scholarly journals Corruption, Party Leaders, and Candidate Selection: Evidence from Italy

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaele Asquer ◽  
Miriam A. Golden ◽  
Brian T. Hamel
Keyword(s):  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Party Leaders

Changes to Candidate Selection and Political Recruitment

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joy K. Langston
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
National Party ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Political Recruitment ◽  
Demand Control

This chapter examines how the PRI’s candidate selection and recruitment changed from the hegemonic to the democratic era to capture how electoral competition strengthened the governors at the expense the corporatist sectors and other PRI groups. Under hegemony, the president controlled (through choosing or vetoing) which PRI politician appeared on the ballot, and thus could punish or benefit ambitious politicians within the wide-flung coalition. Once competition grew, however, a candidate’s popularity with voters began to weigh on these decisions and governors began to demand control over nominations for subnational and federal posts. Regime leaders had to devolve power over federal candidacies to state executives because of their ability to win votes for the party, decentralizing the party. National party leaders won a good deal of control over the closed-list PR seats for both the Chamber and the Senate. Most party-affiliated unions lost nomination power because they were unable to choose popular candidates or procure electoral victories, weakening their position within the party.

scholarly journals Breathing Through their Noses: Candidate Selection and Role Adaptation amongst First-Term MPs in the  New Zealand Parliament

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Steven Barnes
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Senior Leaders ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Low Profile ◽  
The Future

<p>Sir Keith Holyoake, New Zealand Prime Minister from 1960 to 1972, famously counselled first-term Members of Parliament to ‘breathe through their noses’, suggesting that it was in their best interests to keep their heads down and mouths shut. Perhaps this recommendation is instrumental in the low profile of first-term MPs in New Zealand and the subsequent dearth of information available about these individuals. Within political science, scholarly attention has tended to focus on the ‘power holders’ – senior leaders and those perceived to have the most influence. In New Zealand, this has resulted in a growing field of literature about prime ministers, party leaders, and the few parliamentarians who reach cabinet. This thesis steps back from power holders to shed light on new MPs. It is important to know who new MPs are. Within parliamentary systems MPs often serve long apprenticeships before being promoted to the senior positions of their party and government. Thus MPs who enter parliament today may hold significant influence in the future. However, very little is known about legislators when they enter parliament. Do all Members of Parliament wish to become ministers or prime ministers, or do they have more modest aspirations, such as being the best local MP they possibly can? By understanding the motivations of our neophyte politicians we can better understand the types of people who are likely to become significant political actors in the future. This study aims to understand how and why individuals become MPs and how they adapt to the role once they have been elected. This thesis uses information gained from two rounds of interviews conducted with first-term Members of Parliament during their first nine months in office. Thus this research presents an insight into how MPs view candidate selection and follows them through their first few months in the job as they reconcile their pre-election expectations with the roles expected of MPs. The result is an account of how individuals become MPs and the roles they develop once elected.</p>

scholarly journals The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-639
Author(s):  
Raúl A. Ponce-Rodríguez ◽  
Charles R. Hankla ◽  
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez ◽  
Eunice Heredia-Ortiz
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Public Services ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Democratic Decentralization ◽  
Local Party

We explore how party structures can condition the benefits of decentralization in modern democracies. In particular, we study the interaction of two political institutions: democratic (de)centralization (whether a country has fiscally autonomous and elected local governments) and party (non)integration (whether power over local party leaders flows upwards through party institutions, which we model using control over candidate selection). We incorporate these institutions into our strong decentralization theorem, which expands on Oates (1972) to examine when the decentralized provision of public services will dominate centralized provision even in the presence of inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Our findings suggest that, when externalities are present, democratic decentralization will be beneficial only when parties are integrated. In countries with non-integrated parties, we find that the participation rules of primaries have implications for the expected gains from democratic decentralization. Under blanket primaries, Oates’ conventional decentralization theorem holds but our strong decentralization theorem does not. By contrast, when primaries are closed, not even Oates’ conventional decentralization theorem holds.

Primaries on Demand? Intra-Party Politics and Nominations in Ghana

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 769-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nahomi Ichino ◽  
Noah L. Nathan
Keyword(s):  
Party Politics ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Primary Elections ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
On Demand ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Political Interference ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Local Party

In new democracies, why do political party leaders relinquish power over nominations and allow legislative candidates to be selected by primary elections? Where the legislature is weak and politics is clientelistic, democratization of candidate selection is driven by local party members seeking benefits from primary contestants. Analysis of an original dataset on legislative nominations and political interference by party leaders for the 2004 and 2008 elections in Ghana shows that primaries are more common where nominations attract more aspirants and where the party is more likely to win, counter to predictions in the existing literature. Moreover, the analysis shows that party leaders interfere in primaries in a pattern consistent with anticipation of party members’ reactions.

When rotten apples spoil the ballot: The conditional effect of corruption charges on parties’ vote shares

2016 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Ceron ◽  
Marco Mainenti
Keyword(s):  
Selection Process ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Conditional Effect ◽  
Electoral Performance ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

The impact of corruption charges on the electoral performance of parties is conditioned by specific institutional factors. This article shows the extent to which the effects of political corruption depend on the control that party leaders exercise over the ballot. It is argued that voters might abstain or support other lists if they cannot select individual candidates to revitalize the reputation of the political party. Employing data on judicial investigations in Italy from 1983 to 2013, we provide evidence of the role of electoral rules and intra-party xcandidate selection in shaping the relationship between corruption and voters’ behaviour. Parties implicated in corruption or related crimes experience a loss of votes when they compete under a closed list formula or when the candidate selection process is strongly centralized.

scholarly journals An Experiment in Candidate Selection

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (5) ◽  
pp. 1575-1612
Author(s):  
Katherine Casey ◽  
Abou Bakarr Kamara ◽  
Niccoló F. Meriggi
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Sierra Leone ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Primary System ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Ordinary Citizens

Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets citizens choose, most democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while officials are often better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits, like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination, at odds with identifying the best performer. We partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say voters have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. Estimates suggest that more democratic procedures increase the likelihood that parties select voters’ most preferred candidates and favor candidates with stronger records of public goods provision. (JEL D72, H41, O17)

scholarly journals Breathing Through their Noses: Candidate Selection and Role Adaptation amongst First-Term MPs in the  New Zealand Parliament

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Steven Barnes
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Senior Leaders ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Low Profile ◽  
The Future

<p>Sir Keith Holyoake, New Zealand Prime Minister from 1960 to 1972, famously counselled first-term Members of Parliament to ‘breathe through their noses’, suggesting that it was in their best interests to keep their heads down and mouths shut. Perhaps this recommendation is instrumental in the low profile of first-term MPs in New Zealand and the subsequent dearth of information available about these individuals. Within political science, scholarly attention has tended to focus on the ‘power holders’ – senior leaders and those perceived to have the most influence. In New Zealand, this has resulted in a growing field of literature about prime ministers, party leaders, and the few parliamentarians who reach cabinet. This thesis steps back from power holders to shed light on new MPs. It is important to know who new MPs are. Within parliamentary systems MPs often serve long apprenticeships before being promoted to the senior positions of their party and government. Thus MPs who enter parliament today may hold significant influence in the future. However, very little is known about legislators when they enter parliament. Do all Members of Parliament wish to become ministers or prime ministers, or do they have more modest aspirations, such as being the best local MP they possibly can? By understanding the motivations of our neophyte politicians we can better understand the types of people who are likely to become significant political actors in the future. This study aims to understand how and why individuals become MPs and how they adapt to the role once they have been elected. This thesis uses information gained from two rounds of interviews conducted with first-term Members of Parliament during their first nine months in office. Thus this research presents an insight into how MPs view candidate selection and follows them through their first few months in the job as they reconcile their pre-election expectations with the roles expected of MPs. The result is an account of how individuals become MPs and the roles they develop once elected.</p>

scholarly journals Informal institutions and gendered candidate selection in Brazilian parties

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110088
Author(s):  
Malu AC Gatto ◽  
Kristin N Wylie
Keyword(s):  
Gender Equity ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
State Level ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Informal Practices ◽  
Electoral Cycles ◽  
Gender Quota

Six electoral cycles since the implementation of Brazil’s gender quota, just 15% of the 513 members of the Chamber of Deputies are women. We ask how parties’ use of informal institutions mediates the effectiveness of the gender quota. Drawing on data from more than 4,000 state-level party organizations, we show that parties employ informal practices that intentionally and non-intentionally interact with gender equity rules to affect women’s political representation: the intentional nomination of phantom candidates (“ laranjas”) allows parties to comply with the letter of the quota law, without effectively supporting women’s candidacies—to the detriment of women’s election; meanwhile, the extended use of provisional commissions to minimize oversight on candidate selection poses an obstacle to the quota and women’s candidacies and election more generally. Quota resistance characterizes an instance of both the likely inadvertent effects of informal institutions employed for non-gendered motivations and party leaders acting to preserve their own power.

scholarly journals Paying to party: Candidate resources and party switching in new democracies

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882198956
Author(s):  
Leonardo R Arriola ◽  
Donghyun Danny Choi ◽  
Justine M Davis ◽  
Melanie L Phillips ◽  
Lise Rakner
Keyword(s):  
Conjoint Analysis ◽  
Organizational Support ◽  
Choice Experiment ◽  
Business Owners ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Party Switching ◽  
Original Survey

Party switching among legislative candidates has important implications for accountability and representation in democratizing countries. We argue that party switching is influenced by campaign costs tied to the clientelistic politics that persist in many such countries. Candidates who are expected to personally pay for their campaigns, including handouts for voters, will seek to affiliate with parties that can lower those costs through personal inducements and organizational support. Campaign costs also drive candidate selection among party leaders, as they seek to recruit candidates who can finance their own campaigns. We corroborate these expectations with an original survey and embedded choice experiment conducted among parliamentary candidates in Zambia. The conjoint analysis shows that candidates prefer larger parties that offer particularistic benefits. The survey further reveals that parties select for business owners as candidates—the very candidates most likely to defect from one party to another.

Democratization and the Dynamics of Candidate Selection Rule Change in Mexico, 1991––2003

2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven T. Wuhs
Keyword(s):  
Selection Rule ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Selection Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Rule Change ◽  
Party Activists ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

Party leaders in Mexico face the challenge of maintaining party unity while remaining competitive in a democratizing context. Candidate selection rules are central to achieving both objectives. I argue that leaders must decide between ““open”” rules that nominate electable candidates and ““closed”” rules that build strong party organizations, and suggest that strategic interests are the most powerful determinant of rule choice. Despite an evident trend toward greater openness, however, party leaders have taken advantage of Mexico's mixed electoral system to preserve their own influence and placate party activists, while reaping the benefits of open rules. Los lííderes de los partidos polííticos en Mééxico se enfrentan al reto de mantener la cohesióón de sus partidos mientras buscan seguir ganando las elecciones. Los procesos de seleccióón de los candidatos son cruciales para lograr los dos objetivos. Planteo que los lííderes deben elegir entre procesos ““abiertos”” que producen candidatos atractivos y procesos ““cerrados”” que fortalecen los partidos mismos, y que las metas estratéégicas de los partidos tienen la mayor influencia en la seleccióón de las reglas. A pesar de una tendencia hacia mayor apertura, los lííderes, por medio del sistema electoral ““mixto”” de Mééxico, han conservado su propia influencia, conciliando con los activistas, mientras se aprovechan de los beneficios electorales de los procesos abiertos.

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