North Korea missile development will proceed apace

Significance No warning was given to shipping. With rare speed, owing to Chinese fury at the timing of this during the G20 summit in Hangzhou, the next day the UN Security Council (UNSC) condemned Pyongyang's "flagrant disregard" of past UNSC resolutions. With no sign that Kim Jong-un will heed this latest UN rebuke any more than previous ones, the current Western and global hard line towards North Korea is having no visible impact. Impacts North-South relations will probably remain abysmal till then, though opportunistic U-turns by either Korea cannot be entirely ruled out. Chinese enforcement of sanctions will remain patchy, especially given Beijing's hostility to US missile deployment in South Korea. Regular deployment of SLBMs by Pyongyang would be a game-changer for the region. South Korean predictions of regime collapse are premature.

Significance North Korea the same day pledged a “decisive act of justice” to avenge “a hundred thousand-fold” the “heinous crime” of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions approved unanimously on August 5, which imposed stringent new curbs on North Korea’s exports. Impacts Pyongyang's ever-belligerent rhetoric should not be taken literally. As distinct from provocative WMD tests, Kim Jong-un is unlikely to launch a major attack, knowing it would be suicidal. Seoul and Beijing will strive for renewed diplomacy. South Korea and Japan would bear the brunt of any actual hostilities. Unilateral US action that provoked Pyongyang into striking South Korea or Japan would probably damage these alliances irreparably.


Significance Russia denies breaking any rules but is keen to move towards sanctions relaxation. This would allow it to ramp up economic ties with North Korea through 'trilateral cooperation' with South Korea. It sees opportunities for energy exports and a trade route linking the Korean peninsula with Europe. Impacts Moscow's wider goal is to strengthen its geopolitical position, currently overshadowed by Washington and Beijing. Russian state-linked and private traders will continue to face US penalties for breaking sanctions imposed on North Korea. Moscow appears to be winding down the number of North Korean guest workers as required by the UN Security Council.


Significance This followed Pyongyang’s breach of its 17-month moratorium on missile testing with two volleys on May 4 and May 9, each personally supervised by Kim and both including short-range ballistic missile launches. Impacts Kim has given Washington until the end of the year to rethink its stance; that is possible but unlikely. Pyongyang’s new missile may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defences. South Korea will persevere with cooperation efforts for now, despite Pyongyang’s rebuffs.


Subject The impact of sanctions on North Korea's economy. Significance Successive UN Security Council resolutions over the past year impose the toughest sanctions North Korea has ever faced. If implemented thoroughly, the new sanctions will have much greater impact than earlier measures. The result will be to increase political risk in North-east Asia in the medium term (2018-20). Impacts North Korea's leadership will not even consider denuclearisation, seeing this as tantamount to collective suicide. The threat of domestic instability will push the elite to become more repressive at home. If political collapse or war looked imminent, China would switch back to quietly undermining the sanctions regime.


Headline NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA: Balloon ban may improve ties


Significance This signalled defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2270, passed unanimously on March 2, which condemns Pyongyang's nuclear test on January 6 and its satellite launch (using ballistic missile technology) on February 7, imposes the toughest sanctions yet on the Kim regime. Impacts Whether the new sanctions are more effective than previous ones will take time to assess, and depends on interpretation and implementation. Pyongyang's strategic direction may be clarified once the ruling party holds its first Congress for 35 years in May. With China-North Korea ties icy, Russia will give Kim a degree of diplomatic cover. South Korea's new hard line is bipartisan; even most liberals no longer support a 'sunshine' policy. Any eventual return to diplomacy may have to await new leaders in Washington in 2017 and Seoul from February 2018.


Subject South Korea's international relationships. Significance South Korea’s government is celebrating the success of its response to COVID-19, but the country’s four key foreign relationships all face difficulties -- those with the United States, China, Japan and North Korea. No other countries or regions are vital to Seoul, despite vaunted ‘Southern’ and ‘Northern’ initiatives. Impacts A prolonged deadlock on funding the US military presence in South Korea could push Seoul closer to Beijing. If President Xi Jinping visits South Korea later this year, Washington could easily misread this. Substantial fence-mending with Japan may have to await new leaderships in both countries. South Korean President Moon Jae-in may have tacitly given up on North Korea, which has visibly given up on him.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 763-770

North Korea's Chairman, Kim Jong Un, agreed to work toward the Korean peninsula's denuclearization at a Singapore summit meeting with President Trump on June 12, 2018. The encounter marked the first time in history that the president of the United States and the leader of North Korea have met in person. It came after an intense year and a half of interactions between the two countries, including the exchange of nuclear-laced military threats, the imposition of new sanctions by the United States and the UN Security Council, and, eventually, a touch of détente. Since the meeting occurred, North Korea has taken several steps consistent with commitments it made, including returning remains said to be those of American service members, refraining from missile launches, and beginning to dismantle its testing facilities. Also since the meeting occurred, the United States has suspended its usual joint military exercises with South Korea, consistent with a statement made by Trump at the summit, while leaving in place existing sanctions against North Korea.


Asian Survey ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-127
Author(s):  
Charles K. Armstrong

Kim Jong Un further consolidated his leadership position at the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party in May, the first congress since 1980. Pyongyang conducted two nuclear tests and made advances in missile delivery, eliciting strong sanctions resolutions from the UN Security Council, first in March and again in November.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joon-heon Song

Purpose The purpose of this study is to explore the essential cause for the policy failure of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in South Korea. Design/methodology/approach To substantiate the claims made for the failure of the policy, this paper focuses on the differences in policy preferences among the government ministries and agencies involved in TAA. Findings The failure in the TAA policy, according to this study, was attributed to the conflicts and miscoordination arising from the differences in policy preferences among government ministries and agencies. To rectify this failure, the South Korean government had to revise its laws and regulations several times over a short period. Originality/value Drawing on the analytical framework of the literature on policy failure, this paper examines the causal relationships between outcomes of TAA policy and the conflicts or miscoordination among government bodies at each stage: initiatives and planning, implementation and operation of the policy.


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