Natural Law, Motives, and Freedom of the Will

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 246-261
Author(s):  
William H. Brenner
Open Theology ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleg Bychkov

AbstractOver the past two decades, the debate has intensified over the nature of John Duns Scotus’s (meta) ethics: is it a purely voluntarist “divine command” ethics or is it still based on rational principles? The former side is exemplified by Thomas Williams and the latter by Allan Wolter. Scotus claims that even the divine commandments that are not based on natural law are still somehow “in harmony with reason.” But what does this mean? Richard Cross in a recent study claims that God’s reasons for establishing certain moral norms are “aesthetic.” However, he fails to show clearly what is “aesthetic” about these reasons or why God’s will would follow “aesthetic” principles in legislating moral norms. This article clarifies both points, first, by painting an up-to-date picture of what constitutes “aesthetic” principles, and second, by providing a more accurate model of the way the human volitional faculty operates and addressing the problem of the “freedom of the will” from a present-day point of view.


Author(s):  
Richard A. Muller

Grace and Freedom addresses the issue of divine grace in relation to the freedom of the will in Reformed or “Calvinist” theology in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century with a focus on the work of the English Reformed theologian William Perkins, and his role as an apologist of the Church of England, defending its theology against Roman Catholic polemic, and specifically against the charge that Reformed theology denies human free choice. Perkins and his contemporaries affirmed that salvation occurs by grace alone and that God is the ultimate cause of all things, but they also insisted on the freedom of the human will and specifically the freedom of choice in a way that does not conform to modern notions of libertarian freedom or compatibilism. In developing this position, Perkins drew on the thought of various Reformers such as Peter Martyr Vermigli and Zacharias Ursinus, on the nuanced positions of medieval scholastics, and on several contemporary Roman Catholic representatives of the so-called second scholasticism. His work was a major contribution to early modern Reformed thought both in England and on the continent. His influence in England extended both to the Reformed heritage of the Church of England and to English Puritanism. On the Continent, his work contributed to the main lines of Reformed orthodoxy and to the piety of the Dutch Second Reformation.


2003 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Offer

Herbert Spencer remains an important and intriguing figure in thinking about political, social and moral matters. At present his writings in relation to idealist thought, social policy, sociology and ethics are undergoing reassessment. This article is concerned with some recent interpretations of Spencer on individuals in social life. It looks in some detail at Spencer's work on psychology and sociology as well as on ethics, seeking to establish how Spencer understood people as social individuals. In particular the neglect of Spencer's denial of freedom of the will is identified as a problem in some recent interpretations. One of his contemporary critics, J.E. Cairnes, charged that Spencer's own theory of social evolution left even Spencer himself the status of only a ‘conscious automaton’. This article, drawing on a range of past and present interpretative discussions of Spencer, seeks to show that Spencerian individuals are psychically and socially so constituted as to be only indirectly responsive to moral suasion, even to that of his own Principles of Ethics as he himself acknowledged. Whilst overtly reconstructionist projects to develop a liberal utilitarianism out of Spencer to enliven political and philosophical debate for today are worthwhile – dead theorists have uses – care needs to be taken that the original context and its concerns with the processes associated with innovation (and decay) in social life are not thereby eclipsed, the more so since in some important respects they have recently received little systematic attention even though the issues have contemporary relevance in sociology.


1948 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Perry Miller

The reputation of Jonathan Edwards, impressive though it is, rests upon only a fragmentary representation of the range or profundity of his thinking. Harassed by events and controversies, he was forced repeatedly to put aside his real work and to expend his energies in turning out sermons, defenses of the Great Awakening, or theological polemics. Only two of his published books (and those the shortest), The Nature of True Virtue and The End for which God Created the World, were not ad hoc productions. Even The Freedom of the Will is primarily a dispute, aimed at silencing the enemy rather than expounding a philosophy. He died with his Summa still a mass of notes in a bundle of home-made folios, the handwriting barely legible. The conventional estimate that Edwards was America's greatest metaphysical genius is a tribute to his youthful Notes on the Mind — which were a crude forecast of the system at which he labored for the rest of his days — and to a few incidental flashes that illumine his forensic argumentations. The American mind is immeasurably the poorer that he was not permitted to bring into order his accumulated meditations.


Kant Yearbook ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71
Author(s):  
Mike L. Gregory

Abstract Kant’s Naturrecht Feyerabend has recently gained more sustained attention for its role in clarifying Kant’s published positions in political philosophy. However, too little attention has been given to the lecture’s relation to Gottfried Achenwall, whose book was the textbook for the course. In this paper, I will examine how Kant rejected and transforms Achenwall’s natural law system in the Feyerabend Lectures. Specifically, I will argue that Kant problematizes Achenwall’s foundational notion of a divine juridical state which opens up a normative gap between objective law (prohibitions, prescriptions and permissions) and subjective rights (moral capacities). In the absence of a divine sovereign, formal natural law is unable to justify subjective natural rights in the state of nature. In the Feyerabend Lectures, Kant, in order to close this gap, replaces the divine will with the “will of society”, making the state necessary for the possibility of rights.


2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Rhonheimer

Giovanni Paolo II nel suo Magistero ha trattato ampiamente il tema della legge naturale, in particolare nell’Enciclica Veritatis Splendor, ove è possibile reperire una trattazione sulla definizione, l’essenza e le caratteristiche di essa secondo l’insegnamento di Tommaso d’Aquino. La legge naturale è una legge propria dell’uomo creato quale essere libero e razionale, la cui ragione, partecipe della ragione divina e ordinatrice, è capace di reperire in se stessa, in base alle inclinazioni naturali della persona umana, i principi primi e, in tal modo, svolgere funzione normativa e di discernimento sul bene e sul male. La legge naturale è la stessa ragione umana in quanto compie questo ruolo normativo nell’unità sostanziale di corpo e anima spirituale. Nella Veritatis Splendor la questione etica si esplica mediante una trattazione sull’oggetto dell’azione, dal quale dipende fondamentalmente la moralità dell’atto umano poiché nell’oggetto viene a trovarsi il fine immediato o proximus di una libera scelta della volontà guidata dalla ragione. Tale insegnamento trova applicazione nell’ambito dell’etica della vita nei tre grandi temi affrontati da Giovanni Paolo II nell’Enciclica Evangelium Vitae: il divieto assoluto di uccidere, che si specifica in particolare nella condanna di atti quali l’uccisione diretta di un innocente, l’aborto e l’eutanasia, deriva da una fondamentale violazione della giustizia, fondata sull’uguaglianza. La scelta deliberata della morte di un soggetto, intesa quale fine o mezzo, con la relativa strumentalizzazione della vita e della persona, è perciò sempre moralmente illecita. Così, Giovanni Paolo II ha presentato una dottrina coerente atta ad evidenziare il nesso fra legge naturale, oggetto morale degli atti umani ed etica della vita. Il divieto di uccidere è un principio primo ed universale della stessa legge naturale che, perseguendo il bene dell’uomo, viene, come diritto naturale, a costituire il fondamento della convivenza umana nella società. ---------- John Paul II broadly dealt with the topic of natural law in his Magisterial teaching, particularly in the Encyclical Veritatis Splendor, where it is possible to retrieve a treatment on the definition, the essence and the characteristics of it according to the teaching of Thomas Aquinas. Natural law is a law proper of man created as a free and rational being, whose reason, participating of the divine and ordaining reason, is able to retrieve in itself, according to the natural inclinations of the human person, the first principles and, in such way, to develop normative function and of discernment on the good and on the evil. The natural law is the human reason itself as it achieves this normative role in the substantial unity of body and spiritual soul. In Veritatis Splendor the ethical matter is expounded through a treatment on the object of the action, on which the morality of the human act fundamentally depends, since in the object it comes to be the immediate end itself or proximus of a free choice of the will driven by the reason. Such teaching finds application within the ethics of life in the three great themes faced by John Paul II in the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae: the absolute prohibition to kill, that is particularly specified in the condemnation of acts as the direct killing of an innocent, the abortion and the euthanasia, derives from a fundamental violation of the justice, founded upon the equality. The deliberate choice of the death of a subject, intended as end or mean, with the relative exploitation of the life and the person, is therefore always morally illicit. This way, John Paul II presented a coherent doctrine able to underline the connection between natural law, moral object of the human acts and ethics of life. The prohibition to kill is a first and universal principle of the natural law itself that, aiming at the good of man, it comes, as natural right, to constitute the base of the human cohabitation in the society.


2020 ◽  
pp. 65-101
Author(s):  
Douglas Flippen

John Finnis joins Grisez in providing a new foundation for Thomistic natural law theory. To accomplish this, they closely associate good as perfection with good as to be pursued and have both senses grasped together by the practical intellect independently of the speculative intellect. The practical intellect then presents good to the will and motivates it to act for the first time. Since good as perfection is inherently speculative and since the intellect becomes practical only depending on the will, their notion of the practical intellect is incoherent and their new foundation is deeply flawed.


Sententiae ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-45
Author(s):  
Oleh Bondar ◽  

In the book “Freedom of the Will”, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) put forward a strong ar-gument for theological fatalism. This argument, I suppose, can be considered as the universal basis for discussion between Fatalists and Anti-Fatalists in the 20th century, especially in the context of the most powerful argument for fatalism, introduced by Nelson Pike. The argument of Edwards rests upon the following principles: (a) if something has been the case in the past, it has been the case necessarily (Necessity of the past); (b) if God knows something (say A), it is not the case that ~A is possible (Infallibility of God`s knowledge). Hence, Edwards infers that if God had foreknowledge that A, then A is necessary, and it is not the case that someone could voluntarily choose ~A. The article argues that (i) the Edwards` inference Kgp → □p rests upon the modal fallacy; (ii) the inference „God had a knowledge that p will happen, therefore „God had a knowledge that p will happen” is the proposition about the past, and hence, the necessarily true proposition“ is ambiguous; thus, it is not the case that this proposition necessarily entails the impossibility of ~p; (iii) it is not the case that p, being known by God, turns out to be necessary. Thus, we can avoid the inference of Edwards that if Kgp is a fact of the past, then we cannot freely choose ~p. It has also been shown that the main provisions of the argument of Edwards remain significant in the context of contemporary debates about free will and foreknowledge (Theories of soft facts, Anti-Ockhamism, theories of temporal modal asymmetry, „Timeless solution”). Additionally, I introduce a new challenge for fatalism – argument from Brouwerian axiom.


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