Balkans will stick with United States over Chinese 5G

Significance With Bulgaria signing on October 23, 27 out of 30 NATO members have joined the pact, and only Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro in the Balkans have not. According to the US State Department, the programme aims to safeguard data privacy, security and human rights from such “authoritarian malign actors” as the Chinese Communist Party. Impacts The time may have come for Balkans countries to evaluate their own needs, capabilities and interests, against what the big powers want. Signatory countries will start implementing Clean Network core principles, ultimately distancing themselves from China and Huawei. Chinese influence in the region takes various forms and will remain strong even if it loses the fight for the Balkan 5G market.

2001 ◽  
Vol 100 (647) ◽  
pp. 263-268
Author(s):  
Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom

When attempting to bring pressure on Beijing, the United States should stop using vague universal standards or comparisons with the contemporary United States. Washington's criticisms of the Chinese Communist Party should instead build on Beijing's own claims about history and politics.


Significance The US-led diplomatic boycott of the Winter Olympics in February will increase the pressure on US companies to decide whether China or the United States is their more valuable market. Some of that pressure to decide is coming from employees and customers in both countries. Impacts More frequent and sharper confrontations between US companies and China could accelerate the decoupling of the two economies. Renewed emphasis on human rights concerns will encourage the further shifting of some supply chain elements out of China. Consumer brands are particularly vulnerable to human rights concerns, as are their suppliers.


1987 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 256-275
Author(s):  
Jon W. Huebner

On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China was formally established in Beijing. On 7 December Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who had earlier moved to Taiwan to secure a final base of resistance in the civil war, ordered the Kuomintang (KMT) regime to withdraw to the island from Chengdu, Sichuan, its last seat on the mainland. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared its commitment to the goal of unifying the nation under the People's Republic, and thus called for the “liberation” of Taiwan. Although Taiwan represented the final phase of the still unfinished civil war, it was the strategic significance of the island that became of paramount concern to the CCP, the KMT and the United States.


Significance Under pressure from the US and EU ambassadors, Bosnia's leaders have reached agreement to form a state government. The breakthrough has provided a badly needed respite from political paralysis; it required difficult concessions from all sides. Impacts By emphasising each side's concessions, politically affiliated media could jeopardise a shaky settlement. The United States and EU are too preoccupied with mainly internal problems to re-engage in Bosnia or the Balkans more concretely. Tensions between Russia and the West are being reflected in Bosnian politics.


2001 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-244
Author(s):  
XIXIAO GUO

Late 1946 was a time of anticlimax in the history of Sino-American relations. For four years since the outbreak of the Pacific War, thousands of American servicemen had been in China rubbing shoulders with the Chinese. When victory finally came, more United States troops (mainly the marines of the Third Amphibious Corps) poured in, and the Chinese hailed them as heroes. In less than a year, however, as hostilities between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) closed in, the Americans were caught in the crossfire. Along the communication lines in North China, armed clashes between US and CCP forces escalated; in the cities, anti-American rallies became daily occurrences. The Chinese now became hostile to its erstwhile allies; wherever US servicemen went, they received boos from the locals. The rupture seemed to be irreversible: US forces started to evacuated, George Marshall, the presidential envoy to China, also ended his yearlong mediation, thus bringing the extraordinary intercourse between the two nations to an anticlimactic conclusion.


Subject China's 19th Communist Party Congress. Significance Preparations are underway for the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which is likely to be scheduled for October or November. Much political groundwork has been laid in support of President Xi Jinping and for progress on his vision for China. The Congress will set a direction towards the 100th anniversary in 2021 of the founding of the Party and the handover of power to a sixth generation of leaders shortly after. Impacts Beijing will probably be cautious in its foreign policy during the months running up to the Congress. Consolidating his position at the Congress should increase Xi's ability to press his economically reformist, politically illiberal agenda. Bar any serious reversal, Xi will be in a position to dominate Chinese politics after he retires from formal offices.


Significance Although North Korea’s nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are still rudimentary by international standards, Pyongyang’s threats of striking targets in the continental United States have more credible technological underpinnings than before. The development of North Korean ICBMs threatens to ‘decouple’ Washington from Seoul and Tokyo, whereby US security commitments to allies become less credible because Pyongyang could attack the US homeland. Impacts Budget battles in Washington preclude extensive investment in mainland US ballistic missile defence systems. However, further integration of Japan and South Korea into the US regional missile defence network is likely. State Department vacancies for ambassadorships and Washington-based Asia policy officials will hinder US reassurance efforts. US interception of North Korean smuggling vessels or overflying missiles risk military-to-military armed clashes.


Significance Presumptive presidential election winner Joe Biden is reputed not to have trusted Suga’s predecessor, while Democratic governments in general are seen in Tokyo as giving Japan a low priority. Impacts A US return to multilateralism will begin to rebuild Japan’s diminished respect for the United States. East Asia specialists may return to the US State Department, making for better informed and probably more consistent policy towards Japan. Talks on repairing Japan-South Korea relations are reportedly underway behind the scenes; a creative solution may be found. Together with European partners, Japan and the United States would make a powerful alliance at the COP26 climate talks in November 2021.


2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1065-1078 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelebogile Zvobgo

Abstract The United States—an architect of international criminal tribunals in the twentieth century—has since moderated its involvement in international justice. Striking to many observers is the United States’ failure to join the International Criminal Court—the institutional successor to the tribunals the nation helped install in Germany, Japan, the Balkans, and Rwanda. Interestingly, the US public’s support of the ICC increases yearly despite the government’s ambivalence about, and even hostility toward, the Court. Drawing on the US foreign policy public opinion literature, I theorize that human rights frames increase support for joining the ICC among Americans, whereas national interest frames decrease support. I administer an online survey experiment to evaluate these expectations and find consistent support. I additionally test hypotheses from the framing literature in American politics regarding the effect of exposure to two competing frames. I find that participants exposed to competing frames hold more moderate positions than participants exposed to a single frame but differ appreciably from the control group. Crucially, I find that participants’ beliefs about international organizations’ effectiveness and impartiality are equally, if not more, salient than the treatments. Thus, the ICC may be able to mobilize support and pressure policy change by demonstrating effectiveness and impartiality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (02) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Gang CHEN

In September 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping urged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to gear up in countering imminent “struggles” and in achieving the ambitious “two centennial” targets amid the US–China trade war, Hong Kong unrest and a slowing economy. A novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak that erupted in Wuhan in October 2019 had scuppered China’s timeline to achieve its targets. While China successfully curbed the spread of COVID-19 within its border, enormous challenges lie ahead for China to maintain its economic growth and social stability. The daunting combat against the COVID-19 pandemic marks the beginning of the testing time.


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