Converging Theory and Practice: example selection in moral philosophy

1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM VITEK
Author(s):  
Andrew Hadfield

Chapter 4 examines a variety of treatises and debates about rhetoric and its value, and whether the art of persuasion could be a dangerous tool in the hands of the unscrupulous or even whether it was a skill that risked corrupting the user, dangers that were identified by Quintilian, whose Institutio Oratoria (The Orator’s Education) shaped so much rhetorical theory and practice in the Renaissance. The chapter explores the practice of commonplacing, noting down particular maxims which could then serve as the basis of explorations of issues, a practice that, like rhetoric, generated anxiety about truth, falsehood, and lying. Particular attention is paid to Erasmus’s Colloquies and Lingua; William Baldwin’s A Treatise of Moral Philosophy, the most popular work of philosophy in sixteenth-century England; the use of commonplaces in Montaigne’s Essays; George Puttenham’s use of proverbs and figures in his Arte of English Poesie (1589); and Sir Philip Sidney’s understanding of poetry as lying in The Defence of Poetry.


Author(s):  
Michael N. Forster

Herder develops a number of very important principles both in meta-ethics and in first-order morality. In meta-ethics he argues for a form of sentimentalism, but a form of it that acknowledges a role for cognition in the sentiments involved and which emphasizes their radical variability between periods and cultures. He also invents a “genetic” or “genealogical” method predicated on such variability and applies it to moral values in particular in order to make them better understood. And finally, he develops an ambitious theory and practice of moral pedagogy that rests on his sentimentalism and which accordingly focuses on causal influences on moral character formation, such as role models and literature. In first-order morality he invents an important pluralistic form of cosmopolitanism to replace the more usual but problematic homogenizing cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment; an influential ideal of individual Bildung, or self-formation; and a distinctive ideal of humanity.


Author(s):  
Juho Ritola

Critical thinking is active, good-quality thinking. This kind of thinking is initiated by an agent’s desire to decide what to believe, it satisfies relevant norms, and the decision on the matter at hand is reached through the use of available reasons under the control of the thinking agent. In the educational context, critical thinking refers to an educational aim that includes certain skills and abilities to think according to relevant standards and corresponding attitudes, habits, and dispositions to apply those skills to problems the agent wants to solve. The basis of this ideal is the conviction that we ought to be rational. This rationality is manifested through the proper use of reasons that a cognizing agent is able to appreciate. From the philosophical perspective, this fascinating ability to appreciate reasons leads into interesting philosophical problems in epistemology, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Critical thinking in itself and the educational ideal are closely connected to the idea that we ought to be rational. But why exactly? This profound question seems to contain the elements needed for its solution. To ask why is to ask either for an explanation or for reasons for accepting a claim. Concentrating on the latter, we notice that such a question presupposes that the acceptability of a claim depends on the quality of the reasons that can be given for it: asking this question grants us the claim that we ought to be rational, that is, to make our beliefs fit what we have reason to believe. In the center of this fit are the concepts of knowledge and justified belief. A critical thinker wants to know and strives to achieve the state of knowledge by mentally examining reasons and the relation those reasons bear to candidate beliefs. Both these aspects include fascinating philosophical problems. How does this mental examination bring about knowledge? What is the relation my belief must have to a putative reason for my belief to qualify as knowledge? The appreciation of reason has been a key theme in the writings of the key figures of philosophy of education, but the ideal of individual justifying reasoning is not the sole value that guides educational theory and practice. It is therefore important to discuss tensions this ideal has with other important concepts and values, such as autonomy, liberty, and political justification. For example, given that we take critical thinking to be essential for the liberty and autonomy of an individual, how far can we try to inculcate a student with this ideal when the student rejects it? These issues underline important practical choices an educator has to make.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Krasnoff

Kant’s relation to Hobbesian voluntarism has recently become a source of controversy for the interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy. Realist interpreters, most prominently Karl Ameriks, have attacked the genealogies of Kantian autonomy suggested by J. B. Schneewind and Christine Korsgaard as misleadingly voluntarist and unacceptably anti-realist. In this debate, however, there has been no real discussion of Kant’s own views about Hobbes. By examining the relation of Hobbes’ voluntarism to a kind of conventionalism, and through a reading of Kant’s most explicit discussion of Hobbes, in “Theory and Practice,”1 I argue that Kant’s criticism of Hobbes is much more limited than it might first appear. Rather than rejecting Hobbes’ voluntarism and conventionalism entirely, Kant ends up criticizing only Hobbes’ understanding of the relation between these doctrines. The essay thus defends Schneewind’s and Korsgaard’s histories of modern moral philosophy, and raises doubts about realist readings of Kant’s practical philosophy.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann

AbstractWhat is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice. Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant's attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve's challenge.


The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Economics provides a timely and thorough survey of the various ways ethics can, does, and should inform economic theory and practice. The first part of the book, Foundations, explores how the most prominent schools of moral philosophy relate to economics; asks how morals relevant to economic behavior may have evolved; and explains how various approaches to economics incorporate ethics into their work. The second part, Applications, looks at the ethics of commerce, finance, and markets; uncovers the moral dilemmas involved with making decisions regarding social welfare, risk, and harm to others; and explores how ethics is relevant to major topics within economics, such as health care and the environment. A concluding chapter turns the table, recommending some lessons that ethics can learn from economics. With esteemed contributors from economics and philosophy, The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Economics is designed to be a resource for scholars in both disciplines (and related fields such as political science, sociology, and psychology) as well as “consumers” of economics, such as policymakers, journalists, and laypersons. It highlights the close relationship between ethics and economics in the past while also laying a foundation for further integration going forward.


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 74-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debbie Witkowski ◽  
Bruce Baker

Abstract In the early elementary grades, the primary emphasis is on developing skills crucial to future academic and personal success—specifically oral and written communication skills. These skills are vital to student success as well as to meaningful participation in the classroom and interaction with peers. Children with complex communication needs (CCN) may require the use of high-performance speech generating devices (SGDs). The challenges for these students are further complicated by the task of learning language at a time when they are expected to apply their linguistic skills to academic tasks. However, by focusing on core vocabulary as a primary vehicle for instruction, educators can equip students who use SGDs to develop language skills and be competitive in the classroom. In this article, we will define core vocabulary and provide theoretical and practical insights into integrating it into the classroom routine for developing oral and written communication skills.


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