scholarly journals Deepening Not Departure: Xi Jinping's Governance of China's State-owned Economy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Wendy Leutert ◽  
Sarah Eaton

Abstract To what extent has governance of China's state-owned economy changed under Xi Jinping? Against the background of momentous shifts in the political arena since 2012, some observe a decisive departure in Xi's approach to managing state-owned enterprises (SOEs): towards tight centralized control by the Chinese Communist Party and away from gradual marketization. Analysing the main aims and methods of SOE governance over the last two decades, we find that SOE policy under Xi exhibits a deepening of pre-existing trends rather than a departure. First, the essential vision of SOE functions articulated under Xi is strikingly consistent with that of his predecessors. Second, his administration's approach to governing SOEs is not novel; it relies on established mechanisms of bureaucratic design, the cadre management system, Party organizations and campaigns. While Xi has amplified Party-centred tools of command and control, this appears to be an incremental rather than a radical shift in approach.

Modern China ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Trevaskes

This article explores the political significance of “governing the nation in accordance with the law” 依法治国 ( yifa zhiguo) in the Xi Jinping era. It examines party statements and propaganda about the necessity of exercising party leadership over all key aspects of law-based governance, particularly the politico-legal system. The aim is to understand the strategic need for yifa zhiguo as part of the ideological repertoire of the Xi leadership. The argument is that yifa zhiguo is essentially an ideological and strategic message about power relations under Xi and the capacity of the party to withstand various threats to its credibility and thus ultimately to bring about the nation’s and party’s rejuvenation.


Subject The upcoming Chinese Communist Party Congress. Significance President Xi Jinping may be about to upend China’s post-Mao succession arrangements at the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled to open on October 18. Xi has engineered a 'quiet revolution' that has introduced new risks into China's domestic and foreign policies. To continue his unfinished revolution and safeguard its legacy, Xi has the incentive and the political momentum to seek a third term as the head of the Party. Impacts Most of Xi's ambitious projects are works in progress, and success is far from certain. Xi’s leadership could be called into question should the economy run into serious problems, related to corporate debt, for instance. Failure of One Belt One Road or a serious breakdown in relations with Washington could cause problems for Xi domestically.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Patricia M. Thornton

Abstract Democratic centralism, a hallmark of Leninist party organizations, has played a formative role in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yet despite being hailed as an “inviolable” and “unchanging” Party principle, understandings of democratic centralism have shifted dramatically over the century of its existence. This study traces the long arc of the concept's evolution across successive Party Constitutions, focusing on three critical historical junctures: the Sixth Party Congress, which formally adopted democratic centralism into its Constitution as an organizational principle; the Seventh Party Congress, which adopted rectification as the Party's practice of democratic centralism; and the 19th Party Congress, which set a new milestone in codifying the system as a disciplinary tool. I argue that while democratic centralism exemplifies the CCP's institutional plasticity and adaptive governance and is critical to understanding Party-driven constitutionalism in contemporary China, it also highlights an irresolvable paradox inherent in Party rule. Adaptability does not necessarily impart resilience. I conclude that the CCP's normatively unconstrained extra-constitutional leadership under Xi Jinping highlights the essentially and increasingly irrationalist aspects of its illiberal governance project.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 65-87
Author(s):  
Li Xing

This article proposes a framework for understanding the way the Chinese Revolution emerged, developed and achieved power (1921-49), then further consolidated in the period of socialist 'uninterrupted revolution' (1949-77) and was finally abandoned by the post-Mao regime (1977 to the present). This analysis is based on a perspective of discourse theories framed in historically new forms of political, social and ideological relations. In other words, it attempts to conceptualize the transformation of China and the Chinese Communist Party by analysing the role of ideological discourses (arguments and interpretations) and the cognitive elements (beliefs, goals, desires, expertise, knowledge) as the driving-force behind societal transformations. The discourse theory applied here – logocentrism and econocentrism – also serves both as a political arena of struggle to confer legitimacy on a specific socio-political project and as a distinctive cog ni tive and evaluative framework for understanding societal transformations. The conceptualization of the paper is informed by the work of David Apter and Tony Saich on discourse theory.


Since taking power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has consistently tried to enforce a monopoly on the writing and interpretation of history. However, since 1998 individual initiatives have increased in the field of memory. Confronting official amnesia, victims of Maoist movements have decided to write their versions of history before it is too late. This chapter presents a typology of these endeavours. Annals of the Yellow Emperor (Yanhuang chunqiu), an official publication, enjoyed some freedom to publish dissenting historical accounts but was suppressed in 2016. With the rise of the internet, unofficial journals appeared that were often dedicated to a specific period: Tie Liu’s Small traces of the Past (Wangshi weihen) published accounts of victims of the Anti-Rightist movement for almost a decade before the editor was arrested; Wu Di’s Remembrance (Jiyi) founded by former Red Guards and rusticated youth circulates on line. The third type is the samizdat: targets of repression during Mao’s reign recount their experience in books that are published at their own expense and circulated privately. Most of these “entrepreneurs of memory” are convinced that restoring historical truth is a pre-requisite to China’s democratization. Since Xi Jinping came to power, they have suffered repression.


1987 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 591-630 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alastair I. Johnston

In October 1983 the secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hu Yaobang, formally announced the beginning of a two-stage, three-year Party rectification. The first stage, from November 1983 to around December 1984, would concentrate on the rectification of Party committees (dangwei) and leading offices at the Centre and in the provinces, major municipalities and autonomous regions. The second stage, from early 1985 to the end of 1986, would focus on rectification of Party organizations below provincial level. In fact, however, rectification was not officially ended until May 1987.


Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 545
Author(s):  
Philip J. Ivanhoe

Notions of “face” play a central role in traditional East Asian ethics and, in particular, in Confucian views about the self and its cultivation. Awareness of and attention to face is central to self-reflection and evaluation and, when properly employed, motivate one to continue to strive to improve oneself morally. Today, the Chinese Communist Party seeks to monitor and control its population by means of an extensive system of surveillance that is increasingly controlled by artificial intelligence programs. This not only undermines traditional conceptions of face but ultimately the role and ability of the party to set and enforce its own view of what Chinese citizens should seek and pursue.


2019 ◽  
pp. 135406881986362
Author(s):  
Sergiu Gherghina ◽  
Sorina Soare

In spite of extensive research dedicated to the rise and development of fringe populist political parties in Eastern Europe, little attention has been paid to the organizational determinants of their electoral performance. This article aims to fill this void in the literature and analyzes the extent to which particular types of leadership and party organization could influence the electoral performance of three political parties from Bulgaria, Republic of Moldova, and Romania. The qualitative analysis is conducted for the period 2012–2015 and uses a combination of primary (party statutes) and secondary sources (party histories, electoral databases, and literature). The results indicate how the existence of underdeveloped party organizations has a negative influence on the electoral performance, while strong and charismatic leaders are an insufficient condition for ensuring survival on the political arena.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Satriono Priyo Utomo

During the leadership of President Sukarno, China had an important meaning not only for the people of Indonesia but also as a source of political concept from the perspective of Sukarno. In addition, China also had significance for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a meeting room prior to communist ideology. The paper employs literary study method and discusses about diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China during the Guidance Democracy ( 1949-1965). The relationship between two countries at that time exhibited closeness between Sukarno and Mao Tse Tung. The political dynamics at that time brought the spirit of the New Emerging Forces. Both leaders relied on mass mobilization politics in which Mao used the Chinese Communist Party while Sukarno used the PKI.Keywords: Indonesia, China, diplomacy, politics, ideology, communism


2008 ◽  
Vol 195 ◽  
pp. 675-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kai-Sing Kung

AbstractA farm survey conducted in Wuxi county in the 1950s found that the Chinese Communist Party had successfully “preserved the rich peasant economy” in the “newly liberated areas”: the landlords were indeed the only social class whose properties had been redistributed, yet without compromising on the magnitude of benefits received by the poor peasants. A higher land inequality in that region, coupled with an inter-village transfer of land, allowed these dual goals to be achieved. Our study further reveals that class status was determined both by the amount of land a household owned and whether it had committed certain “exploitative acts,” which explains why some landlords did not own a vast amount of land. Conversely, it was the amount of land owned, not class status, that determined redistributive entitlements, which was why 15 per cent of the poor peasants and half of the middle peasants were not redistributed any land.


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