Canberra will pursue moderation amid China-US tensions

Significance Maritime disputes in the South China Sea throw two key Australian foreign policy objectives into contention: maintaining close security ties with Washington and developing commercial relations with China. In this context, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop announced in August that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) would would produce a white paper on Australia's foreign policy, the first since 2003. Impacts Hosting the 2018 ASEAN-Australia Biennial Summit will help Australia promote business ties with South-east Asia. Post-Brexit talks with the United Kingdom would likely see receptive Australian counterparts, but Pacific ties will be Canberra's priority. Australia would probably find a Hillary Clinton presidency more conducive to the status quo compared to Donald Trump's 'unknown quality'.

Subject Brazilian foreign policy under Aloysio Nunes. Significance Senator Aloysio Nunes, who took office as foreign minister on March 7, is an experienced politician from the centre-right Social Democrats (PSDB). He led the bloc supporting the government of President Michel Temer in the Senate, where he was also since 2015 head of the Commission of Foreign Affairs and National Defence. Nunes replaces Jose Serra at the foreign ministry and will seek overall continuity of Serra's agenda focused on the pursuit of trade opening and border security. Impacts Brazil lacks a clear strategy for its crucial relationship with China. Border security, a key issue for Serra, will remain important for Nunes. Domestic politics may divert Nunes’s attention as the 2018 elections approach.


Subject Recent developments in Japanese foreign policy. Significance This month has seen a flurry of high-level diplomatic activity. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has visited Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom and Russia. Over the same period, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida visited China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. Impacts Except for Washington, G7 governments have more interest in economic ties with Beijing than in Tokyo's concerns about territorial issues. Japan's willingness to engage Russia may draw the West's ire in due course. The process of relocating the Futenma airbase may drag on for another decade. TPP ratification will be slower than Abe wanted, but US politics is the greatest obstacle. A weakened South Korean administration could find itself pushed into a more hostile approach to Tokyo.


2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 876-877 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Boyle

Following NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the United Kingdom House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee commenced an inquiry with the following terms of reference: “To inquire into the foreign policy lessons of the Kosovo crisis and how the Foreign and Commonwealth Office might best promote peace and stability in the region.” The Committee heard oral evidence from government ministers, diplomats, FCO staff, journalists, academics, and lawyers. It also received written memoranda. The President of Montenegro and the Foreign Minister of Albania were interviewed in private, and the Committee visited Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. The Committee's Report was published on 7 June 2000 as the 4th Report of The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (HC28-II, ISBN 010 2331006) together with the evidence and appendices (HC28-II, ISBN 010 2333009).


Subject Outlook for ASEAN-EU ties post-Brexit. Significance UK foreign minister Boris Johnson's absence from the EU's November 13 meeting following Donald Trump's US presidential election win symbolised the diverging EU and UK foreign policy trajectories as the United Kingdom prepares to depart the EU, probably in 2019. For ASEAN, this raises questions about what damage the separation will cause to both its trade and investment and its diplomatic and security relations with Europe. Impacts The EU-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership Agreement talks begun this year will not be affected by ECJ rulings on EU-ASEAN FTAs. ASEAN will decreasingly look to the EU as an appropriate model for regional integration. Brexit will mean the EU cannot rely on UK defence assets for projection in South-east Asia.


Significance As emir and before that as foreign minister, Sabah was the key architect of the moderate foreign policy that characterises Kuwait today. The new ruler, Nawaf, was formerly deputy commander of the military. He is a broadly uncontroversial figure associated with the status quo, but who recently sought to reach out to the opposition. Impacts A new legislature by December will focus on condemning corruption and protecting Kuwaitis’ economic benefits. Normalisation of ties with Israel remains unlikely. Demographic and health issues under COVID-19 will be key immediate challenges.


Significance The differing perspectives of unionists and nationalists on the creation of Northern Ireland as a political entity within the United Kingdom, together with Brexit and tensions over the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP), have brought the contentious issue of Irish reunification onto the political agenda in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Impacts Scottish independence would likely increase momentum for a referendum on Irish unity. Successful implementation of the NIP, giving firms access to EU and UK markets, may support arguments for maintaining the status quo. If the UK government abandons the NIP, the adverse trade impact on Northern Irish firms could increase support for unification.


Author(s):  
Tahir Abbas

This article situates the debate on the United Kingdom’s Prevent policy in the broader framework of the global paradigm for countering violent extremism (CVE), which appeared at the end of 2015. It argues that omission of a nuanced focus on the social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics of radicalised people has led to a tendency to introduce blanket measures which, inadvertently and indirectly, have had harmful results. Moreover, although Prevent has been the fundamental element of the British government’s counterterrorist strategy since 2006, it confuses legitimate political resistance of young British Muslims with signs of violent extremism, thus giving credence to the argument that Prevent is a form of social engineering which, in the last instance, pacifies resistance by reaffirming the status quo in the country’s domestic and foreign policy.


Worldview ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-17
Author(s):  
Gerald Franklin Hyman

Seven years after the fall of Saigori and three and a half after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia/Kampuchea, Southeast Asia is an area in search of equilibrium. That search provides the key to understanding the relations between and among the various states in the region.Vietnam's foreign policy objectives have been fairly clear and in a sense straightforward, at least since 1979. It wants de jure recognition of the status quo; that is, of a unitary Vietnamese state (now widely granted) and of both the Heng Samrin government in Cambodia and the Kaysone government in Laos (far less widely granted). Vietnam says it is seeking a normalization of relations with ASEAN and China for itself and on behalf of the other two Indochinese governments.


1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 845-847

The fourteenth session of the Council of Ministers of die Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was held in Ankara, Turkey, on April 20–21, 1966, under the chairmanship of Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, the Foreign Minister of Turkey. Others attending the session were Abbas Aram, Foreign Minister of Iran; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan; Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom; and Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States. The session had been preceded by a meeting of the CENTO Military Committee held in Tehran, Iran, on April 5–6.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 737-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Marie Blum ◽  
Christopher Sebastian Parker

President Trump is often at odds with the conservative establishment over a range of issues, not least of which is foreign policy. Yet it remains unclear whether supporting “Trumpism” is commensurate with coherent foreign policy views that are distinct from conventionally conservative positions. We evaluate whether the foreign policy views of Trump’s supporters, both in the voting public and among activists, differ from those of other Republicans. We use the 2016 ANES to examine Republican primary voters and the new 2016 State Convention Delegate Study to assess Republican activists. In doing so, we reveal systematic differences in foreign policy preferences between Trump supporters and more establishment conservatives. We demonstrate that the status-threat model need not be confined to domestic politics. Indeed, it may be extended to explain foreign policy preferences on the political right, that of Trump’s supporters in the present case. In doing so, we also find evidence that status threat may well be the source of fracture in the Republican Party.


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