scholarly journals Dynamic Behavior of Coupled Neuron System from a Game-Theoretic Standpoint

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avinash Kori

AbstractThis paper is concerned with the theoretical investigation of game theory concepts in analyzing the behavior of dynamically coupled oscillators. Here, we claim that the coupling strength in any neuronal oscillators can be modeled as a game. We formulate the game to describe the effect of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium on two neuron systems of Hopf-oscillator and later demonstrate the application of the same assumptions and methods to N × N neuronal sheet. We also demonstrate the effect of the proposed method on MNIST data to show the equilibrium behavior of neurons in a N × N neuronal grid for all different digits. A significant outcome of the paper is a modified Hebbian algorithm, which adapts the coupling weights to neural potential resulting in a stable phase difference. Which in turn, makes it possible for an individual neuron to encode input information.

2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfons Schuster ◽  
Yoko Yamaguchi

The paper is a theoretical investigation into the potential application of game theoretic concepts to neural networks (natural and artificial). The paper relies on basic models but the findings are more general in nature and therefore should apply to more complex environments. A major outcome of the paper is a learning algorithm based on game theory for a paired neuron system.


2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (12) ◽  
pp. 4002-4045
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Philippos Louis

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered unrelated. M equilibrium is empirically robust and, despite being set-valued, falsifiable. Results from a series of experiments that compare M equilibrium to leading behavioral game theory models demonstrate its virtues in predicting observed choices and stated beliefs. Data from experimental games with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and multiple M equilibria exhibit coordination problems that could not be anticipated through the lens of existing models. (JEL C72, C90, D83)


Author(s):  
Ayan Sinha ◽  
Farrokh Mistree ◽  
Janet K. Allen

The effectiveness of the use of game theory in addressing multi-objective design problems has been illustrated. For the most part, researchers have focused on design problems at single level. In this paper, we illustrate the efficacy of using game theoretic protocols to model the relationship between multidisciplinary engineering teams and facilitate decision making at multiple levels. We will illustrate the protocols in the context of an underwater vehicle with three levels that span material and geometric modeling associated with microstructure mediated design of the material and vehicle.


2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 1350007 ◽  
Author(s):  
XIAOMING YAN ◽  
YONG WANG

We look at a Cournot model in which each firm may be unreliable with random capacity, so the total quantity brought into market is uncertain. The Cournot model has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), in which the number of active firms is determined by each firm's production cost and reliability. Our results indicate the following effects of unreliability: the number of active firms in the NE is more than that each firm is completely reliable and the expected total quantity brought into market is less than that each firm is completely reliable. Whether a given firm joins in the game is independent of its reliability, but any given firm always hopes that the less-expensive firms' capacities are random and stochastically smaller.


Author(s):  
Nick Zangwill

Abstract I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.


Recently, game-theoretic models have become famous in many academic research areas. Therefore, many applications and extensions of the original game theoretic approach appear in many of the major science fields. Despite all the technical problems, the history of game theory suggests that it would be premature to abandon the tool, especially in the absence of a viable alternative. If anything, the development of game theory has been driven precisely by the realization of its limitations and attempts to overcome them. This chapter explores these ideas.


Game Theory ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 204-218
Author(s):  
Chih-Yu Wang ◽  
Hung-Yu Wei ◽  
Mehdi Bennis ◽  
Athanasios V. Vasilakos

Improving capacity and coverage is one of the main issues in next-generation wireless communication. Heterogeneous networks (HetNets), which is currently investigated in LTE-Advanced standard, is a promising solution to enhance capacity and eliminate coverage holes in a cost-efficient manner. A HetNet is composed of existing macrocells and various types of small cells. By deploying small cells into the existing network, operators enhance the users' quality of service which are suffering from severe signal degradation at cell edges or coverage holes. Nevertheless, there are numerous challenges in integrating small cells into the existing cellular network due to the characteristics: unplanned deployment, intercell interference, economic potential, etc. Recently, game theory has been shown to be a powerful tool for investigating the challenges in HetNets. Several game-theoretic approaches have been proposed to model the distributed deployment and self-organization feature of HetNets. In this chapter, the authors first give an overview of the challenges in HetNets. Subsequently, the authors illustrate how game theory can be applied to solve issues related to HetNets.


Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare

This chapter addresses the charge made by some behavioral economists (and many strategic analysts) that game theory is of limited utility for understanding interstate conflict behavior. Using one of perfect deterrence theory’s constituent models, a logically consistent game-theoretic explanation for the absence of a superpower conflict during the Cold War era is provided. As well, the chapter discusses a prescription based on an incorrect prediction attributed to John von Neumann, one of the cofounders of game theory. It also examines a logically inconsistent explanation of the long peace offered by Thomas Schelling, the game theorist many consider the most important strategic thinker in the field of security studies. The argument is made that a predictively inaccurate or logically inconsistent game model in no way undermines the utility of game theory as a potentially powerful methodological tool.


Author(s):  
Duane Windsor

This chapter identifies some game-theoretic insights concerning several key issues of business ethics typically occurring in emerging economies. The chapter explicates four elements in this sequence: nature of game theory, characteristics of emerging economies, fundamentals of business ethics, and key business ethics issues. The chapter emphasizes useful insights of game theory rather than undertaking formal modeling (examples are noted in references). Game theory assists reasoning about strategic scenarios for businesses. A multinational entity operates within layers of institutions and norms from the international to the national and sub-national levels. Such institutions and norms help structure the complex environment within which a multinational entity operates. The approach in this chapter is to inquire into certain specific decision scenarios available in the extant literature as instances of important classes of decision problems and to suggest game-theoretic responses. These scenarios concern long-term sustainable business models, corporate values, and corporate reputation.


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