South Korea defence ambitions may exceed capabilities

Significance It also benefits from policies that heavily favour the domestic arms industry. This has resulted in a well-equipped modern military and a high degree of self-reliance in equipping it. However, this model may be unsustainable. Impacts Seoul will likely attempt to expand armaments collaboration with other countries to gain additional resources, technologies and markets. China’s military modernisation is an increasing concern, including in the context of potential war with China’s ally, North Korea. Threats from North Korea make air and missile defence the top procurement priorities.

Subject North Korea-US relations. Significance The ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) held a Plenum on December 28-31. Supreme leader Kim Jong-un’s uncompromising keynote speech included an explicit abrogation of his two-year moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests, plus a pledge to reveal an unspecified “new strategic weapon” soon. Personnel changes, both announced and apparent, also suggest a turn away from diplomacy. Impacts Chinese economic support will be vital for North Korea, despite Kim’s rhetoric of self-reliance. Nuclear testing would anger Beijing, whose cooperation Kim needs, so an ICBM launch is likelier. South Korea, unmentioned in Kim’s speech, will be sidelined; President Moon Jae-in’s peace process is in tatters.


Significance South Korea’s unification minister (MOU) warned on April 10 that any US strike on North Korea would put “the safety of the public” at risk. A day later, Seoul’s defence (MND) and foreign (MFA) ministries dismissed rumours on local social media of an imminent war crisis as “overblown” and “groundless”, respectively. Moon Jae-in, the liberal opposition candidate whom most polls predict will win the May 9 snap presidential election, said he does not expect a US pre-emptive strike on the North. However, Moon also warned Washington that South Korea is “the concerned party” which “owns” peninsula-related matters, including the nuclear issue. Impacts Experienced military professionals in Trump’s cabinet and National Security Council are a restraining influence. South Korea and Japan, being in the front line, will counsel their US protector against any action that might imperil their security. If Moon Jae-in is elected, his desire to re-engage the North will clash with Trump’s hard-line attitude and narrow nuclear focus. After his smooth -- if insubstantial -- summit with Xi, Trump’s threatened unilateralism on North Korea is likely to stop at sanctions.


Subject Politics in South Korea. Significance President Moon Jae-in has hailed the second summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump due to be held in Hanoi on February 27-28 as a “remarkable breakthrough” for peace on the Korean peninsula. Moon hopes the meeting will lead to an easing of sanctions on Pyongyang, enabling inter-Korean cooperation such as the relinking of roads and railways to progress, and that this will boost his waning popularity. Impacts US pressure on Seoul to pay more for US troops in South Korea may stoke anti-US sentiment. Rising tensions with Japan will ultimately cause problems for both countries, and their currently indifferent US ally. Pinning hopes on the unpredictable Kim and Trump is risky; failure with North Korea would galvanise the conservatives.


Subject Japan-South Korea relations. Significance Japan-South Korea relations have global significance. The two are East Asia’s largest and second-largest advanced economies and play a vital role in the economy of the Asia-Pacific region, including in the creation of large free trade areas. Their relationship also affects security issues related to North Korea. Impacts The shared threat from North Korea and the alliances both governments have with Washington will force a degree of cooperation. Intractable political and psychological issues related to history will impede cooperation indefinitely. Bilateral economic ties will remain large-scale and important for both sides, but gradually become less so.


Subject The outlook for North Korea-US denuclearisation talks. Significance On June 30, President Donald Trump used a long-planned trip to South Korea after the G20 summit in Osaka to visit the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), for his third meeting in barely a year with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Impacts Working talks will resume, but progress may depend on Pyongyang gaining partial sanctions relief. Inter-Korean relations will likely remain stalled unless sanctions are eased. The peninsula has not become risk-free; Kim may miscalculate or hardliners could push for policies even Trump cannot accept. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seeks his own summit with Kim; Kim has scant incentive to grant one.


Significance This followed Pyongyang’s breach of its 17-month moratorium on missile testing with two volleys on May 4 and May 9, each personally supervised by Kim and both including short-range ballistic missile launches. Impacts Kim has given Washington until the end of the year to rethink its stance; that is possible but unlikely. Pyongyang’s new missile may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defences. South Korea will persevere with cooperation efforts for now, despite Pyongyang’s rebuffs.


Subject North Korea's foreign relations. Significance China’s President Xi Jinping visited Pyongyang on June 20-21, ahead of the G20 summit in Osaka where he will meet his US counterpart Donald Trump. Trump is then due in Seoul on June 29-30 to meet President Moon Jae-in. Reports that Trump may visit Panmunjom in the inter-Korean Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) have sparked speculation of steps to revive nuclear diplomacy, possibly even including an unannounced third summit with Kim. Impacts North Korea will be Trump’s main agenda item in Seoul, so some initiative seems likely. South Korea risks being sidelined if nuclear diplomacy resumes, with China perhaps taking the intermediary role. If Trump and Kim meet at Panmunjom, that would boost Moon’s position; the more so if he joins them.


Keyword(s):  

Headline NORTH KOREA: Seoul will mediate US-North Korea talks


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Nam Kwang Kyu

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present the North Korea policy pursued by the Moon Jae-in administration and discuss the possibility of a weakened alliance between South Korea and the USA. Design/methodology/approach This paper compares the North Korean policies and the ROK–US alliance under the Moon administration, analyzing the recent inter-Korean and North Korea–US summits, with a focus on the issues of denuclearization and establishing a peace regime. Findings This paper reveals that the approach taken by the Moon administration regarding North Korea is similar to that of North Korea and China, and that the ROK–US alliance is likely to weaken should there be any change concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. Originality/value Denuclearization takes place in accordance with the agreement between North Korea and the USA, there is a high likelihood of the ROK–US alliance weakening.


Significance Moon Jae-in’s preoccupations in his final year as president will remain local -- not least, coordinating policy on North Korea with the Biden administration. However, his successor, to be elected in March 2022, will have broader horizons. Impacts Ignoring Pyongyang may prompt new and potentially bloody provocations, as happened to President Lee Myung-bak in 2010. South Korea will pursue fresh free trade agreements. Its declared intention to join the CPTPP has not yet yielded a specific roadmap. Asia will remain Seoul’s main focus; South Asia, especially India, offers many untapped synergies. ‘Top table’ ambitions such as the G7 summit will make it more difficult for Seoul to ignore human rights in its diplomacy, as it used to.


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