Xi's legacy hinges on leadership reshuffle

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Political ◽  
Corporate Debt ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Quiet Revolution ◽  
One Belt One Road ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Party Congress

Subject The upcoming Chinese Communist Party Congress. Significance President Xi Jinping may be about to upend China’s post-Mao succession arrangements at the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled to open on October 18. Xi has engineered a 'quiet revolution' that has introduced new risks into China's domestic and foreign policies. To continue his unfinished revolution and safeguard its legacy, Xi has the incentive and the political momentum to seek a third term as the head of the Party. Impacts Most of Xi's ambitious projects are works in progress, and success is far from certain. Xi’s leadership could be called into question should the economy run into serious problems, related to corporate debt, for instance. Failure of One Belt One Road or a serious breakdown in relations with Washington could cause problems for Xi domestically.

Party Congress will set China's course to 2022

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
100Th Anniversary ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sixth Generation ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Party Congress

Subject China's 19th Communist Party Congress. Significance Preparations are underway for the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which is likely to be scheduled for October or November. Much political groundwork has been laid in support of President Xi Jinping and for progress on his vision for China. The Congress will set a direction towards the 100th anniversary in 2021 of the founding of the Party and the handover of power to a sixth generation of leaders shortly after. Impacts Beijing will probably be cautious in its foreign policy during the months running up to the Congress. Consolidating his position at the Congress should increase Xi's ability to press his economically reformist, politically illiberal agenda. Bar any serious reversal, Xi will be in a position to dominate Chinese politics after he retires from formal offices.

A Law Unto Itself: Chinese Communist Party Leadership and Yifa zhiguo in the Xi Era

Modern China ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Trevaskes
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Power Relations ◽  
The Political ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
The Law ◽  
Key Aspects

This article explores the political significance of “governing the nation in accordance with the law” 依法治国 ( yifa zhiguo) in the Xi Jinping era. It examines party statements and propaganda about the necessity of exercising party leadership over all key aspects of law-based governance, particularly the politico-legal system. The aim is to understand the strategic need for yifa zhiguo as part of the ideological repertoire of the Xi leadership. The argument is that yifa zhiguo is essentially an ideological and strategic message about power relations under Xi and the capacity of the party to withstand various threats to its credibility and thus ultimately to bring about the nation’s and party’s rejuvenation.

scholarly journals Deepening Not Departure: Xi Jinping's Governance of China's State-owned Economy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Wendy Leutert ◽  
Sarah Eaton
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Management System ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Political ◽  
Centralized Control ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
And Control ◽  
Radical Shift

Abstract To what extent has governance of China's state-owned economy changed under Xi Jinping? Against the background of momentous shifts in the political arena since 2012, some observe a decisive departure in Xi's approach to managing state-owned enterprises (SOEs): towards tight centralized control by the Chinese Communist Party and away from gradual marketization. Analysing the main aims and methods of SOE governance over the last two decades, we find that SOE policy under Xi exhibits a deepening of pre-existing trends rather than a departure. First, the essential vision of SOE functions articulated under Xi is strikingly consistent with that of his predecessors. Second, his administration's approach to governing SOEs is not novel; it relies on established mechanisms of bureaucratic design, the cadre management system, Party organizations and campaigns. While Xi has amplified Party-centred tools of command and control, this appears to be an incremental rather than a radical shift in approach.

scholarly journals Of Constitutions, Campaigns and Commissions: A Century of Democratic Centralism under the CCP

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Patricia M. Thornton
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Adaptive Governance ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Contemporary China ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Democratic Centralism ◽  
Organizational Principle ◽  
History Of ◽  
Party Congress

Abstract Democratic centralism, a hallmark of Leninist party organizations, has played a formative role in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yet despite being hailed as an “inviolable” and “unchanging” Party principle, understandings of democratic centralism have shifted dramatically over the century of its existence. This study traces the long arc of the concept's evolution across successive Party Constitutions, focusing on three critical historical junctures: the Sixth Party Congress, which formally adopted democratic centralism into its Constitution as an organizational principle; the Seventh Party Congress, which adopted rectification as the Party's practice of democratic centralism; and the 19th Party Congress, which set a new milestone in codifying the system as a disciplinary tool. I argue that while democratic centralism exemplifies the CCP's institutional plasticity and adaptive governance and is critical to understanding Party-driven constitutionalism in contemporary China, it also highlights an irresolvable paradox inherent in Party rule. Adaptability does not necessarily impart resilience. I conclude that the CCP's normatively unconstrained extra-constitutional leadership under Xi Jinping highlights the essentially and increasingly irrationalist aspects of its illiberal governance project.

Prospects for Chinese politics in 2018

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The World ◽  
National Congress ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Dominant Influence

Subject Prospect for politics in China in 2018. Significance Last month’s 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party saw President Xi Jinping confirmed as the single most powerful person in China. He can now pursue his ambitions for the country with tighter coordination and greater intensity. These include transforming China into a dominant influence on the world stage.

Writing about the Past, an Act of Resistance

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-42
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Official Publication ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Past ◽  
On Line ◽  
Historical Truth ◽  
Historical Accounts

Since taking power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has consistently tried to enforce a monopoly on the writing and interpretation of history. However, since 1998 individual initiatives have increased in the field of memory. Confronting official amnesia, victims of Maoist movements have decided to write their versions of history before it is too late. This chapter presents a typology of these endeavours. Annals of the Yellow Emperor (Yanhuang chunqiu), an official publication, enjoyed some freedom to publish dissenting historical accounts but was suppressed in 2016. With the rise of the internet, unofficial journals appeared that were often dedicated to a specific period: Tie Liu’s Small traces of the Past (Wangshi weihen) published accounts of victims of the Anti-Rightist movement for almost a decade before the editor was arrested; Wu Di’s Remembrance (Jiyi) founded by former Red Guards and rusticated youth circulates on line. The third type is the samizdat: targets of repression during Mao’s reign recount their experience in books that are published at their own expense and circulated privately. Most of these “entrepreneurs of memory” are convinced that restoring historical truth is a pre-requisite to China’s democratization. Since Xi Jinping came to power, they have suffered repression.

scholarly journals Indonesia, Tiongkok dan Komunisme, 1949-1965

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Satriono Priyo Utomo
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Political ◽  
Diplomatic Relations ◽  
Mass Mobilization ◽  
Meeting Room ◽  
Political Concept ◽  
The People ◽  
Communist Ideology ◽  
The Relationship

During the leadership of President Sukarno, China had an important meaning not only for the people of Indonesia but also as a source of political concept from the perspective of Sukarno. In addition, China also had significance for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a meeting room prior to communist ideology. The paper employs literary study method and discusses about diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China during the Guidance Democracy ( 1949-1965). The relationship between two countries at that time exhibited closeness between Sukarno and Mao Tse Tung. The political dynamics at that time brought the spirit of the New Emerging Forces. Both leaders relied on mass mobilization politics in which Mao used the Chinese Communist Party while Sukarno used the PKI.Keywords: Indonesia, China, diplomacy, politics, ideology, communism

The Political Economy of Land Reform in China's “Newly Liberated Areas”: Evidence from Wuxi County

2008 ◽  
Vol 195 ◽  
pp. 675-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kai-Sing Kung
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Political ◽  
Land Inequality ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Farm Survey ◽  
Class Status ◽  
The Rich

AbstractA farm survey conducted in Wuxi county in the 1950s found that the Chinese Communist Party had successfully “preserved the rich peasant economy” in the “newly liberated areas”: the landlords were indeed the only social class whose properties had been redistributed, yet without compromising on the magnitude of benefits received by the poor peasants. A higher land inequality in that region, coupled with an inter-village transfer of land, allowed these dual goals to be achieved. Our study further reveals that class status was determined both by the amount of land a household owned and whether it had committed certain “exploitative acts,” which explains why some landlords did not own a vast amount of land. Conversely, it was the amount of land owned, not class status, that determined redistributive entitlements, which was why 15 per cent of the poor peasants and half of the middle peasants were not redistributed any land.

scholarly journals Mummifying the Working Class: The Cultural Revolution and the Fates of the Political Parties of the 20th Century

2016 ◽  
Vol 227 ◽  
pp. 653-673 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Russo
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Working Class ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Cultural Revolution ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Cultural Revolution

AbstractA number of prolonged political experiments in Chinese factories during the Cultural Revolution proved that, despite any alleged “historical” connection between the Communist Party and the “working class,” the role of the workers, lacking a deep political reinvention, was framed by a regime of subordination that was ultimately not dissimilar from that under capitalist command. This paper argues that one key point of Deng Xiaoping's reforms derived from taking these experimental results into account accurately but redirecting them towards the opposite aim, an even more stringent disciplining of wage labour. The outcome so far is a governmental discourse which plays an important role in upholding the term “working class” among the emblems of power, while at the same time nailing the workers to an unconditional obedience. The paper discusses the assumption that, while this stratagem is one factor behind the stabilization of the Chinese Communist Party, it has nonetheless affected the decline of the party systems inherited from the 20th century.

Ideologues steer China to undemocratic future

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Party Ideology ◽  
Foreign Governments ◽  
People's Congress

Subject The significance of the 'Four Comprehensives' ideological campaign. Significance Shortly before the National People's Congress opened last month, the state media presented the 'Four Comprehensives'. This is the rhetorical framework for the next stage of President Xi Jinping's leadership, and may become Xi's enduring contribution to Chinese Communist Party ideology. Impacts The Four Comprehensives signal that Xi intends the austerity and disciplinary campaigns to continue indefinitely. The Four Comprehensives are vague enough that policymakers of many stripes will invoke them to argue their case. Foreign governments and businesses should take ideological processes in China seriously; they are not 'empty' slogans.

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