Myanmar government-military ties could be at risk

Significance The response underlines the military's continued internal security role but, given that the restive areas are home to large Rohingya populations, also highlights residual political sensitivity about the military's position and the importance of effective government-military relations. Impacts An immediate trigger for civil-military frictions could be a breakdown in peace negotiations with ethnic minority groups. The government will struggle to convince military leaders that wide concessions to armed ethnic groups are needed. Centralisation of power within the NLD will hamper junior civilian leaders gaining experience of working with the military. In time, the military's economic influence will be politically problematic for the NLD.

Author(s):  
Marco Bünte

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.


Significance Military and civilian leaders within the current power-sharing government have since accused each other of creating the conditions that prompted the coup, in an escalating confrontation over security sector reform that risks becoming a greater threat to the transition than the coup attempt itself. Impacts The more aggressively the commission established to dismantle the former regime conducts its work, the more the risk of coups will rise. Concrete guarantees of immunity for past crimes could encourage some (but not all) military leaders to consider more serious reforms. Civilian leaders might revive discussions shelved last year about creating a new internal security organ under civilian control.


Subject Prospects for the peace process with ethnic groups under the incoming National League for Democracy government. Significance Peace negotiations between the government, ethnic armed groups (EAGs) and the military (Tatmadaw) were discussed when National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi met Tatmadaw chief Min Aung Hlaing on January 25. This followed the Union Peace Conference (UPC) round held oon January 12-16, which also involved outgoing President Thein Sein, and which marked Suu Kyi's official debut in the peace process. Impacts Progressing peace in Rakhine State could help Myanmar reduce Islamic State group threats. To protect its interests, the military could stymie peace talks by restarting conflict in ethnic areas. The NLD may soften its stance on federalism to keep the military aboard, but likely thus alienating ethnic groups.


Author(s):  
Heidi Urben ◽  
James Golby

After nearly two decades of war, public confidence in the US military remains high, even though our wars remain inconclusive. There is no shortage of public discourse on the perceived failures of civilians overseeing these wars. Yet this chapter asks: Is the uniformed military increasingly resistant to civilian oversight? Are members of the military making it tougher for political leaders to do their jobs? High public confidence in the military is neither the best measure of the health of civil-military relations nor the same thing as the military’s being trustworthy. This chapter argues that military leaders will best serve the public by focusing on ways they can exhibit appropriate behavior in their dealings with the public and civilian leaders. The trust required for healthy civil-military relations and effective civilian oversight is a two-way street, and those in uniform must recognize their responsibility for introspection, self-policing, and holding themselves to account. This chapter assesses what it might take for the armed forces to “screw up” their relationship with the American people, discussing five potential pitfalls that members of the profession of arms must avoid in order to be worthy of the public’s trust.


Subject Security pre-election in Mexico. Significance The former mayor of Colipa, Veracruz, Victor Molina Dorantes, was shot dead on January 9. His killing follows that of Miguel Angel Licona -- former mayor of Mixquiahuala, Hidalgo -- on January 3. Over 100 former, established or newly elected mayors have been murdered since Mexico launched its 'war on drugs' in 2006, but a recent uptick has seen more than a dozen such killings in the last few months. In total, more than 23,000 murders occurred in 2017, making it Mexico’s bloodiest year on record. Nevertheless, with general elections fast approaching, the government shows no sign of changing tack on its failed security policies, enacting a controversial security law that looks set to cement the military's role in policing. Impacts Newly appointed Interior Minister Alfonso Navarrete will not significantly alter the security policies of his predecessor. The Internal Security Law is more likely to exacerbate violence than bring any meaningful security improvements. If approved by the Supreme Court, the law will reposition the military in the political arena, further disrupting civil-military balances.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2110629
Author(s):  
Kirill Shamiev

This article studies the role of military culture in defense policymaking. It focuses on Russia’s post-Soviet civil–military relations and military reform attempts. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s armed forces were in a state of despair. Despite having relative institutional autonomy, the military neither made itself more effective before minister Serdyukov nor tried to overthrow the government. The paper uses the advocacy coalition framework’s belief system approach to analyze data from military memoirs, parliamentary speeches, and 15 interviews. The research shows that the military’s support for institutional autonomy, combined with its elites’ self-serving bias, critically contributed to what I term an “imperfect equilibrium” in Russian civil–military relations: the military could not reform itself and fought back against radical, though necessary, changes imposed by civilian leadership.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonia Ruiz Moreno ◽  
María Isabel Roldán Bravo ◽  
Carlos García-Guiu ◽  
Luis M. Lozano ◽  
Natalio Extremera Pacheco ◽  
...  

PurposeThis paper aims to report the findings of a study examining the relationship between different leadership styles and engagement through the mediating role of proactive personality.Design/methodology/approachServant leadership, paradoxical leadership, authentic leadership, employee engagement and proactive personality were assessed in an empirical study based on a sample of 348 military personnel in Spain. The questionnaire data were analyzed through SEM using EQS and bootstrapping analysis using the PROCESS macro for SPSS.FindingsThe results reveal that servant leadership style in officers partially impacts their cadets' engagement through proactive personality but that authentic and paradoxical leadership styles do not mediate the relationship. The authors also verify a direct relationship between proactive personality and engagement.Practical implicationsThe study implications advance the literature on leadership in emphasizing new leadership styles to increase proactive personality and engagement in the military context. This study verifies the importance of military leaders fostering servant leadership as an antecedent of proactive personality. Finally, the authors show that servant leadership partially impacts engagement through proactive personality.Originality/valueThis study explores the relationship among servant, paradoxical and authentic leadership styles, proactive personality, and engagement – relationships that have not been explored theoretically and tested empirically in the military context.


Significance His departure is ostensibly a blow for Sudan’s military leaders and a symbolic victory for Sudanese calling for the military to leave power. However, the stand-off between the two groups remains fundamentally unchanged. Impacts If leaders cannot find enough civilians to form a cabinet, they may offer some posts to serving or retired military. Protests and possible strike action will continue but may have only limited impact, unless rising casualties trigger a new flashpoint. Significant new international sanctions are unlikely to materialise.


Author(s):  
Sarah Sewall

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-429
Author(s):  
Bon Sang Koo

This paper revisits the military rule in Korea by paying attention, like Korean specialists, to the disconnection in dictatorship but like comparativists, using the tools in comparative studies of modern authoritarian regimes. This paper argues that the differences in the military leaders’ orientations (personalist vs. party-based type) and survival strategies to deal with potential threat sources (key insiders, political opponents, and economic elites) entailed different regime pathways. Examining (a) how to form a ruling group in terms of unity (competing factions vs. a single dominant faction), (b) how to control the legislative branch (directly controlled organization vs. opposition parties indirectly supported by the government), and (c) how to manage capital owners (tight constraints vs. financial liberalization with occasional punishments), this paper provides an explanation as to why only the second military regime was able to open the door to democratization instead of giving way to authoritarian replacement in Korea.


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