The Netherlands may ratify the EU-Ukraine treaty soon

Headline NETHERLANDS: EU-Ukraine treaty ratification in sight

Subject Political and economic consequences of austerity in the Netherlands. Significance The popularity of the Dutch governing parties has declined steadily since they came into power in 2012. The absolute winner in the polls continues to be the far-right Freedom Party (PVV) led by Geert Wilders. There are signs, however, that mainstream parties are coming back into favour, thanks to a combination of promising economic prospects and relatively stable immigration levels. Impacts The EU, healthcare provision, integration and care of the elderly are likely to be key themes during the election campaign. Calls for a referendum on the withdrawal of the Netherlands from the EU -- a 'Nexit' -- are likely to intensify. Prospects for the Labour Party in the next election will depend on whom the party elects as its leader.


Significance This does not mean reimposing pre-Schengen border controls, Dijkhoff said. However, last September, mobile patrols initiated random checks for smugglers and those ineligible for asylum. Amid increasing pressure to close its borders to control the entry of refugees, the Netherlands is meanwhile the only EU member state to hold a referendum on Ukraine's Association Agreement (AA). This springs from public discontent about what some consider further 'expansion' of Europe. Impacts A major rise in Ukrainian workers entering the Netherlands is unlikely post-ratification because employment permits would still be required. The AA would benefit Dutch investors, in the agri-food, horticulture, energy, logistics, water, hi-tech and retail industries in particular. Rejecting the AA could play into the hands of the Kremlin, by driving a wedge between Ukraine and the EU.


Subject Outlook for the Dutch government. Significance The popularity of Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s four-party government has decreased in recent months amid workers’ protests and controversy over parts of its new climate deal. Having lost its majority in both houses, the government will struggle to pass legislation in order to strengthen its track record ahead of the 2021 election unless it compromises with the opposition, which will likely alienate core supporters. Impacts The priority given to social spending will likely mean the Netherlands will not reach the NATO goal of 2% of GDP defence spending by 2025. Climate legislation is now far more likely to be contested and amended in parliament, as it cannot be passed without opposition parties. Rutte’s departure would be an important loss for the EU, given his strong support for EU cooperation and negotiating skills.


Subject The Netherlands' 2017 budget. Significance In the final budget of its four-year term presented on September 20, the Dutch government announced it would redistribute a 1.1-billion-euro (1.2-billion-dollar) financial windfall among households. This represents a clear break from four years of austerity and tight spending, a line strictly set out by Prime Minister Mark Rutte's second cabinet in 2012. Impacts An upsurge in the number of incoming migrants could fuel support for the PVV. The government may not address the 'no' vote in the April 2016 referendum on the EU-Ukraine association agreement until next year. The housing market will be boosted by incentives for first-time buyers and measures to encourage home ownership.


Subject EU-Italy tension. Significance On April 9 the Eurogroup (EU finance ministers) reached an agreement worth 550 billion euros (602 billion dollars) to help governments and businesses deal with the immediate impact of COVID-19. However, they failed to agree on a recovery package, which has been the main source of tension between northern and southern member states, in particular creating conflict between the Netherlands and Italy. The incomplete nature of the agreement, coupled with the negative political reaction in Italy, has alarmed the markets. Impacts Differing COVID-19 reconstruction requirements across the EU will make it more difficult to reach a consolidated recovery plan. Italy has little leverage to press for what it wants from the Eurogroup, as conflict with other euro-area members would alarm investors. The ECB may be inclined to do everything it can to help Italy, knowing the potential political impacts of forcing Rome to use the ESM.


Subject Citizen opposition to 5G technologies. Significance Public concerns about and activism against 5G technology are highly varied across EU countries. Resistance is particularly strong in Germany, France, Belgium and Austria, while the Netherlands has thus far seen the highest number of arson attacks against mobile phone masts. Impacts The EU will not exclude Huawei from 5G outright, despite escalating US-China tensions over technology. Huawei’s geostrategic, reputational and supply chain difficulties are rising, clouding its market appeal worldwide. Resistance to 5G may lead to increased regulation on radio-wave strength levels to help address public concerns. Governments may adjust complaints procedures to shorten delays in the rollout of 5G and other infrastructure projects.


Subject Euro-area unity. Significance A serious divergence has emerged between northern and southern EU states over how to respond to the economic impact of COVID-19. At least nine mainly southern members want a consolidated euro-area fiscal response through the issuance of Eurobonds -- a shared debt instrument -- but they face strong opposition from Germany and the Netherlands in particular, who fear they may have to underwrite the debts of poorer countries. Failure to resolve this dispute could result in a euro-area crisis and undermine broader EU unity. Impacts Eurobonds should lower the spread between Italian and German bonds as they would make Italy’s public finances more easily sustainable. A Eurobond issuance could slow the rise of populists in some poorer countries by giving governments greater capacity to deal with COVID-19. A deeper and longer-term economic crisis caused by COVID-19 could expose Europe further to influence from Russia and China.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 4394
Author(s):  
Margarita Ignatyeva ◽  
Vera Yurak ◽  
Alexey Dushin ◽  
Vladimir Strovsky ◽  
Sergey Zavyalov ◽  
...  

Nowadays, circular economy (CE) is on the agenda, however, this concept of closed supply chains originated in the 1960s. The current growing quantity of studies in this area accounts for different discourses except the holistic one, which mixes both approaches—contextual and operating (contextual approach utilizes the thorough examination of the CE theory, stricture of the policy, etc.; the operating one uses any kind of statistical data)—to assess the capacity of circular economy regulatory policy packages (CERPP) in operating raw materials and industrial wastes. This article demonstrates new guidelines for assessing the degree level of capacity (DLC) of CERPPs in the operation of raw materials and industrial wastes by utilizing the apparatus of the fuzzy set theory. It scrupulously surveys current CERPPs in three regions: the EU overall, Finland and Russia; and assesses for eight regions—the EU overall, Finland, Russia, China, Greece, France, the Netherlands and South Korea—the DLC of CERPPs in operating raw materials and industrial wastes. The results show that EU is the best in CE policy and its CERPP is 3R. The following are South Korea and China with the same type of CERPP. Finland, France and the Netherlands have worse results than EU with the type of CERPP called “integrated waste management” because of the absence of a waste hierarchy (reduce, recover, recycle). Russia closes the list with the type of CERPP “basic waste management”.


2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 70-75
Author(s):  
Simon Otjes

AbstractFor the Netherlands, the single most important EU issue is the future of the eurozone.


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