Some Economic Aspects of Ethical-Behavioural Codes

1979 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland N. McKean

Some informal rules merely save decision-making costs in social exchanges, but we try to use others as social contracts to produce public goods. (In fact, effective ethical-behavioural constraints may be essential to retention and the useful functioning of markets and democratic government.) Ethical-behavioural tenets are themselves public goods, however, adherence to them being vulnerable to cheap- or free-rider difficulties. In the long run, therefore, desirable informal laws will be underprovided. Nonetheless, according to both theory and observation, individuals sometimes overturn their free-riderism, compulsively sacrifice their selfish interests, and maintain useful customs and rules. Conditions that determine the costs and ‘indoctrinated’ or psychic rewards to individuals for their adherence are discussed. These conditions will shape the degree of underproduction of advantageous behavioural codes.

2010 ◽  
Vol 56 (No. 5) ◽  
pp. 201-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Beranová ◽  
D. Martinovičová

The costs functions are mentioned mostly in the relation to the Break-even Analysis where they are presented in the linear form. But there exist several different types and forms of cost functions. Fist of all, it is necessary to distinguish between the short-run and long-run cost function that are both very important tools of the managerial decision making even if each one is used on a different level of management. Also several methods of estimation of the cost function's parameters are elaborated in the literature. But all these methods are based on the past data taken from the financial accounting while the financial accounting is not able to separate the fixed and variable costs and it is also strongly adjusted to taxation in the many companies. As a tool of the managerial decision making support, the cost functions should provide a vision to the future where many factors of risk and uncertainty influence economic results. Consequently, these random factors should be considered in the construction of cost functions, especially in the long-run. In order to quantify the influences of these risks and uncertainties, the authors submit the application of the Bayesian Theorem.


2021 ◽  
pp. 194855062110297
Author(s):  
Chris C. Martin ◽  
Michael J. Zyphur

Justice should increase inclusion because just treatment conveys acceptance and enables social exchanges that build cohesion. Inclusion should increase justice because people can use inclusion as a convenient fairness cue. Prior research touches on these causal associations but relies on a thin conception of inclusion and neglects within-person effects. We analyze whether justice causes inclusion at the within-person level. Five waves of data were gathered from 235 college students in 38 entrepreneurial teams. Teams were similar in size, work experience, deadlines, and goals. General cross-lagged panel models indicated that justice and inclusion had a reciprocal influence on each other. A robustness check with random-intercept cross-lagged models supported the results. In the long run, reversion to the mean occurred after an effect decayed, suggesting that virtuous or vicious cycles are unlikely. The results imply that maintaining overall justice at the peer-to-peer level may lead to inclusion.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Fotios Fitsilis ◽  
Athanasia Pliakogianni

Because of their particular nature, representative institutions around the globe are usually well equipped, both legally and capacity-wise, to adequately respond to political crises; this is what political evolution has taught them. Responses to political crises have been developed and take the form of formal or informal rules of procedure that lie at the disposal of the Speaker or other parliamentary functionaries. On the contrary, battling a health crisis does not immediately belong to the issues a parliament under normal circumstances deals with. Hence, the scattered responses by the world’s parliaments, as pointed out by recent studies, come as no surprise. This article showcases the Hellenic Parliament, which constitutes a classic example of a legislature combating the pandemic situation through a gradual and multidimensional response. Its relevant actions are displayed and analysed vis à vis the average global response. As the pandemic seems far from being over, the article attempts a series of future projections on how to deal with it in the long run.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matus Adamkovic

The paper aims to assess the verisimilitude of the hypothesized model of poverty perpetuation linking socioeconomic situation and economic preferences via cognitive load, executive functions, and intuitive/deliberative decision-making style. The proposed model as a whole has not found required support in data, and simultaneously, the dyadic relationships between the variables have been mainly weak. Sensitivity analysis has revealed that the majority of the observed estimates varies substantively depending on the arbitrary analytic decisions of the researcher. The findings could be primarily attributed to (1) the possibility that the nature of economic preferences resembles stable personality traits and hence the preferences are only weakly determined by cognitive dispositions or patterns of emotional/cognitive responses in a long run; (2) the high social equality and relatively low poverty rate in Slovakia, which currently allows the majority of the inhabitants to afford elementary goods and meet the basic needs, regardless of their economic situation; (3) the fact that the current state of knowledge in behavioral sciences is burdened by multiple problems (e.g., lack of good theory, complicated issue of causality, prevalence of questionable research practices, or publication bias), resulting into poor replicability and low credibility of the knowledge, implies that the theories upon which the model was built might not necessarily be true. The hypothesized cognitive mechanism does not allow to explain what economic decision-making depends on, neither why do people fall into poverty traps.


Data & Policy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chih-Hao Huang ◽  
Feras A. Batarseh ◽  
Adel Boueiz ◽  
Ajay Kulkarni ◽  
Po-Hsuan Su ◽  
...  

Abstract The quality of service in healthcare is constantly challenged by outlier events such as pandemics (i.e., Covid-19) and natural disasters (such as hurricanes and earthquakes). In most cases, such events lead to critical uncertainties in decision-making, as well as in multiple medical and economic aspects at a hospital. External (geographic) or internal factors (medical and managerial) lead to shifts in planning and budgeting, but most importantly, reduce confidence in conventional processes. In some cases, support from other hospitals proves necessary, which exacerbates the planning aspect. This paper presents three data-driven methods that provide data-driven indicators to help healthcare managers organize their economics and identify the most optimum plan for resources allocation and sharing. Conventional decision-making methods fall short in recommending validated policies for managers. Using reinforcement learning, genetic algorithms, traveling salesman, and clustering, we experimented with different healthcare variables and presented tools and outcomes that could be applied at health institutes. Experiments are performed; the results are recorded, evaluated, and presented.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryce Morsky ◽  
Dervis Can Vural

AbstractMuch research has focused on the deleterious effects of free-riding in public goods games, and a variety of mechanisms that suppresses cheating behavior. Here we argue that under certain conditions cheating behavior can be beneficial to the population. In a public goods game, cheaters do not pay for the cost of the public goods, yet they receive the benefit. Although this free-riding harms the entire population in the long run, the success of cheaters may aid the population when there is a common enemy that antagonizes both cooperators and cheaters. Here we study models in which an immune system antagonizes a cooperating pathogen. We investigate three population dynamics models, and determine under what conditions the presence of cheaters help defeat the immune system. The mechanism of action is that a polymorphism of cheaters and altruists optimizes the average growth rate. Our results give support for a possible synergy between cooperators and cheaters in ecological public goods games.


2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 31-51
Author(s):  
Alpar Losonc

The author treats in this article the modalities of ecological-political regulation. At first he analyzes the modalities of regulation that are government-related and connected to the normative engagement of government. The author especially emphasizes the advantageous and less advantageous aspects of the normatively based interventions of government. He critically explores the disadvantageous dimensions of the ecological aid and shows the discrepancy between the short and long run concerning the effects of aid-practice. At second the author deals with the regulation based on the market-mechanisms. The conclusion refers to the trade-off between the normatively determined govern mentality and the market-based mechanisms. The author pays special attention to the emission-trading schemes in Europe and demonstrates the main uncertainties in relation to the market of pollution and emission trading.


Author(s):  
Liesbet Hooghe ◽  
Tobias Lenz ◽  
Gary Marks

Chapter 1 sets out the core puzzle of international governance, introduces postfunctionalist theory, and situates it in relation to realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Postfunctionalism theorizes how conceptions of community constrain the functional provision of public goods across territorial scale. It hypothesizes that international organization is social as well as functional and provides a precise and falsifiable explanation of the institutional set-up of an IO, including its membership, contractual basis, policy portfolio, and the extent to which an IO pools authority in collective decision making and delegates authority to independent actors.


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