scholarly journals Mental Distress Damages for Breach of Contract

2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 687
Author(s):  
Renee Holmes
Keyword(s):  
Mental Distress ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Sound Policy

The common law has long held that damages for the mental distress suffered after a breach of contract are unrecoverable. Like all rules, a range of exceptions has developed to mitigate the severity of this rule. In this article the author argues that both the rule and its exceptions, being based neither in principle nor sound policy, have only created confusion in the law. The decision of the House of Lords in Farley v Skinner is analysed as a possible solution to this confusion, but is found to be unhelpful. The author concludes by calling for a principled revision of this area of the law in accordance with the usual principles of damages.

Interest as damages and interest on damages

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Burrows
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
Compensatory Damages ◽  
Compound Interest

The law on interest in English law is a tangled web. This is principally because the common law traditionally set itself against awards of interest and this has resulted in the piecemeal intervention of statutes which allow the award of interest in specific situations. In the leading modern case of Sempra Metals Ltd v IRC the House of Lords reformed the common law as regards awards of interest as compensatory damages for a tort or breach of contract (although the part of the decision that was concerned with interest as restitution of an unjust enrichment, which was the direct claim in question, was overruled by the Supreme Court in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v HMRC). Sempra Metals was concerned with an award of compound interest (as damages or as restitution) which contrasts with the relevant statutes which allow awards of simple interest only.

scholarly journals Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police; [2008] UKHL; 50

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Exclusive Focus

WHO HAS FIRST CLAIM ON “THE LOYALTY OF THE LAW”?Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police (hereafter Smith) was heard by the House of Lords at the same time as Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and another because they had two uniting factors. First, they both concerned the recurring question of the ambit of police liability in the situation described by Lord Bingham thus: “…if the police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, and if so, how and in what circumstances?”2  Secondly, considering the cases together highlighted the wider issue of the relationship between decisions under the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the HRA) and the development of the common law. The Law Lords embarked on a more extensive examination of these issues in Smith and thus that case will be the exclusive focus of this note.  In addition, the study of Smith raises questions regarding proposals for law reform as well as about judicial perceptions of policy priorities. 

Harassing conduct and outrageous acts: a cause of action for intentionally inflicted mental distress?

Legal Studies ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Bridgeman ◽  
Michael A. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Driving Force ◽  
Human Error ◽  
Mental Distress ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Subsequent Development ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

Over the years, the genius of the common law lay in its ability to adapt old laws to new circumstances, to remake itself in a new image which reflected the concerns and needs of the time. In this century much of our thinking about the law of torts has been shaped by the tort of negligence, which has been the paradigm of adaptability. Although it was Lord Atkin’s speech in Donoghue v Stevenson that provided the central unifying principle for the subsequent development of the tort, it was Lord Macmillan’s famous dictum that the categories of negligence are never closed which provided much of the driving force for those developments. Liability in negligence shifts the focus of the courts’ attention away from the nature of the plaintiffs interest that has been infringed to the nature of the defendant’s conduct. Once attention moved from the deed itself to the manner of its commission, it gradually became possible for the tort of negligence to seep into almost any arena. The opportunities for human error are manifold, and as the old immunities were removed new areas of liability were established.

Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About Turn by the House of Lords

1988 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Milgate
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
General Rule ◽  
The Past ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Second Degree

In the field of criminal law we should be used to the House of Lords changing its mind. In the course of the past three years the House has fundamentally altered its view on the meaning of intention, on the relationship between statutory and common law conspiracy and on the law of impossible attempts. Now we have another about turn. In R. v. Howe and Bannister the House of Lords has unanimously decided that duress can never be a defence to murder. Yet elsewhere in the criminal law (with the exception of some forms of treason) duress operates as a complete defence, leading to acquittal if raised successfully. In making murder an exception to this general rule the House, using its power under the Practice Statement of 1966, has departed from its previous decision in D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch which allowed the defence of duress to be raised by principals in the second degree to murder. The Lynch decision, which had stood as part of the common law for some twelve years, is now consigned to the legal scrapheap.

scholarly journals Liability for Manslaughter by Omission: Don't Let the Baby Drown!

2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
The Other ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

By removing the common law rules on a duty to act from liability for manslaughter by omission, the law would more accurately reflect the intention of the House of Lords in R v Adomako (1995). The current duplicitous requirement of both a duty to act and a duty of care appears to be confusing both the trial judge and the jury. The causing of a harm by an omission does not automatically mean the conduct was less morally reprehensible than where harm is caused by an act and this reform would therefore potentially bring the law more closely into line with society's moral values. The law would be rendered clearer and simpler and injustices would be avoided due to the other requirements of the Law Commission's proposed offence of killing by gross carelessness, including causation and gross carelessness. Through this reform justice could at last be offered should a stranger choose to walk by a drowning baby.

created by the common law rule were addressed by Parliament in the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, considered below, but the unjust enrichment principle is also relevant in other respects in determining whether a particular event is capable of frustrating a contract. If the decision to treat a contract as frustrated might give one of the parties an undue advantage this may operate as a justification for refusing to treat the contract as frustrated. For example, in Tamplin SS Co v Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co Ltd, an oil tanker was chartered for a period of five years, but was subject to government requisition when the charterparty still had nearly three years to run. In the circumstances, there was no prejudice to the charterers, since the government compensation payable to the charterers exceeded the agreed hire charges. However, the owners of the ship claimed that the contract was frustrated. The House of Lords held, by a narrow majority, that the contract was not frustrated. One explanation for the action of the owners is that they wanted to secure the increased benefit of the government compensation in replacement for the lower hire charges. In this case, it is readily understandable that the majority of the House of Lords preferred not to allow the owners to benefit in this way at the expense of the charterers. Remedies, unjust enrichment and frustration Money paid or payable before the date of frustration

1995 ◽  
pp. 382-382
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Petroleum Products ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
Undue Advantage ◽  
Oil Tanker

scholarly journals Ignorance of the Law as a Defence to Rape: The Destruction of a Maxim

2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 336-347
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Arenson
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
The Poor ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Long Line ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Sexual Offences Act 2003 ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an accused who entertained a genuine belief that a woman was consenting to carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of the common law crime of rape as such a belief and the requisite mens rea to convict were mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1(b), which allows for conviction upon proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting, the Morgan principle has retained its vitality at common law as well as under the various statutory crimes of rape that exist throughout Australia, most notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions which have reaffirmed the Morgan principle, the court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of the Act as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact that the accused acted with an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)–(g) of the Act were operating at the time of his or her sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that the foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that the accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. This article endeavours to explain how the accused could be aware of such circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain such a belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii) and the court's apparent refusal to follow the longstanding precept that ignorance of the law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed as superfluous.

5. Contract IV: discharge of contract and remedies for breach

2019 ◽  
pp. 67-80
Author(s):  
James Marson ◽  
Katy Ferris
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
Specific Performance ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Contractual Obligations

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter focuses on contract law. It discusses the discharge of contracts and the remedies for breach of contract where one of the parties has failed in their contractual obligations. Contracts can be discharged through performance, agreement, frustration, or breach. In the event of frustration, the parties can establish their own remedies or they can rely on the provisions developed through the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943. Remedies have been established through the common law and equity. Damages are the primary remedy in most cases, but equitable remedies include specific performance, injunctions, and rectification.

The Road Ahead for the Common Law

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Cooke
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Economic Damage ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
The Road ◽  
Golden Thread ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
English Speaking World

In the 1996 Hamlyn Lectures, under the title Turning Points of the Common Law, I examined four great cases where the House of Lords set the law of England, and consequently the law of most of the English-speaking world, on a new course by reversing decisions of the courts below. They were Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd1 (insistence on separate identities of company and controlling shareholder); Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions2 (discovery of a golden thread about onus of proof in English criminal law); Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller3 (qualified acceptance of duty of care in tort to safeguard against economic damage); and Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission4 (affirmation that material errors of law by administrative bodies are alwaysredressible by courts).

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