Government Rulemaking as a Brake on Perestroika

1990 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 419-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene Huskey

The Soviet political system is made up of three major institutions: the Communist Party, the parliament, and the government. Whereas the first two have changed dramatically under perestroika, the government has continued to function in more traditional ways. Most worrying to reformists, the government–the Soviet Union's “executive branch”–has used its broad rulemaking authority to impede the transformation of Soviet politics and society. This essay examines the role of governmental rules in the Soviet political and legal system. It concludes, following the lead of Soviet reformists, that without a fundamental restructuring of government making authority, legal, political, and economic reform in the Soviet Union cannot be institutionalized.

2018 ◽  
pp. 93-107
Author(s):  
Bogdan Koszel

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has become Germany’s main Central European partner. The economic interests and hopes of gigantic contracts to modernize the Russian economy have played a colossal role in German policy. The Government of Chancellor Angela Merkel aspired to shape the Eastern policy of the European Union, and it was highly favorable towards the strategy of Russian modernization to be implemented with the participation of Western partners, as proposed by President Medvedev in 2009. However, this project never went beyond the stage of preliminary agreements, and both sides are increasingly disappointed with its progress. Germany continues to aspire to play the role of the leading EU member state involved in the transformation process in Russia, yet this is no longer treated in terms of the ‘Russia first’ attitude without any reservations. Germans are becoming increasingly aware that their efforts are doomed to fail without true Russian efforts aimed at the democratization of both their public life and economic structures.


Author(s):  
Hafner Gerhard

This contribution discusses the intervention of five member states of the Warsaw Pact Organization under the leading role of the Soviet Union in the CSSR in August 1968, which terminated the “Prague Spring” in a forceful manner. After presenting the facts of this intervention and its reasons, it describes the legal positions of the protagonists of this intervention as well as that of the states condemning it, as presented in particular in the Security Council. It then examines the legality of this intervention against general international law and the particular views of the Soviet doctrine existing at that time, defending some sort of socialist (regional) international law. This case stresses the requirement of valid consent for the presence of foreign troops in a country and denies the legality of any justification solely based on the necessity to maintain the political system within a state.


Author(s):  
Jorge I. Domínguez

Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), founded in 1959, have been among the world’s most successful military. In the early 1960s, they defended the new revolutionary regime against all adversaries during years when Cuba was invaded at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, faced nuclear Armageddon in 1962, and experienced a civil war that included U.S. support for regime opponents. From 1963 to 1991, the FAR served the worldwide objectives of a small power that sought to behave as if it were a major world power. Cuba deployed combat troops overseas for wars in support of Algeria (1963), Syria (1973), Angola (1975–1991), and Ethiopia (1977–1989). Military advisers and some combat troops served in smaller missions in about two dozen countries the world over. Altogether, nearly 400,000 Cuban troops served overseas. Throughout those years, the FAR also worked significantly to support Cuba’s economy, especially in the 1960s and again since the early 1990s following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Uninterruptedly, officers and troops have been directly engaged in economic planning, management, physical labor, and production. In the mid-1960s, the FAR ran compulsory labor camps that sought to turn homosexuals into heterosexuals and to remedy the alleged socially deviant behavior of these and others, as well. During the Cold War years, the FAR deepened Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union, deterred a U.S. invasion by signaling its cost for U.S. troops, and since the early 1990s developed confidence-building practices collaborating with U.S. military counterparts to prevent an accidental military clash. Following false starts and experimentation, the FAR settled on a model of joint civilian-military governance that has proved durable: the civic soldier. The FAR and the Communist Party of Cuba are closely interpenetrated at all levels and together endeavored to transform Cuban society, economy, and politics while defending state and regime. Under this hybrid approach, military officers govern large swaths of military and civilian life and are held up as paragons for soldiers and civilians, bearers of revolutionary traditions and ideology. Thoroughly politicized military are well educated as professionals in political, economic, managerial, engineering, and military affairs; in the FAR, officers with party rank and training, not outsider political commissars, run the party-in-the-FAR. Their civilian and military roles were fused, especially during the 1960s, yet they endured into the 21st century. Fused roles make it difficult to think of civilian control over the military or military control over civilians. Consequently, political conflict between “military” and “civilians” has been rare and, when it has arisen (often over the need for, and the extent of, military specialization for combat readiness), it has not pitted civilian against military leaders but rather cleaved the leadership of the FAR, the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), and the government. Intertwined leaderships facilitate cadre exchanges between military and nonmilitary sectors. The FAR enter their seventh decade smaller, undersupplied absent the Soviet Union, less capable of waging war effectively, and more at risk of instances of corruption through the activities of some of their market enterprises. Yet the FAR remain both an effective institution in a polity that they have helped to stabilize and proud of their accomplishments the world over.


2020 ◽  
pp. 331-369
Author(s):  
Michael Goldfield

Chapter 8 examines the role of the Communist Party, by far the largest Left group, during the 1930s and 1940s. It looks at the Party’s complex behavior, its many pluses and minuses, and its ties to the Soviet Union. In particular, it examines the role of CP activists as trade union militants and as the unabashed and unrelenting champions of civil rights, a role that distinguished them from the members of all other interracial organizations during this period. Yet it also looks at the Party’s role in demoralizing and destroying the left-wing movement in the 1930s and 1940s, even undermining many of the organizations and movements it had helped create, including those dedicated to civil rights.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-111
Author(s):  
I. Y. Zuenko

The article is timed to coincide with two anniversaries: centenary of the Communist Party of China, and thirty years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. According to the author’s idea, these two anniversaries correlate: analysis of the reasons and consequences of the USSR dissolution became one of the factors of current policy of Chinese communists. The article brings light to this coherence. A wide range of Chinese sources and literature regarding 1991 events in the USSR was used for the article. Another feature is the attention to historical context of the late 1980s – early 1990s, analysis of which helps to understand domination of conservative view to the USSR dissolution. The article shows how the Chinese state and party interest in the Soviet experience led to creation of a large bulk of works regarding historical, sociological and culturological aspects of the USSR dissolution. The analysis of the most impactful of these works shows a wide range of views regarding certain aspects (fi rst of all, the role of reforms in the fi nal dissolution of the state) and consensus regarding other aspects (negative role of Mikhail Gorbachev, labelling the dissolution of the USSR and the Communist Party as a ‘catastrophe’). Further analysis of the Soviet experience led to such measures by the Chinese leadership like strengthening of partocracy regime, conducting of media-covered anti-smuggling campaigns, establishing of harsh administrative and security control in areas with ethnic minorities, active counterpropaganda and struggling with foreign information infl uence. Appellation to the negative experience of the USSR and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is using by the Chinese leadership in its propaganda as an argument for unacceptability of any political reforms regarding weakening of the party role.


Author(s):  
Barbara Ann Chotiner

Two years after the November 1962 decision to divide the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) into separate industrial and agricultural organs, the new Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership reunited the party. The reorganization was and remains the most fundamental reform of the Soviet political system since the Great Purges. Restructuring the CPSU "on the production principle" had divided party committees below the union-republican level into industrial and agricultural organizations. Raikoms and some gorkoms were abolished; territorial production kolkhozsovkhoz administration (TPA) party committees and zonal-industrial party committees were established. The CPSU Central Committee (CC) and its unionrepublican counterparts acquired specialized bureaus to oversee production in the different economic spheres. 1 As a result of the 1962 reorganization, party involvement in the economy became more frequent and more occupied with details of production. Moreover, partkoms' economic interventions became oriented primarily toward development and guidance through the restructuring of productive relationships, introducing new products and technology, and planning.


Author(s):  
no name Leading Korean scholars

The paper deals with various aspects of economic and social crisis in the DPRK on the eve of 2010’s. Basically, there is an evident functional paralysis of the command economy that leads to its complete decay and breakdown. The result is emergence of a set of isolated sectors and segments living by different rules. Also, it triggers major social processes which undermine the stability of North Korean political system and its ideology. Different options of future developments are considered in the light of possible similarities with processes characteristic of the Soviet Union, East European countries and China in the past. Special attention is paid to actual and potential role of external factors, primarily to the influence of Chinese policy towards North Korea and the recent contacts with South Korea.


2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Knight

This article examines the role of the Committee on State Security (KGB) during the turbulent six-and-a-half years under Mikhail Gorbachev, from March 1985 to December 1991. Contrary to popular impressions, the KGB was never an independent actor in the Soviet system; it acted at the behest of the Communist Party. When Vladimir Kryuchkov replaced Viktor Chebrikov as head of the KGB in 1986, the move signaled what was intended to be a new role for the KGB. But as the reforms launched by Gorbachev became more radical, and as political instability in the Soviet Union became widespread, many in the KGB grew anxious about the possible fragmentation of the country. These concerns were instrumental in the decision by Kryuchkov and other high-ranking KGB officials to organize a hardline coup in August 1991. Even then, however, the KGB was not truly independent of the party. On the contrary, KGB officials were expecting—and then desperately hoping—that Gorbachev would agree to order an all-out crackdown. Because Gorbachev was unwilling to take a direct part in mass repression, Kryuchkov lacked the authority he was seeking to act. As a result, the attempted coup failed, and the KGB was forced onto the defensive. Shortly before the Soviet state was dissolved, the KGB was broken up into a number of agencies that soon came under Russia's direct control.


Slavic Review ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Richard Little

It is a settled principle of Soviet constitutional law that the USSR Supreme Soviet is the supreme representative organ, the supreme legislative body, and the supreme executor of the people's sovereignty. The 1936 Constitution subordinates all other organs of government to the Supreme Soviet, and it alone, on the national level, has the right to form governments, pass laws, and amend the Constitution. The Constitution also stipulates, however, that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is “the vanguard of the workers in their struggle for the construction of a communist society and constitutes the guiding core of all workers’ organizations, public as well as governmental.”


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