Dialogue failure risks new conflicts in Venezuela

Significance Venezuela has welcomed OPEC's agreement to the first oil production cut since 2008 but this fillip was offset by a 67% fall in the black market value of the bolivar in November -- the steepest monthly fall to date. Amid triple-digit figure inflation, the Central Bank announced that new denomination bank notes will be released on December 15. Impacts The predictable collapse of the Vatican-endorsed dialogue process portends a renewed and possibly violent cycle of protest and conflict. Absent structural reform and dramatic change in fiscal and monetary policy, a lift in oil prices will not alleviate economic turbulence. Official optimism over a possible return to modest growth next year appears misplaced.

Subject The outlook for fiscal consolidation. Significance The significant drop in oil prices should not derail the fiscal consolidation trajectory mapped by President Enrique Pena Nieto's administration, which envisages that the debt/GDP ratio should stabilise by 2017. The fiscal hole opened by reduced oil prices has been compensated with greater taxation income and one-off revenues. Impacts Defying expectations, the oil price plunge did not push the government into an overtly contractionary fiscal correction. An arguably much-needed simplification of the cumbersome taxation regime will not take place due to the government's pledge not to alter it. Loose monetary policy from the autonomous central bank has worked in tandem with the government's fiscal stance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 1159-1174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Caldas Montes ◽  
Cristiane Gea

Purpose The evidence concerning the effects of the inflation targeting (IT) regime as well as greater central bank transparency on monetary policy interest rates is not conclusive, and the following questions remain open. What is the effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of monetary policy interest rate? Does central bank transparency affect the level of the monetary policy interest rate and its volatility? Are these effects greater in developing countries? The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature by answering these questions. Hence, the paper analyzes the effects of IT and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Design/methodology/approach The analysis uses a sample of 48 countries (31 developing) comprising the period between 1998 and 2014. Based on panel data methodology, estimates are made for the full sample, and then for the sample of developing countries. Findings Countries that adopt the IT regime tend to have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. The effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is smaller in developing countries. Besides, countries with more transparent central banks have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. In turn, the effect of central bank transparency on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is greater in developing countries. Practical implications The study brings important practical implications regarding the influence of both the IT regime and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Originality/value Studies have sought to analyze whether IT and central bank transparency are effective to control inflation. However, few studies analyze the influence of IT and central bank transparency on interest rates. This study differs from the few existing studies since: the analysis is done not only for the effect of transparency on the level of the monetary policy interest rate, but also on its volatility; the central bank transparency index that is used has never been utilized in this sort of analysis; and the study uses panel data methodology, and compares the results between different samples.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-190
Author(s):  
Mehrab Kiarsi

PurposeThe paper includes characterizing Ramsey policy in a cash-in-advance monetary model, under flexible and sticky prices, and with different fiscal instruments.Design/methodology/approachThe paper analytically and numerically characterizes the dynamic properties of Ramsey allocations. The author computes dynamics by solving second-order approximations to the Ramsey planner’s policy functions around a non-stochastic Ramsey steady state.FindingsThe Friedman rule is not mainly optimal in a cash-in-advance model with distorting taxes. The Ramsey-optimal policy with both taxes on income and consumption calls for a high inflation rate that is extremely volatile, despite the fact that changing prices is costly.Practical implicationsThe optimality of zero nominal interest rate under flexible prices in monetary models is not mainly the case and quite depends on the preferences. The optimality of a zero inflation rate under sticky prices also very much depends on the assumed set of fiscal instruments.Originality/valueThe non-optimality of the Friedman rule under flexible prices is quite new. Moreover, studying the optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with a rich set of fiscal instruments is also quite original.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Selim ◽  
M. Kabir Hassan

Purpose This paper aims to examine how a central bank (CB) can act as a lender of last resort (LOLR) for both Islamic and conventional interest-based banks by pursuing a Qard-al-Hasan (QH)-based monetary policy (MP). Design/methodology/approach The role of the CB as LOLR under QH-based MP and its effects on major macroeconomic variables, including deposits, loan creation and aggregate expenditures, are examined on theoretical grounds by using the aggregate output and aggregate expenditure model under the framework of Islamic MP. Findings When the CB acts as LOLR by pursuing QH-based MP, it automatically empowers Islamic banks (IBs) by providing access to borrowing funds from the CB on a QH basis. As a result, IBs will not be required to hold billions of dollars as liquid assets against liquidity risks. Thus, the lending capacity of IBs will increase and deposit expansion, loan creation and aggregate expenditures in the economy will all expand. This will in turn increase real GDP and employment while reducing the unemployment rate. Originality/value This is the first paper to analyze CBs acting as LOLR for both IBs and conventional interest-based banks by pursuing a QH-based MP, thus providing equal opportunities and equal access to borrowing facilities from the CB, along with equal partnership and fair competition for all and absolutely no discrimination to anyone. The LOLR service to all banks under QH-based MP will unveil a new horizon of opportunities where all financial institutions are expected to thrive. IBs will escape the constraints of the constant fear of liquidity risks and find a level-playing field.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-313
Author(s):  
Wondemhunegn Ezezew Melesse

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to compare business cycle fluctuations in Ethiopia under interest rate and money growth rules. Design/methodology/approach In order to achieve this objective, the author constructs a medium-scale open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The model features several nominal and real distortions including habit formation in consumption, price rigidity, deviation from purchasing power parity and imperfect capital mobility. The paper also distinguishes between liquidity-constrained and Ricardian households. The model parameters are calibrated for the Ethiopian economy based on data covering the period January 2000–April 2015. Findings The main result suggests that: the model economy with money growth rule is substantially less powerful or more muted for the amplification and transmission of exogenous shocks originating from government spending programs, monetary policy, technological progress and exchange rate movements. The responses of output to fiscal policy shocks are relatively stronger under autarky which appears to confirm the findings of Ilzetzki et al. (2013) who suggest bigger multipliers in self-sufficient, closed economies. With regard to positive productivity shock, however, the model with interest rate feedback rule generates a decline in output and an increase in inflation, which are at odds with conventional empirical regularities. Research limitations/implications The major implication is that a central bank regulating some measure of monetary stocks should not expect (fear) as much expansion (contraction) in output following currency devaluation (liquidity withdrawal) as a sister central bank that relies on an interest rate feedback rule. As emphasized by Mishra et al. (2010) the necessary conditions for stronger transmission of interest-rule-based monetary policy shocks are hardly existent in emerging and developing economies targeting monetary aggregates; hence the relatively weaker responses of output and inflation in the model economy with money growth rule. Monetary policy authorities need to be cautious when using DSGE models to analyze business cycle dynamics. Quite often, DSGE models tend to mimic the proverbial “crooked house” built to every man’s advise. Whenever additional modification is made to an existing baseline model, previously established regularities break down. For instance, this paper documented negative response of output to technology shock. Such contradictions are not uncommon. For example, Furlanetto (2006) and Ramayandi (2008) have also found similarly inconsistent responses to fiscal and productivity shocks, respectively. Originality/value Using DSGE models for research and teaching purposes is not common in developing economies. To the best of the author’s knowledge, only one other Ethiopian author did apply DSGE model to study business cycle fluctuation in Ethiopia albeit under the implausible assumption of perfect capital mobility and a central bank following interest rate rule. The contribution of this paper is that it departs from these two unrealistic assumptions by allowing international risk premium as a function of the net foreign asset position of the country and by applying money growth rule which closely mimics the behavior of central banks in low-income economies such as Ethiopia.


Significance Khartoum has benefited from a fixed per-barrel transit fee given falling oil prices, but the Sudanese economy has yet to recover from the shock caused by South Sudan's secession in 2011. According to the IMF's latest review, Sudan at that point lost three quarters of its oil production, one-half of its fiscal revenue and two-thirds of its international payments capacity. While the economy has begun to stabilise, recovery is fragile. Impacts Khartoum benefits from the delay to transit fee renegotiation, but talks are likely to begin soon. This may provoke renewed confrontations over other issues, such as the border and claims about rebel support. However, a renewed suspension of South Sudanese oil exports would hurt Juba more than Khartoum.


Significance In the worst start to a year for US equities since 2008, the benchmark S&P 500 index fell 0.7% during the week ending January 10. December's employment report showed US non-farm payrolls rising by a robust 252,000, but average hourly earnings declined, accentuating deflationary fears. The dollar continued to strengthen against the euro on concerns about a possible euro crisis over Greece and the introduction of sovereign QE by the ECB. With the US Federal Reserve preparing to raise rates, investor sentiment remains fragile. Impacts The tug-of-war between central bank largesse and country-specific, geopolitical and economic risks will become more intense. Markets will focus on renewed fears of 'Grexit' and on concerns about German opposition to an ECB sovereign QE programme. The relentless oil prices slide, exacerbated by the dollar's strength, will put further strain on EM assets. The ruble is likely to weaken further, increasing the scope for contagion to other developing economies.


Significance The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) should easily get the most votes, but it faces a likely setback and a dent in its authority. Weakening support from its voters and Turkey's proportional representation system are likely to drive its number of parliamentary seats down from the 327 out of 550 seats it won in 2011, perhaps even to the point where an overall majority is in doubt. Impacts Market confidence and the lira may weaken, but will not deteriorate drastically, unless AKP is forced out of office -- a remote scenario. Fiscal and monetary policy may be loosened to win support until a new government able to last for a full four-year term is in office. A politically weaker AKP risks long-term splits, but these will not emerge unless there have been months of instability. Growing internal discord -- and the government's defiant response to its critics at home and abroad -- may isolate Turkey internationally. The United States and EU will continue to avoid confrontation with the Erdogan government as far as possible.


Significance The slowing down of Kazakhstan's economy continues against a background of slow global growth, the turbulent economic situation in Russia and low oil prices. Lower-than-projected oil prices will reduce budget revenues and forecasts; on January 16, Astana said it was revising its budgets for 2015-17 to mirror an average oil price of 50 dollars/barrel, as current budgets were based on 80 dollars/barrel. The blow will be softened by substantial reserves, which are expected to be used to stimulate the economy. Dwindling demand for commodities will negatively affect the profitability of Kazakhstan's major producers. The cumulative spillover from the Russian-Ukrainian crisis is substantial, although manageable at present. Impacts Further devaluation of the tenge would undermine public confidence in Kazakhstan's national currency. Increased dollarisation of Kazakhstan's economy will make regulation difficult by monetary policy. Ruble depreciation will put pressure on the tenge and promote replacement of domestic products with Russian imports.


Significance Expectations that the Fed will refrain from hiking its benchmark rates from its target range of 0.25-0.5% and that the Japanese central bank will provide further stimulus are suppressing volatility in financial markets and fuelling demand for risk assets. However, evidence that "overburdened" monetary policy is losing its efficacy triggered a sell-off in bonds and equities on September 9, increasing the scope for sharper price falls as investors worry that central banks have run out of ammunition. Impacts Services expanded in August at their slowest pace since 2010, making it less likely that the Fed will raise interest rates this month. EM bond and equity mutual funds have enjoyed a surge in inflows since the Brexit vote as yield-hungry investors pour money into risk assets Oil, a key determinant of investor sentiment, will stay below 50 dollars/barrel unless major producers agree measures to stabilise prices.


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