scholarly journals Why cooperation is not running away

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Félix Geoffroy ◽  
Nicolas Baumard ◽  
Jean-Baptiste André
Keyword(s):  
Adaptive Dynamics ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Matching Theory ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Optimum Level ◽  
Social Efficiency ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
Competitive Altruism ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Experimental And Theoretical Studies

AbstractA growing number of experimental and theoretical studies show the importance of partner choice as a mechanism to promote the evolution of cooperation, especially in humans. In this paper, we focus on the question of the precise quantitative level of cooperation that should evolve under this mechanism. When individuals compete to be chosen by others, their level of investment in cooperation evolves towards higher values, a process called competitive altruism, or runaway cooperation. Using a classic adaptive dynamics model, we first show that, when the cost of changing partner is low, this runaway process can lead to a profitless escalation of cooperation. In the extreme, when partner choice is entirely frictionless, cooperation even increases up to a level where its cost entirely cancels out its benefit. That is, at evolutionary equilibrium, individuals gain the same payoff than if they had not cooperated at all. Second, importing models from matching theory in economics we, however, show that, when individuals can plastically modulate their choosiness in function of their own cooperation level, partner choice stops being a runaway competition to outbid others, and becomes a competition to form the most optimal partnerships. In this case, when the cost of changing partner tends toward zero partner choice leads to the evolution of the socially optimum level of cooperation. This last result could explain the observation that human cooperation seems to be often constrained by considerations of social efficiency.

scholarly journals ON THE CONVERGENCE RATE OF POTENTIALS OF BRENIER MAPS

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-37
Author(s):  
Florian F. Gunsilius
Keyword(s):  
Convergence Rate ◽  
Poincaré Inequality ◽  
Optimal Transportation ◽  
Matching Theory ◽  
Economic Research ◽  
Poincare Inequality ◽  
Optimal Transportation Problem ◽  
Minimax Rate ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Kantorovich Problem

The theory of optimal transportation has experienced a sharp increase in interest in many areas of economic research such as optimal matching theory and econometric identification. A particularly valuable tool, due to its convenient representation as the gradient of a convex function, has been the Brenier map: the matching obtained as the optimizer of the Monge–Kantorovich optimal transportation problem with the euclidean distance as the cost function. Despite its popularity, the statistical properties of the Brenier map have yet to be fully established, which impedes its practical use for estimation and inference. This article takes a first step in this direction by deriving a convergence rate for the simple plug-in estimator of the potential of the Brenier map via the semi-dual Monge–Kantorovich problem. Relying on classical results for the convergence of smoothed empirical processes, it is shown that this plug-in estimator converges in standard deviation to its population counterpart under the minimax rate of convergence of kernel density estimators if one of the probability measures satisfies the Poincaré inequality. Under a normalization of the potential, the result extends to convergence in the $L^2$ norm, while the Poincaré inequality is automatically satisfied. The main mathematical contribution of this article is an analysis of the second variation of the semi-dual Monge–Kantorovich problem, which is of independent interest.

Baumard et al.'s moral markets lack market dynamics

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. T. Fessler ◽  
Colin Holbrook
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Market Dynamics ◽  
Market Models

AbstractMarket models are indeed indispensable to understanding the evolution of cooperation and its emotional substrates. Unfortunately, Baumard et al. eschew market thinking in stressing the supposed invariance of moral/cooperative behavior across circumstances. To the contrary, humans display contingent morality/cooperation, and these shifts are best accounted for by market models of partner choice for mutually beneficial collaboration.

The evolution of extortion strategy in the kagome lattice

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 2050162
Author(s):  
Qian Zhao ◽  
Yajun Mao ◽  
Zhihai Rong
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Living Environment ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Kagome Lattice ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Kagomé Lattice ◽  
Population Games ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The extortion strategy can let its surplus exceed its opponents by a fixed percentage, hence the influence of extortion strategy in a population games has drawn wide attention. In this paper, we study the evolution of extortion strategy with unconditional cooperation and unconditional defection strategies in the Kagome lattice with abundant triangles. Our investigation shows that the extortion strategy can act as catalysts to promote the evolution of cooperation in the networked Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Moreover, proper strength of extortion slope can improve the living environment of the cooperators, thus they enhance cooperation level in the network. Moreover, proper strength of extortion can not only enhance the cooperation level, but also delay the extinction of cooperation. The underlying overlapping triangles help individuals form cooperation cliques that play crucial roles for the evolution of cooperation in those lattices.

Business uncertainty and financial leverage: should the firm double up on risk?

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-544
Author(s):  
Khaled Elkhal
Keyword(s):  
Financial Distress ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Optimum Level ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Financial Leverage ◽  
Research Papers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of the relationship between business risk and financial leverage. While past theoretical and empirical studies on this topic use similar variables, overall, their findings are inconclusive. In this paper, the author contends this is partially due to inappropriate proxies for business risk that are commonly used in these research papers. To correct for this misspecification, this paper proposes an alternative proxy for business risk that is isolated from the effects of financial leverage. Design/methodology/approach Past research on the relationship between business risk and financial leverage uses some variations in a firm’s operating cash flow as a proxy for business risk. This proxy cannot solely reflect business risk and may very well be affected by the level of financial leverage, especially for financially distressed firms. This paper proposes an alternative proxy for business risk that is isolated from the effects of financial leverage. This proxy is the cost of capital of an all-equity firm. The theoretical model developed in this paper is based on deriving the optimum level of debt as a function of business risk in the context of the Modigliani and Miller Proposition II model. Findings The findings show a positive linkage between business risk and financial leverage. This relationship is robust to the various forms the cost of financial distress function may take. Originality/value The mixed findings in past research papers regarding the relationship between business risk and financial leverage are mainly due to “inappropriate” measures of business risk that do not only reflect one firm attribute and are contaminated with other factors mainly financial leverage. As such, since the variable of interest is misspecified, the outcome of these studies cannot be credible. This paper attempts to correct for such misspecification by proposing a proxy that only reflects business risk. In addition, the proposed model is based on the widely acceptable Modigliani and Miller static theory of capital structure.

scholarly journals Gossip and competitive altruism support cooperation in a Public Good game

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Giardini ◽  
Daniele Vilone ◽  
Angel Sánchez ◽  
Alberto Antonioni
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Competitive Altruism

When there is an opportunity to gain a positive reputation, individuals are more willing to sacrifice their immediate self-interest. Partner choice creates opportunities for competitive altruism, i.e. individuals compete to be regarded as more generous and to be chosen for future partnerships. Tests of the competitive altruism hypothesis have focused so far on reputation based on direct observation, whereas the role of gossip has not been theoretically and empirically addressed. Partner choice can create an incentive to cooperate and to send truthful messages, but it can also work in the opposite direction. In order to understand the consequences of partner choice on cooperation and gossip, we designed an experimental study in which participants played a sequence of Public Goods games and gossip rounds. In our two treatments, we observed that cooperation increased when there was an opportunity to be selected, but also that cooperators sent more honest messages than defectors, and that this strategy was prevalent in the treatment in which inter-group competition was implemented. We also found evidence that participants detached themselves from the information more often when lying. Taken together, our study fills a theoretical and empirical gap by showing that partner choice increases both cooperation and honesty of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Free to choose: Mutualist Motives for Partner Choice, Proportional Division, Punishment, and Help

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chien-An Lin ◽  
Timothy Charles Bates
Keyword(s):  
External Validity ◽  
Discriminant Validity ◽  
Factor Model ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Total N ◽  
Psychological Structure ◽  
Model C ◽  
Psychological Measure

Mutualism – the disposition to cooperate in ways that benefit both actor and recipient – has been proposed as a key construct in the evolution of cooperation, with distinct adaptations for 1) partner choice, 2) division, 3) punishment, and 4) helping. However, no psychological measure or validation of this psychological structure exists. To fill this need, in two pre-registered studies (total N = 902), we: (A) Develop and administer items assessing each of the four mutualist adaptations; (B) Show good fit to the predicted four factor model; (C) Demonstrate reliability and stability across time; (D) Evidence discriminant validity from existing constructs, including compassion and utilitarianism; (E) Establish external validity by predicting proportional choices in catch division, opposition to partner coercion, and reduced support for redistribution; and (F) Replicate each of these findings. Jointly, these results support the validity of mutualism, including a motive to maintain the freedom to choose, and provide reliable scales for use in integrating, further developing, and applying mutualism.

Competitive morality

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-98
Author(s):  
Gilbert Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Partner Choice ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Moral Conduct ◽  
Competitive Altruism

AbstractBaumard et al. argue that partner choice leads to fairness and mutualism, which then form the basis for morality. I comment that mutualism takes us only so far, and I apply the theory of competitive altruism in arguing how strategic investment in behaviours which make one a desirable partner may drive moral conduct.

scholarly journals Cheating can stabilize cooperation in mutualisms

2006 ◽  
Vol 273 (1598) ◽  
pp. 2233-2239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin R Foster ◽  
Hanna Kokko
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Female Choice ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Lek Paradox ◽  
The Face ◽  
Selection For ◽  
Selective Incentive

Mutualisms present a challenge for evolutionary theory. How is cooperation maintained in the face of selection for selfishness and cheating? Both theory and data suggest that partner choice, where one species preferentially directs aid to the more cooperative members of the other species, is central to cooperation in many mutualisms. However, the theory has only so far considered the evolutionary effects of partner choice on one of the species in a mutualism in isolation. Here, we investigate the co-evolution of cooperation and choice in a choosy host and its symbiont. Our model reveals that even though choice and cooperation may be initially selected, it will often be unstable. This is because choice reduces variation in the symbiont and, therefore, tends to remove the selective incentive for its own maintenance (a scenario paralleled in the lek paradox in female choice and policing in within-species cooperation). However, we also show that when variability is reintroduced into symbionts each generation, in the form of less cooperative individuals, choice is maintained. This suggests that the presence of cheaters and cheater species in many mutualisms is central to the maintenance of partner choice and, paradoxically, cooperation itself.

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