Legislative Behaviour and Party Competition in the European Parliament: An Application of Nominate to the EU

2001 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 663-688 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hix
2021 ◽  

The European Parliament (EP) has experienced an unprecedented transformation since its first direct elections in 1979 and developed into one of the most powerful legislatures in the world. It started as a talking shop assembly of legislators seconded from the national parliaments of the European Communities’ member states who met twice a year. Now it co-decides on nearly all European Union (EU) legislation, approves the EU budget together with member state governments represented by the EU Council, scrutinizes the EU executive (i.e., the European Commission), and needs to give its consent for any new international trade agreement of the EU. This spectacular evolution has stimulated prolific research on the EP’s elections, internal organization, relations with other EU institutions, and policy impact. This bibliographical review does not purport to include all the important contributions but rather offers a map of this rich scholarly work. This article summarizes EP research into four streams. First, scholars have investigated the ability of the EP election to effectively link the EU to its citizens and increase its legitimacy and accountability. Second, an extensive body of work analyzes party competition and cooperation in the EP. A related third stream of literature studies the parliamentary organization and committees. Fourth, scholars have developed elaborate theoretical models and empirical tools to investigate the power relations between the EP and other EU institutions. These debates are discussed after a brief review of major data sources used in EP studies as well as key textbooks and journal venues for research on the EP.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4 (1)) ◽  
pp. 23-37
Author(s):  
Marek Danikowski

The right of EU citizens residing in another Member State, to vote and stand in elections to the European Parliament is a major achievement of the European democracy. In the light of EU citizens’ still insufficient knowledge concerning the opportunities and benefits brought in by this right, it is worth making this institution more familiar to themin a straightforward way, at the same time balancing criticism towards the idea of the EU.


Author(s):  
Panagiotis Delimatsis

Secrecy and informality rather than transparency traditionally reign trade negotiations at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. Yet, transparency ranks among the most basic desiderata in the grammar of global governance and has been regarded as positively related to legitimacy. In the EU’s case, transparent trade diplomacy is quintessential for constitutional—but also for broader political—reasons. First, even if trade matters fall within the EU’s exclusive competence, the EU executive is bound by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to inform the European Parliament, the EU co-legislator, in regular intervals. Second, transparency at an early stage is important to address public reluctance, suspicion, or even opposition regarding a particular trade deal. This chapter chronicles the quest for and turning moments relating to transparency during the EU trade negotiations with Canada (CETA); the US (TTIP), and various WTO members on services (TiSA).


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 4
Author(s):  
Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes

In November 2016, the European Commission presented the Clean-Energy-for-all-Europeans Package. It consists of eight legislative proposals which should define targets and policy and regulatory frameworks for the EU's climate and energy policies up to 2030 and beyond. Recasts of the existing Renewable Energies Directive and the Energy Efficiency Directive, as well as proposals for a new energy market design, which should be fit for renewables, are among the key elements of the package, which aims at replacing the existing 2020-framework. The package includes 2030-targets for Greenhouse Gas Reduction (at least 40%), Energy Efficiency (at least 27/30%), and the share of Renewables in Gross Final Energy Consumption (at least 27%). In contrast to the 2020-framework, the EU-wide renewables-target would no longer be underpinned by binding national targets but should be reached in a joint effort with a new governance system. Since the proposal was submitted to the European Parliament and the European Council for the legislative procedures which must end in an agreement before the next elections for the European Parliament in 2019, controversial debates are taking place. The intention is to finalise the legal procedures before the end of 2018. Parliament and Council had planned to decide about their respective opinions about the various pieces by February 2018. Afterwards, probably not finished before the end of 2018, compromise negations will take place, before the whole package will eventually be accepted by both bodies. Among the most controversially discussed topics is the ambition level of the proposals and whether or not it is in line with the commitments signed by the EU and all its Member States in the context of the Paris Agreement. Industry stakeholders not only from the renewable energy sector and environmental NGOs have proposed significantly higher targets in order to stay “well below 2 °C” of global warming before the end of the century. They also suggested continuing binding national targets or − as a compromise − enacting a very strict governance system. I shall present and evaluate the state of play of the 2030-framework decision process. And I shall end with some policy recommendation still to be considered in the ongoing debate.


Author(s):  
Marco Morini ◽  
Matthew Loveless

Abstract Over the last two decades, the formation of grand coalitions has grown in the European Union (EU), even in countries with no previous political experience with them. Alongside a significant rise in both new and radical parties, grand coalitions signal the increasing fragmentation of contemporary European politics. We, therefore, investigate the electoral performance of both mainstream and new parties entering and leaving grand coalitions. We find that mainstream parties do not appear to enter grand coalitions after negative election results. They are, however, punished in the following elections, albeit not as heavily as previous findings have shown. This post-grand coalition electoral penalty is true for both major and minor grand coalition members. These findings contribute to the literature on party competition and provide insights into the choices mainstream parties' have been making in response to recent and rapid changes in the electoral landscape of the EU.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 625-649
Author(s):  
Bas Schotel

AbstractFor the first time in its history, the EU is in the process of acquiring significant and genuine permanent operational powers. A new Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard provides Frontex with a permanent corps of 10,000 border guards—3,000 of which will be EU agents—its own equipment, and its own competences to intervene along the EU borders and beyond. The operational powers will allow the EU to directly and physically intervene in tangible reality.This Article argues that the conferral of operational powers on the EU poses a risk to individual legal protection. This is because once authorities have acquired operational powers of a certain extent and quality, they can afford to act against or without the law by simply overpowering or eluding the legal mechanisms that normally constrain the exercise of public power. So far, Members of the European Parliament and academics critical of Frontex and the new Regulation have overlooked this issue and concentrated exclusively on how to legally constrain the exercise of operational powers. This Article addresses this blind spot by examining whether and how public law should place legal constraints not only on the exercise but also on the build-up of operational powers.


Management ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 473-487
Author(s):  
Andrzej Czyżewski ◽  
Sebastian Stępień

Summary The objective of the paper is to present the results of negotiations on the EU budget for 2014-2020, with particular emphasis on the Common Agricultural Policy. Authors indicate the steps for establishing the budget, from the proposal of the European Commission presented in 2011, ending with the draft of UE budget agreed at the meeting of the European Council on February 2013 and the meeting of the AGRIFISH on March 2013 and then approved by the political agreement of the European Commission, European Parliament and European Council on June 2013. In this context, there will be an assessment of the new budget from the point of view of Polish economy and agriculture.


1996 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hix ◽  
Christopher Lord

THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY attempted to balance two principles of representation in their redesign of the institutional structures of the European Union: the one, based on the indirect representation of publics through nationally elected governments in the European Council and Council of Ministers; the other, based on the direct representation of publics through a more powerful European Parliament. There is much to be said for this balance, for neither of the two principles can, on its own, be an adequate solution at this stage in the development of the EU. The Council suffers from a non-transparent style of decision-making and is, in the view of many, closer to oligarchic than to democratic politics. On the other hand, the claims of the European Parliament to represent public sentiments on European integration are limited by low voter participation, the second-order nature of European elections and the still Protean nature of what we might call a transnational European demos. The EU lacks a single public arena of political debate, communications and shared meanings; of partisan aggregation and political entrepreneurship; and of high and even acceptance, across issues and member states, that it is European and not national majority views which should count in collective rule-making.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 333-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Garzia ◽  
Alexander Trechsel ◽  
Lorenzo De Sio

Throughout the years, political scientists have devised a multitude of techniques to position political parties on various ideological and policy/issue dimensions. So far, however, none of these techniques was able to evolve into a “gold standard” in party positioning. Against this background, one could recently witness the appearance of a new methodology for party positioning tightly connected to the spread of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs), i.e. an iterative method that aims at improving existing techniques using a combination of party self-placement and expert judgement. Such a method, as pioneered by the Dutch Kieskompas, was first systematically employed on a large cross-national scale by the EU Profiler VAA in the context of the 2009 European Parliamentary elections. This article introduces the party placement datasets generated by euandi (reads: EU and I), a transnational VAA for the 2014 EP elections. The scientific relevance of the euandi endeavour lies primarily in its choice to stick to the iterative method of party positioning employed by the EU Profiler in 2009 as well as in the choice to keep as many as 17 policy statements in the 2014 questionnaire in order to allow for cross-national, longitudinal research on party competition in Europe across a five-year period. This article provides a brief review of traditional methods of party positioning and contrasts them to the iterative method employed by the euandi team. It then introduces the specifics of the project, facts and figures of the data collection procedure, and the details of the resulting dataset encompassing 242 parties from the whole EU28.


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