Pyongyang party plenum presages provocations

Subject North Korea-US relations. Significance The ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) held a Plenum on December 28-31. Supreme leader Kim Jong-un’s uncompromising keynote speech included an explicit abrogation of his two-year moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests, plus a pledge to reveal an unspecified “new strategic weapon” soon. Personnel changes, both announced and apparent, also suggest a turn away from diplomacy. Impacts Chinese economic support will be vital for North Korea, despite Kim’s rhetoric of self-reliance. Nuclear testing would anger Beijing, whose cooperation Kim needs, so an ICBM launch is likelier. South Korea, unmentioned in Kim’s speech, will be sidelined; President Moon Jae-in’s peace process is in tatters.

Subject North Korea's worsening economic situation. Significance A change of premier and increased stress by supreme leader Kim Jong-un on self-reliance both suggest that tentative market reforms are stalled. Pyongyang is appealing for food aid, with the UN and others warning of a risk of famine. Leaked internal documents reveal unrealistic targets for GDP growth, and an equally impossible wish to lessen trade and other dependence on China. Impacts Despite Kim’s bonhomie with President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok, Russia can offer little economic support. South Korea’s government wants economic cooperation, but, to Pyongyang’s anger, will not defy UN sanctions. Washington will not agree to ease sanctions without material concessions by Kim. China remains Kim’s bulwark, uncomfortably for both; Beijing cannot openly defy sanctions, but will not risk collapse on its borders.


Significance It also benefits from policies that heavily favour the domestic arms industry. This has resulted in a well-equipped modern military and a high degree of self-reliance in equipping it. However, this model may be unsustainable. Impacts Seoul will likely attempt to expand armaments collaboration with other countries to gain additional resources, technologies and markets. China’s military modernisation is an increasing concern, including in the context of potential war with China’s ally, North Korea. Threats from North Korea make air and missile defence the top procurement priorities.


Significance This followed Pyongyang’s breach of its 17-month moratorium on missile testing with two volleys on May 4 and May 9, each personally supervised by Kim and both including short-range ballistic missile launches. Impacts Kim has given Washington until the end of the year to rethink its stance; that is possible but unlikely. Pyongyang’s new missile may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defences. South Korea will persevere with cooperation efforts for now, despite Pyongyang’s rebuffs.


Subject The first summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un. Significance On March 26-27 Kim Jong-un, North Korea's supreme leader, paid an unexpected two-day visit to Beijing for a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The visit's goal was to secure Chinese support for the coming summits with the presidents of South Korea and the United States and to soften up the hard-line stance China has taken towards North Korea over the past year. Impacts Pyongyang will pay lip service to eventual denuclearisation, but keep at least some of its arsenal under any conditions. Pyongyang's rejection of US demands for immediate and complete denuclearisation could lead to a new, more dangerous, nuclear crisis. Trade-related tensions between Washington and Beijing work in Pyongyang's favour.


Subject North Korea's politics and foreign relations. Significance North Korea on May 9 announced its first ever test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Separately, Pyongyang has yet to comment on allegations by South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) on May 13 that the North's defence minister, Hyon Yong-chol, was publicly executed using anti-aircraft guns around April 30, apparently for disrespect and disobedience to Kim. Impacts Delivering on pledges of economic improvement would buy Kim loyalty, but there are reasons for pessimism. The new missile threat will raise North Korea's place on the list of US priorities. Decisions on missile defence in South Korea will become more urgent.


Significance North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited China during January 7-10. He spent his 35th birthday in Beijing and met Chinese President Xi Jinping for the fourth time in ten months. Meanwhile, Pompeo implied on January 11 that sanctions on North Korea could be eased, with a focus on removing its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat to the United States rather than full denuclearisation. Impacts Xi might make an overdue return visit to Pyongyang in April, perhaps before Kim’s promised first visit to Seoul. Other Asian leaders may visit Pyongyang too, conferring legitimacy on Kim. South Korea may once again challenge China for influence in North Korea.


Subject Prospects for North Korea in 2018. Significance 2018 will be Kim Jong-un’s seventh year as supreme leader, a role he inherited on the death of his father Kim Jong-il in December 2011. Turning 34 in January, he has consolidated power and has no known rivals, but he faces grave challenges of his own making: how far and fast to push ahead with nuclear weapons and ballistic missile testing in the face of US threats.


Significance The message was conveyed by a South Korean delegation in Washington, briefing Trump on its talks earlier this week in Pyongyang. North Korea had said, the delegation reported, that it is “committed to denuclearisation” if regime security is not at risk. This follows months of escalating friction between North Korea and the international community that has seen Pyongyang ramp up its intercontinental missile and nuclear testing. Impacts The risk of confrontation on the Korean Peninsula could be reduced while talks are being prepared. Trump may relax his hawkish trade policy in the interim, to avoid alienating partners he needs in managing Pyongyang, including Beijing. A successful Trump-Kim meeting could gain South Korea’s president political benefits. If significant moves towards denuclearisation did occur, Trump’s administration might revise its pro-nuclear defence strategy. Any sanctions relief could be politically beneficial to the Pyongyang regime, but too much opening up could undermine it.


Significance South Korea’s unification minister (MOU) warned on April 10 that any US strike on North Korea would put “the safety of the public” at risk. A day later, Seoul’s defence (MND) and foreign (MFA) ministries dismissed rumours on local social media of an imminent war crisis as “overblown” and “groundless”, respectively. Moon Jae-in, the liberal opposition candidate whom most polls predict will win the May 9 snap presidential election, said he does not expect a US pre-emptive strike on the North. However, Moon also warned Washington that South Korea is “the concerned party” which “owns” peninsula-related matters, including the nuclear issue. Impacts Experienced military professionals in Trump’s cabinet and National Security Council are a restraining influence. South Korea and Japan, being in the front line, will counsel their US protector against any action that might imperil their security. If Moon Jae-in is elected, his desire to re-engage the North will clash with Trump’s hard-line attitude and narrow nuclear focus. After his smooth -- if insubstantial -- summit with Xi, Trump’s threatened unilateralism on North Korea is likely to stop at sanctions.


Significance It had threatened to do so during a fortnight of ever more violent rhetoric against South Korea and its president, spearheaded by supreme leader Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong. Pyongyang now threatens to nullify the 2018 peace accord by reactivating vacant border guard posts and holding military exercises near the Demilitarised Zone. Impacts President Donald Trump’s impulsiveness and a live dispute over history between Seoul and Tokyo hamper a coordinated response. Trump is unlikely to perceive yielding to pressure from Kim as something that will boost his chances of re-election. Tokyo’s recent suspension of a new missile defence project will reduce its ability to protect the United States from North Korean missiles. Increasing hostility between Washington and Beijing may reduce the latter’s willingness to put pressure on Pyongyang.


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