Harassing conduct and outrageous acts: a cause of action for intentionally inflicted mental distress?

Legal Studies ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Bridgeman ◽  
Michael A. Jones

Over the years, the genius of the common law lay in its ability to adapt old laws to new circumstances, to remake itself in a new image which reflected the concerns and needs of the time. In this century much of our thinking about the law of torts has been shaped by the tort of negligence, which has been the paradigm of adaptability. Although it was Lord Atkin’s speech in Donoghue v Stevenson that provided the central unifying principle for the subsequent development of the tort, it was Lord Macmillan’s famous dictum that the categories of negligence are never closed which provided much of the driving force for those developments. Liability in negligence shifts the focus of the courts’ attention away from the nature of the plaintiffs interest that has been infringed to the nature of the defendant’s conduct. Once attention moved from the deed itself to the manner of its commission, it gradually became possible for the tort of negligence to seep into almost any arena. The opportunities for human error are manifold, and as the old immunities were removed new areas of liability were established.

2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 687
Author(s):  
Renee Holmes

The common law has long held that damages for the mental distress suffered after a breach of contract are unrecoverable. Like all rules, a range of exceptions has developed to mitigate the severity of this rule. In this article the author argues that both the rule and its exceptions, being based neither in principle nor sound policy, have only created confusion in the law. The decision of the House of Lords in Farley v Skinner is analysed as a possible solution to this confusion, but is found to be unhelpful. The author concludes by calling for a principled revision of this area of the law in accordance with the usual principles of damages.


Author(s):  
Nigam Nuggehalli

This chapter examines the law on the formation of contracts in India. The Indian Contract Act 1872 is significant as it is the first successful attempt to codify the English common law of contract in the British Commonwealth. The Act was then transplanted to other jurisdictions in the British Commonwealth. The preamble of the Act makes it clear that it is intended to ‘define and amend certain parts of the law relating to contract’; therefore the Act does not exhaustively set out the rules of contract law. Interesting issues follow relating to the precise ambit of the Act, and the areas where there continues to be room for common law development, whether novel and unique to India, or adopted into Indian law after considering the common law developments in other jurisdictions. One issue relates to the postal acceptance rule which does not state that it is an exception to the instantaneous communication rule. Another issue relates to whether the Act permits the accommodation of a subsequent development in the English common law.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter examines the law of contract in France and discusses the milestone reform of French contract law. While this new legislation introduces a fresh equilibrium between the contracting parties and enhances accessibility and legal certainty in contract, it does not radically change the state of the law in this area. In addition, it does not strongly impact the traditional philosophical foundations of the law of contract. The reform, in short, looks more like a tidying up operation rather than a far-reaching transformation of the law. Therefore, the chapter argues that it is questionable whether the new law, which was also intended to increase France's attractiveness against the background of a world market dominated by the Common Law, will keep its promise.


Author(s):  
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling

This chapter studies intellectual property (IP). A hallmark of the New Private Law (NPL) is attentiveness to and appreciation of legal concepts and categories, including the traditional categories of the common law. These categories can sometimes usefully be deployed outside of the traditional common law, to characterize, conceptualize, and critique other bodies of law. For scholars interested in IP, for example, common law categories can be used to describe patent, copyright, trademark, and other fields of IP as more or less “property-like” or “tort-like.” Thischapter investigates both the property- and tort-like features of IP to understand the circumstances under which one set of features tends to dominate and why. It surveys several doctrines within the law of copyright that demonstrate how courts move along the property/tort continuum depending on the nature of the copyrighted work at issue—including, in particular, how well the work’s protected contours are defined. This conceptual navigation is familiar, echoing how common law courts have moved along the property/tort continuum to address disputes over distinctive types of tangible resources.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136571272110022
Author(s):  
Jennifer Porter

The common law test of voluntariness has come to be associated with important policy rationales including the privilege against self-incrimination. However, when the test originated more than a century ago, it was a test concerned specifically with the truthfulness of confession evidence; which evidence was at that time adduced in the form of indirect oral testimony, that is, as hearsay. Given that, a century later, confession evidence is now mostly adduced in the form of an audiovisual recording that can be observed directly by the trial judge, rather than as indirect oral testimony, there may be capacity for a different emphasis regarding the question of admissibility. This article considers the law currently operating in Western Australia, Queensland and South Australia to see whether or not, in the form of an audiovisual recording, the exercise of judicial discretion as to the question of the admissibility of confession evidence might be supported if the common law test of voluntariness was not a strict test of exclusion.


1993 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Braham Dabscheck

In October 1992 the federal coalition released Jobsback, a statement of its industrial relations policies. The article situates Jobsback in the context of the evolution of the coalition's industrial relations policies since the Fraser years, outlines its major features, and provides a critique. Jobsback erects a new regulatory schema under a banner of deregulation. Three key elements are contained in Jobsback. They are tribunal avoidance and the use of the common law, legislatively imposed employment rules to ‘aid’ the transition from an award to a non-award system, and enterprise confinement. The article draws attention to the coalition's views concerning industrial conflict, constitutional issues, transitional problems associated with establishing legislatively imposed workplace rules, minima in workplace agreements, the Office of the Employee Advocate, equality before the law and good faith bargaining.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony O. Nwafor

The realization that the directors occupy important position in corporate governance, and as business men and women, cannot be prevented from having dealings with the company, demand a close scrutiny of corporate transactions in which they are directly or indirectly involved or have an interest to ensure that such interest is not placed above their duty to the company. One of the ways in which the law strives to achieve this balance is by imposing a duty on the director to disclose to the board any interest he has in company’s transactions. This requirement which was previously governed by the common law and the company’s articles, is presently increasingly finding a place in companies statutes in different jurisdictions. The paper examines, through a comparative analysis, the provisions on the duty of the director to disclose interest in company’s transactions in South Africa and United Kingdom with the aim of discovering the extent to which the statute in both jurisdictions upholds the common law prescriptions. The paper argues that the need for transparency in corporate governance and the preservation of the distinct legal personality of the company demand that the duty to disclose interest should be upheld even in those cases of companies run by a sole director.


1929 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 376-397
Author(s):  
W. T. S. Stallybrass

It is perhaps true that one of the most important moral qualities of a man, especially an undergraduate, is a knowledge of where to ‘draw the line’; it is certainly true that one of the most essential parts of a lawyer's equipment is the capacity for drawing distinctions correctly. The whole framework of the law is based upon distinctions, and the drawing of false distinctions is as disastrous as is the failure to draw those that are based upon sound reasoning. It is the object of this article to consider, very tentatively, two distinctions which have been introduced into the common law relating to injury done to others by the property of the defendant: in the first place, the distinction between those things which are dangerous per se and those things which are dangerous sub modo, and in the second place, the distinction between the natural and the non-natural user of land. I shall then endeavour to consider the relation of these two problems to each other. But there will be no attempt to state the nature or extent of the liability that arises; for example, I shall not consider the true nature of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher or the extent of the duty owed by him who deals with dangerous chattels, though some light may incidentally be thrown upon such matters.


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