Managerial ability and stock price crash risk – the role of managerial overconfidence

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaxin Liu ◽  
Dongliang Lei
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Belief Heterogeneity ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Managerial Overconfidence

Purpose This paper aims to examine the relation between managerial ability and stock price crash risk, conditional on managerial overconfidence. In addition, conditional on managerial overconfidence, the authors investigate the effect of managerial ability on firms’ choice of bad news hoarding channels, which result in a stock price crash. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 24,289 firm-years from companies listed on Compustat and CRSP from 1994 to 2018, the authors conduct panel regression analysis. Findings The authors find that managerial ability is positively associated with stock price crash risk only when managerial overconfidence is high. Furthermore, the authors find that managerial ability seems to exacerbate (attenuate) the bad news withholding by the overconfident managers using the earnings guidance (earnings management) channel. The authors find limited evidence that high-ability managers are likely to withhold bad news through the overinvestment channel and “other channels” when managers are overconfident. Finally, the authors find that the joint effect of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability on firms’ crash risk is more pronounced when there is a material weakness in firms’ internal controls, high investor belief heterogeneity and high information asymmetry. However, this effect appears to dissipate during the recent financial crisis in 2008. Originality/value This research reveals that managerial ability is costly to firms by engendering bad news hoardings and stock price crash risk when managers are overconfident. It also sheds light on how managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect managers’ choice of bad news withholding channels and stock price crash risk. Finally, the paper is of practical value to the board of directors in selecting the prospective executives.

Managerial overconfidence, firm transparency, and stock price crash risk

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-296
Author(s):  
Quanxi Liang ◽  
Leng Ling ◽  
Jingjing Tang ◽  
Haijian Zeng ◽  
Mingming Zhuang
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression Model ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Fixed Effects Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Managerial Overconfidence

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze whether and how managerial overconfidence affects stock price crash risk. Design/methodology/approach Based on a large sample of Chinese non-state-owned firms from 2000 to 2012, this study employs methods including multiple linear regression model, Heckman two-stage treatment effect procedure, firm fixed effects model and event study to clarify the causality relationship between managerial overconfidence and crash risk. Findings The authors find that firms with overconfident managers (chief executive officer or board chairs) are more likely to experience future stock price crashes than firms with non-overconfident managers. The effect of overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with low transparency, suggesting that firm opacity facilitates overconfident managers’ bad news hoarding activities, which, in turn, increases stock price crash risk. The authors also show evidence that overconfident managers tend to disclose good news in a timely manner. Originality/value The authors add to the growing literature on stock price crash risk. Specifically, the authors find that the cognitive bias of board chair plays an important role in the bad news hoarding activities, thereby increasing the likelihood of stock price crash. This study also contributes to the literature that addresses the effects of managerial overconfidence on corporate finance issues.

Does negative information in MD&A can reduce stock crash risk?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianmai Liu
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Negative Information ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose As an important part of the disclosure of listed companies' annual reports, MD&A will disclose some "bad news" about the company. The purpose of this paper is to study whether such "bad news" can reduce information asymmetry and alleviate the risk of stock price crash remains to be seen. Design/methodology/approach Based on the sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016, the authors examine whether the negative information in MD&A could reduce stock price crash risk. Findings It is found that the negative information in MD&A does not reduce future crash, which indicates that the negative information in MD&A does not alleviate the information asymmetry. Further, it is also found this is due to the low readability of negative information which leads to the negative information not successfully released into the market timely. Only highly readable negative information can alleviate information asymmetry and suppress crash risk. In addition, the authors also find in the companies with more investor surveys negative tone is negatively correlated with crash risk, which means that investor surveys could help investors interpret the negative information in MD&A and alleviate stock price crash risk. Practical implications The practical significance of this article: this paper suggests that investors should carefully identify the quality of negative information in MD&A and pay attention to other quality characteristics besides credibility. This paper suggests that the regulator should pay attention not only to whether to disclose and the amount of disclosure but also to the quality of information disclosure, such as readability, so as to restrict management's strategic behavior in information disclosure. Originality/value First, different from previous studies on the impact of information disclosure on crash risk, this paper directly explores the impact of information in MD&A on stock price crash risk from the perspective of negative information disclosure that management most want to hide. It supplements the literature on the impact of information disclosure on stock price crash risk. Second, this paper studies the interaction between information tone and readability and its impact on the risk of stock price crash. Some studies believe that the credibility of negative news is higher and investors' reaction may be stronger. However, this paper finds that the disclosure of negative information may not be absorbed by the market because of the low readability. Third, this paper finds that investor surveys can help information users to interpret negative information and alleviate the risk of stock price crash, which shows that information disclosure of different channels will complement each other and improve information efficiency. Therefore, it advocates different information disclosure channels which has important practical significance for improving market pricing efficiency and reducing investment decision-making risk.

Managerial ownership and stock price crash risk: a case of Iranian firms

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-55
Author(s):  
Ali Haghighi ◽  
Mehdi Safari Gerayli
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Threshold Level ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Alternative Measure ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Research Hypothesis ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Increasing managerial ownership gives rise to the managerial opportunistic behaviors, among which bad news hoarding has attracted a lot of attention. Nevertheless, there always exists a threshold level at which the accumulated bad news releases abruptly, thereby resulting in corporate stock price crash risk. On the above arguments, this study aims to investigate the impact of managerial ownership on stock price crash risk of the firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). Design/methodology/approach Sample includes the 485 firm-year observations from companies listed on the TSE during the years 2012-2016 and the research hypothesis was tested using multivariate regression model based on panel data. Findings The results reveal that managerial ownership increases the corporate stock price crash risk. These findings are robust to an alternative measure of stock price crash risk, individual analysis of the research hypothesis for each year and endogeneity concern. Originality/value The current study is almost the first study, which has been conducted in emerging capital markets, so the findings of the study not only extend the extant theoretical literature concerning the stock price crash risk in developing countries including emerging capital market of Iran but also help policymakers, regulators, investors and users of financial reports to make informed decisions.

Do statutory internal auditors influence stock price crash risk? Firm-level evidence from Korea

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-237
Author(s):  
Soo Yeon Park ◽  
Hyun-Young Park
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
Financial Expertise

Purpose Based on 1,798 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2013, using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms, this study aims to examine whether statutory internal auditors influence firm-level stock price crash risk. Design/methodology/approach Based on the bad news hoarding theory of crash risk, the authors investigate the association between the quality of statutory internal auditors and one-year-ahead stock price crash risk. The quality of statutory internal auditors is measured as the compensation of statutory internal auditors and the financial expertise of statutory internal auditors. Stock price crash risk is measured as an indicator variable whether a firm experiences one or more crash weeks during the fiscal year period. Findings The authors find that higher quality of statutory internal auditors – measured through greater compensation and greater financial expertise – is associated with lower possibilities of future stock price crash risk. These results indicate that high-quality statutory internal auditors mitigate bad news hoarding of managers because of their greater capability and stronger incentive to lower litigation risk and preserve their reputation. The results are mostly robust to different measures for stock price crash risk and the quality of statutory internal auditors. Practical implications The findings of this study regarding stock price crash risk are important for investors because such risk can significantly affect investor welfare. The results indicate that statutory internal auditors play an important role in controlling future stock price crash risk and maintaining stability in the equity market. Originality/value This study adds to the extant literature on the determinants of stock price crash risk and is the first to examine the impact of internal auditors on stock price crash risk. Moreover, this study also contributes to the existing literature on internal auditor quality by showing that high-quality statutory internal auditors reduce risks in financial markets.

Tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: mitigating role of managerial ability

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mukesh Garg ◽  
Mehdi Khedmati ◽  
Fanjie Meng ◽  
Prabanga Thoradeniya
Keyword(s):  
Least Squares ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Dark Side ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Practical Implications

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine whether the quality of management can mitigate the positive association between corporate tax avoidance and firm-specific stock price crash risk (SPCR).Design/methodology/approachThe study is based on data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Compustat and ExecuComp and focuses on US-listed firms from 1980 to 2016. The authors employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as the baseline methodology and use five measures of tax avoidance and three measures of SPCR. Propensity score matching (PSM) and two-stage least squares methodologies are employed to address endogeneity concerns.FindingsThe authors find that more able managers weaken the positive relationship between tax avoidance and SPCR. The results suggest that the benefits of efficient tax management are more likely in firms with a more able management team as the likelihood of SPCR due to tax avoidance practices is reduced in such firms.Practical implicationsThis study has important practical implications for investors who are concerned about firms that engage in tax planning activities that can reduce corporate taxes, but at the same time increase the SPCR. Considering the compelling arguments and the “dark” side of more able managers who may engage in opportunistic behaviour, the study provides useful evidence in support of more able managers.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the SPCR literature by examining the effect of managerial ability on the likelihood of tax avoidance causing SPCR. Able managers are likely to lower the risk faced by investors and are less likely to extract rent and manipulate information. Therefore, the findings of this study have implications for investors by informing them of the negative value implications of tax avoidance and how they can be mitigated by hiring more able managers.

Capital Market Consequences of Audit Office Size: Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Jeffrey L. Callen ◽  
Xiaohua Fang ◽  
Baohua Xin ◽  
Wenjun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Capital Market ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Empirical Tests ◽  
Office Size ◽  
Market Consequences ◽  
Robust Evidence

SUMMARY This study examines the association between the office size of engagement auditors and their clients' future stock price crash risk, a consequence of managerial bad news hoarding. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with Big 4 auditors, we find robust evidence that local audit office size is significantly and negatively related to future stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with the view that large audit offices effectively detect and deter bad news hoarding activities in comparison with their smaller counterparts. We further explore two possible explanations for these findings, the Auditor Incentive Channel and the Auditor Competency Channel. Our empirical tests offer support for both channels. JEL Classifications: G12; G34; M49.

Do Firms Redact Information from Material Contracts to Conceal Bad News?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dichu Bao ◽  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
Lixin (Nancy) Su
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Public Disclosure ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Equity Incentives

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allows firms to redact information from material contracts by submitting confidential treatment requests, if redacted information is not material and would cause competitive harm upon public disclosure. This study examines whether managers use confidential treatment requests to conceal bad news. We show that confidential treatment requests are positively associated with residual short interest, a proxy for managers’ private negative information. This positive association is more pronounced for firms with lower litigation risk, higher executive equity incentives, and lower external monitoring. Confidential treatment requests filed by firms with higher residual short interests are associated with higher stock price crash risk and poorer future performance. Collectively, our results suggest that managers redact information from material contracts to conceal bad news.

Abnormally long audit report lags and future stock price crash risk: evidence from China

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 611-635
Author(s):  
Ahsan Habib ◽  
Hedy Jiaying Huang
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Research Database ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Opinion ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
International Investors

PurposeAlthough a substantial body of literature investigates the determinants of audit report lag (ARL), scant empirical evidence exists on the consequences of ARL. The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between abnormally long ARL and future stock price crash risk.Design/methodology/approachThis quantitative study employed a large scale (14,445 firm-year observations) of annual financials, audit and ownership information for the Chinese listed companies during 2002–2013 which were retrieved from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database.FindingsThis study finds evidence that abnormally long ARL increases the risk of a future stock price crash. Furthermore, the study finds that this adverse consequence is more pronounced for firms with a poor internal control environment.Practical implicationsRecently literature started to explore the consequences of abnormal ARL such as going concern audit opinion and restatements in the subsequent periods. This paper reveals that abnormal ARL has consequences for investor wealth losses as well. This is relevant in China, where the ongoing economic growth has attracted, and will continue to attract, a growing body of domestic and international investors. Understanding what factors could expose investors to wealth losses is of paramount importance for allocating their scarce capital.Originality/valueThis study extends the scant literature on the consequences of ARL, and provides useful insights for the Chinese regulatory authorities when considering the appropriateness of the current filing deadline for listed firms.

Stock price synchronicity and stock price crash risk

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 230-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yonghong Jin ◽  
Mengya Yan ◽  
Yuqin Xi ◽  
Chunmei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Risk Index ◽  
Mediating Effect ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Security Market ◽  
Herding Behavior ◽  
Stock Price Synchronicity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Mediating Role ◽  
First Time

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the effects of stock price synchronicity and herding behavior of qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) on stock price crash risk, especially the mediating effect of herding behavior of QFII on the relation of stock price synchronicity and stock price crash risk. Design/methodology/approach – Taking China’s A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2014 and QFII holding shares data as the research sample, this study calculates herding effect index, sock price synchronicity index and stock price crash risk index, and perform linear regression. Findings – This study concludes that, either herding behavior of QFII or the stock price synchronicity can increase the stock price crash risk. Further study reveals that, the herding behavior of QFII also improves the effect of stock price synchronicity on stock price crash risk. Namely, herding behavior of QFII acts as the mediating role between stock price synchronicity and stock price crash risk. Originality/value – This study empirically analyzes and verifies the mediating roles of herding behavior of QFII in affecting the relation of sock price synchronicity and stock price crash risk for the first time. The findings of this study contribute to the study of the role of QFII in stabilizing Chinese security market.

scholarly journals Slack And Crash Risk

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 107-120
Author(s):  
Theodore Goodman ◽  
Volkan Muslu ◽  
Hyungshin Park
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Adverse Events ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Working Capital ◽  
Current Income ◽  
Administrative Expenses

We examine how a firm’s operational slack is associated with current income and future stock price crash risk. By doing so, we test the validity of a firm’s alternative motivations for holding operational slack. We show that Supply Chain Slack, which is based on excess working capital, is associated with higher current profits and higher future crash risk. This evidence is consistent with the firm hoarding bad news. In contrast, SG&A Slack, which is based on excess selling, general, and administrative expenses, is associated with lower current income and lower future crash risk. This evidence is consistent with the firm insuring against rare and adverse events. Furthermore, a firm’s stock price crash risk is lower when a slack type is more costly, consistent with both motivations. Overall, our findings suggest a stronger profit-crash risk tradeoff when firms hold more operational slack.

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