scholarly journals ‘Abortion jurisprudence’ at Strasbourg: deferential, avoidant and normatively neutral?

Legal Studies ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Fenwick

This paper evaluates the role being adopted by the European Court of Human Rights when confronted with claims arising from the extreme restriction of access to abortion services in certain Member States. It will be argued that in response to such claims the Court has been prepared to find that the suffering of the applicants can be captured as forms of rights violation, but it has sought to avoid taking a stance as to foetal life, leading it to adopt a highly deferential approach and to avoid the substantive issues at stake, of protection for female reproductive health, dignity and autonomy, in favour of focusing mainly on procedural ones. Having considered such issues as the missing gender-based aspects of the abortion jurisprudence, this paper concludes that its restrained and largely procedural stance has enabled the Court to provide some limited protection for women, on healthcare grounds, but that the opportunity to recognise that highly restrictive abortion regimes systematically and persistently create especially invidious discrimination based on gender has so far been missed.

2020 ◽  
pp. 203228442097974
Author(s):  
Sibel Top ◽  
Paul De Hert

This article examines the changing balance established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between human rights filters to extradition and the obligation to cooperate and how this shift of rationale brought the Court closer to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in that respect. The article argues that the ECtHR initially adopted a position whereby it prioritised human rights concerns over extraditions, but that it later nuanced that approach by establishing, in some cases, an obligation to cooperate to ensure proper respect of human rights. This refinement of its position brought the ECtHR closer to the approach adopted by the CJEU that traditionally put the obligation to cooperate above human rights concerns. In recent years, however, the CJEU also backtracked to some extent from its uncompromising attitude on the obligation to cooperate, which enabled a convergence of the rationales of the two Courts. Although this alignment of the Courts was necessary to mitigate the conflicting obligations of European Union Member States towards both Courts, this article warns against the danger of making too many human rights concessions to cooperation in criminal matters.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Donoghue ◽  
Claire-Michelle Smyth

Abstract Abortion has been a controversial topic in Irish law and one which the Government has been forced to address following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in A, B and C v. Ireland. The Working Group established to make recommendations have specifically been instructed to deal only with the issues raised in the A, B and C judgment and legislate on the basic of the ‘X case’. This restricted approach calls for legalisation of abortion only where the life of the mother is at risk, a position unique only to Ireland and Andorra within Europe. The vast majority of member states to the European Convention on Human Rights allow for legal abortion on the basis of foetal abnormality and with this emerging consensus the margin of appreciation hitherto afforded by the European Court to member states is diminishing. The advancement and availability of non-invasive genetic tests that can determine foetal abnormalities together with the ruling in R. R. v. Poland leaves Ireland in a precarious position for omitting any reference to foetal abnormalities in any proposed legislation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-123
Author(s):  
Mikael Rask Madsen

Abstract The European Convention of Human Rights system was originally created to sound the alarm if democracy was threatened in the member states. Yet, it eventually developed into a very different system with a focus on providing individual justice in an ever growing number of member states. This transformation has raised fundamental questions as to the level of difference and diversity allowed within the common European human rights space. Was the system to rest on minimum standards with room for domestic differences, or was it to create uniform standards? These questions have come up as increasingly contentious issues over the past years and have triggered a number of reforms seeking to introduce more subsidiarity in the system, striking a different balance between the European and national oversight of human rights. The article analyses this turn to subsidiarity by exploring whether the reform process has introduced new forms of difference and diversity within the common space of European human rights. Covering the period from 2000 to the end of 2019 and using a dataset of all judgments of the period, the article provides a structural analysis of developments in reference to the margin of appreciation which is the European Court of Human Rights’ long-standing tool for balancing the common standards, yet leaving space for individual member states to find local solutions to implementing those standards. It concludes that recent developments have contributed to a more federal-style construction of European human rights with more space for differences within the common general standards.


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 417-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIK VOETEN

Can international judges be relied upon to resolve disputes impartially? If not, what are the sources of their biases? Answers to these questions are critically important for the functioning of an emerging international judiciary, yet we know remarkably little about international judicial behavior. An analysis of a new dataset of dissents in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) yields a mixed set of answers. On the bright side, there is no evidence that judges systematically employ cultural or geopolitical biases in their rulings. There is some evidence that career insecurities make judges more likely to favor their national government when it is a party to a dispute. Most strongly, the evidence suggests that international judges are policy seekers. Judges vary in their inclination to defer to member states in the implementation of human rights. Moreover, judges from former socialist countries are more likely to find violations against their own government and against other former socialist governments, suggesting that they are motivated by rectifying a particular set of injustices. I conclude that the overall picture is mostly positive for the possibility of impartial review of government behavior by judges on an international court. Like judges on domestic review courts, ECtHR judges are politically motivated actors in the sense that they have policy preferences on how to best apply abstract human rights in concrete cases, not in the sense that they are using their judicial power to settle geopolitical scores.


Author(s):  
Nussberger Angelika

This chapter assesses the relationship between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and domestic and international legal systems. With the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Member States accept to be bound by final judgments of the Court and to implement them in their domestic legal systems. The Convention system does not make any difference as to the set-up of the national legal system or to the hierarchical position accorded to the Convention in national law. This is in line with a purist international law perspective, summarized in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention of the Law on Treaties: ‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.’ However, from the constitutional law perspective of the Member States, the situation is much more multi-faceted and complex. While it is generally accepted that the Court's judgments are binding and have to be implemented, the relationship between the Convention and the national constitutions as well as between their respective guardians, the Court on the one hand and national constitutional or supreme courts on the other hand, is not seen as one-way and hierarchical, but nuanced and differentiated. Implementation of judgments is accepted to be a duty, but not necessarily without exceptions. The chapter then considers the relationship between the ECtHR and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).


Author(s):  
Nussberger Angelika

This introductory chapter provides a background of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), a multilateral treaty based on humanism and rule of law. Similar to the—albeit non-binding—Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the ECHR is a document that marks a change in philosophy and gives a new definition of the responsibility of the State towards the individual. It fixes basic values in times of change and paves the way towards reconciliation in Europe. Unlike in a peace treaty, not all wartime enemies participate in its elaboration, but, one by one, all the European States accede to it, signalling their consent to the values fixed by a small community of States in the early 1950s. Seven decades later, forty-seven European States have ratified the Convention. Admittedly, the new start based on common values could not prevent the outbreak of violent conflicts between Member States. At the same time, the resurgence of anti-democratic tendencies could not be successfully banned in all Member States, but such tendencies could be stigmatized as grave human rights violations in binding judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Thus, it is not surprising that the European model of human rights protection has been attractive and inspirational for other parts of the world. Nevertheless, there was and is a debate in some Member States to withdraw from the Convention as the Court’s jurisprudence is seen to be too intrusive on national sovereignty.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 757-772 ◽  
Author(s):  
Birgit Peters

Within the Council of Europe, the relationship between the ECtHR and the member states is crucial for the survival and effective functioning of the Court. The ECtHR is currently overwhelmed by applications, the bulk of which emanate from a relatively small number of states, notably Russia, Rumania, Turkey, and the Ukraine. The backlog of cases will soon be toppling the vertiginous mark of 160,000, the adjudication of which alone would take the Court more than six years. The sheer number of cases exemplifies the system's urgent need for reform. Lately, discussions have been heavily influenced by considerations of subsidiarity, which the earlier Interlaken Declaration-as well as the recent Brighton Conference-emphasized as the key for the future relationship between the ECtHR and member states. Discussions about the principle's proper role in the relationship between member states and the ECHR, however, are far from over. This is due to questions regarding the principle itself, as well as to the factual realities dominating in the ECtHR-national court relationship. The principle often focuses on a strict separation of competences at two different levels, the national and the international, and many understandings of that principle require that the two levels stand in a more or less hierarchical relationship. This is difficult to assume in the Council of Europe context, where, compared to the EU, neither the doctrine of direct effect nor the principle of primacy in application reigns. Moreover, Strasbourg's emphasis on subsidiarity appears to focus on the responsibility of the member states to remedy human rights violations. In line with that argument, scholars have opined that the ECHR system should focus on an approach in which the ECtHR would be involved only if there are good reasons to depart from interpretation at the national level. Nonetheless, others recently doubted the overall usefulness of such an understanding of subsidiarity, since those member states responsible for the lion's share of new applications to the ECHR often neither possess a functioning judiciary nor functioning judicial or executive institutions, in general.


2012 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 231-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Zampas ◽  
Ximena Andión-Ibañez

Abstract The practice of conscientious objection often arises in the area of individuals refusing to fulfil compulsory military service requirements and is based on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as protected by national, international and regional human rights law. The practice of conscientious objection also arises in the field of health care, when individual health care providers or institutions refuse to provide certain health services based on religious, moral or philosophical objections. The use of conscientious objection by health care providers to reproductive health care services, including abortion, contraceptive prescriptions, and prenatal tests, among other services is a growing phenomena throughout Europe. However, despite recent progress from the European Court of Human Rights on this issue (RR v. Poland, 2011), countries and international and regional bodies generally have failed to comprehensively and effectively regulate this practice, denying many women reproductive health care services they are legally entitled to receive. The Italian Ministry of Health reported that in 2008 nearly 70% of gynaecologists in Italy refuse to perform abortions on moral grounds. It found that between 2003 and 2007 the number of gynaecologists invoking conscientious objection in their refusal to perform an abortion rose from 58.7 percent to 69.2 percent. Italy is not alone in Europe, for example, the practice is prevalent in Poland, Slovakia, and is growing in the United Kingdom. This article outlines the international and regional human rights obligations and medical standards on this issue, and highlights some of the main gaps in these standards. It illustrates how European countries regulate or fail to regulate conscientious objection and how these regulations are working in practice, including examples of jurisprudence from national level courts and cases before the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, the article will provide recommendations to national governments as well as to international and regional bodies on how to regulate conscientious objection so as to both respect the practice of conscientious objection while protecting individual’s right to reproductive health care.


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 768-827 ◽  
Author(s):  
James L. Cavallaro ◽  
Stephanie Erin Brewer

Over the past few decades, regional human rights tribunals have grown in both number and activity. The European Court of Human Rights (European Court or ECHR) now receives tens of thousands of petitions and issues over fifteen hundred judgments on the merits each year. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights recently tripled the number of cases that it resolves annually. At the time of this writing, in mid-2008, Africa’s own regional human rights court, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, prepares to begin hearing its first contentious cases. Currently, sixty-eight states are subject to the decisions of the two established regional courts (forty-seven in Europe and twenty-one in the Americas), up from less than half that number twenty years ago. In the nascent African system, twenty-four African Union member states have ratified the Protocol establishing the African Court, with an additional twenty-five signatory states.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document