and in this context, schizophrenia is currently understood as a disorder characterized by distortions of acts of awareness, self-consciousness, and self-monitoring. Together, these studies suggest that the processes of disrupted awareness and conscious disintegration in schizophrenia might be related and represented by similar disruptions on the brain level, which, in principle, could be explained by various levels of disturbed connectivity and information disintegration that may negatively affect usual patterns of synchronous activity constituting adaptive integrative functions of consciousness. On the other hand, mental integration based on self-awareness and insight may significantly increase information integration and directly influence neural mechanisms underlying basic pathophysiological processes in schizophrenia.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Forstmann ◽  
Pascal Burgmer

The present research (total N = 2,057) tested whether people’s folk conception of consciousness aligns with the notion of a “Cartesian Theater” (Dennett, 1991). More precisely, we tested the hypotheses that people believe that consciousness happens in a single, confined area (vs. multiple dispersed areas) in the human brain, and that it (partly) happens after the brain finished analyzing all available information. Further, we investigated how these beliefs are related to participants’ neuroscientific knowledge as well as their reliance on intuition, and which rationale they use to explain their responses. Using a computer-administered drawing task, we found that participants located consciousness, but not unrelated neurological processes (Studies 1a & 1b) or unconscious thinking (Study 2) in a single, confined area in the prefrontal cortex, and that they considered most of the brain not involved in consciousness. Participants mostly relied on their intuitions when responding, and they were not affected by prior knowledge about the brain. Additionally, they considered the conscious experience of sensory stimuli to happen in a spatially more confined area than the corresponding computational analysis of these stimuli (Study 3). Furthermore, participants’ explicit beliefs about spatial and temporal localization of consciousness (i.e., consciousness happening after the computational analysis of sensory information is completed) are independent, yet positively correlated beliefs (Study 4). Using a more elaborate measure for temporal localization of conscious experience, our final study confirmed that people believe consciousness to partly happen even after information processing is done (Study 5).


2011 ◽  
Vol 366 (1571) ◽  
pp. 1634-1637 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony C. Little ◽  
Benedict C. Jones ◽  
Lisa M. DeBruine

Face perception is fundamental to human social interaction. Many different types of important information are visible in faces and the processes and mechanisms involved in extracting this information are complex and can be highly specialized. The importance of faces has long been recognized by a wide range of scientists. Importantly, the range of perspectives and techniques that this breadth has brought to face perception research has, in recent years, led to many important advances in our understanding of face processing. The articles in this issue on face perception each review a particular arena of interest in face perception, variously focusing on (i) the social aspects of face perception (attraction, recognition and emotion), (ii) the neural mechanisms underlying face perception (using brain scanning, patient data, direct stimulation of the brain, visual adaptation and single-cell recording), and (iii) comparative aspects of face perception (comparing adult human abilities with those of chimpanzees and children). Here, we introduce the central themes of the issue and present an overview of the articles.


1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 701-702 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Umiltà ◽  
Marco Zorzi

AbstractOn the basis of neuropsychological evidence, it is clear that attention should be given a role in any model (or conjecture) of consciousness. What is known about the many instances of dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge after brain damage suggests that conscious experience might not be linked to a restricted area of the brain. Even if it were true that there is a single brain area devoted to consciousness, the subicular area would seem to be an unlikely possibility.


Author(s):  
Anil K. Seth

Consciousness is perhaps the most familiar aspect of our existence, yet we still do not know its biological basis. This chapter outlines a biomimetic approach to consciousness science, identifying three principles linking properties of conscious experience to potential biological mechanisms. First, conscious experiences generate large quantities of information in virtue of being simultaneously integrated and differentiated. Second, the brain continuously generates predictions about the world and self, which account for the specific content of conscious scenes. Third, the conscious self depends on active inference of self-related signals at multiple levels. Research following these principles helps move from establishing correlations between brain responses and consciousness towards explanations which account for phenomenological properties—addressing what can be called the “real problem” of consciousness. The picture that emerges is one in which consciousness, mind, and life, are tightly bound together—with implications for any possible future “conscious machines.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 263310552110187
Author(s):  
Christopher D Link

Numerous studies have identified microbial sequences or epitopes in pathological and non-pathological human brain samples. It has not been resolved if these observations are artifactual, or truly represent population of the brain by microbes. Given the tempting speculation that resident microbes could play a role in the many neuropsychiatric and neurodegenerative diseases that currently lack clear etiologies, there is a strong motivation to determine the “ground truth” of microbial existence in living brains. Here I argue that the evidence for the presence of microbes in diseased brains is quite strong, but a compelling demonstration of resident microbes in the healthy human brain remains to be done. Dedicated animal models studies may be required to determine if there is indeed a “brain microbiome.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Bitsch ◽  
Philipp Berger ◽  
Andreas Fink ◽  
Arne Nagels ◽  
Benjamin Straube ◽  
...  

AbstractThe ability to generate humor gives rise to positive emotions and thus facilitate the successful resolution of adversity. Although there is consensus that inhibitory processes might be related to broaden the way of thinking, the neural underpinnings of these mechanisms are largely unknown. Here, we use functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, a humorous alternative uses task and a stroop task, to investigate the brain mechanisms underlying the emergence of humorous ideas in 24 subjects. Neuroimaging results indicate that greater cognitive control abilities are associated with increased activation in the amygdala, the hippocampus and the superior and medial frontal gyrus during the generation of humorous ideas. Examining the neural mechanisms more closely shows that the hypoactivation of frontal brain regions is associated with an hyperactivation in the amygdala and vice versa. This antagonistic connectivity is concurrently linked with an increased number of humorous ideas and enhanced amygdala responses during the task. Our data therefore suggests that a neural antagonism previously related to the emergence and regulation of negative affective responses, is linked with the generation of emotionally positive ideas and may represent an important neural pathway supporting mental health.


1984 ◽  
Vol 246 (6) ◽  
pp. R884-R887
Author(s):  
N. Helm-Estabrooks

It is understood that damage to the left cerebral hemisphere in adulthood may result in syndromes of language disturbances called the aphasias. The study of these syndromes sheds light on normal language processes, the relationship between language behavior and the brain, and how best to treat aphasic individuals. Aphasia, for some, is a central communication disorder affecting all symbolic behavior in all modalities (i.e., speech, writing, and gesture). Difficulty producing symbolic gestures on command is called apraxia. Others view aphasia as a manifestation of a motor-sequencing disorder affecting all gestural systems including those required for speech movements. These divergent theories of the underlying nature of aphasia can be tested through examination of deaf individuals who use sign language before onset of aphasia. Poizner et al. [Am. J. Physiol. 246 (Regulatory Integrative Comp. Physiol. 15): R868-R883, 1984] studied three such patients with different aphasia syndromes: one patient had a nonsymbolic, motor-sequencing disorder; one had a gestural apraxia; and one had neither. These findings force the conclusion that neither the symbolic nor motor-sequencing theory of aphasia can account for the many varieties of that disorder.


1989 ◽  
Vol 155 (S7) ◽  
pp. 93-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy C. Andreasen

When Kraepelin originally defined and described dementia praecox, he assumed that it was due to some type of neural mechanism. He hypothesised that abnormalities could occur in a variety of brain regions, including the prefrontal, auditory, and language regions of the cortex. Many members of his department, including Alzheimer and Nissl, were actively involved in the search for the neuropathological lesions that would characterise schizophrenia. Although Kraepelin did not use the term ‘negative symptoms', he describes them comprehensively and states explicitly that he believes the symptoms of schizophrenia can be explained in terms of brain dysfunction:“If it should be confirmed that the disease attacks by preference the frontal areas of the brain, the central convolutions and central lobes, this distribution would in a certain measure agree with our present views about the site of the psychic mechanisms which are principally injured by the disease. On various grounds, it is easy to believe that the frontal cortex, which is specially well developed in man, stands in closer relation to his higher intellectual abilities, and these are the faculties which in our patients invariably suffer profound loss in contrast to memory and acquired ability.” Kraepelin (1919, p. 219)


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