scholarly journals Second Thoughts About Central Bank Digital Currencies

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Arto Kovanen

Sustained decline in central banks’ monetary liabilities (reserves and currency in circulation), which the emergency of cryptocurrencies may have hastened, has been enabled by technological innovations that over time have allowed financial institutions and their customers to execute transactions and settle their debts without resorting to central bank currency. Policymakers are concerned about their ability to guarantee public’s access to government-backed currency. This has implications for central banks’ balance sheet and income position, which central bank digital currency might reconstitute. But the introduction of central bank digital currency (CBDC) comes with its own risks and could be disruptive for financial markets. We believe that retaining the option to have access to government-guaranteed currency is of utmost importance, despite the sporadic demand for physical currency in the modern society, but it could be addressed within existing institutional structures without the introduction of CBDC. However, policy authorities are right in seeking oversight and regulation for cryptocurrencies to address the destabilizing potential of cryptocurrencies for financial markets, and they should continue modernizing payment infrastructures to bring retail settlement systems at par with cryptocurrencies in terms of settlement speed but without associated liquidity and credit risks. These steps would preserve the status quo and allow private sector to continue innovating while limiting central banks’ footprint in the financial markets.

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Roger E. A. Farmer ◽  
Pawel Zabczyk

This paper is about the effectiveness of qualitative easing, a form of unconventional monetary policy that changes the risk composition of the central bank balance sheet. We construct a general equilibrium model where agents have rational expectations, and there is a complete set of financial securities, but where some agents are unable to participate in financial markets. We show that a change in the risk composition of the central bank’s balance sheet affects equilibrium asset prices and economic activity. We prove that, in our model, a policy in which the central bank stabilizes non-fundamental fluctuations in the stock market is self-financing and leads to a Pareto efficient outcome.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-48
Author(s):  
Volodymyr MISHCHENKO ◽  
◽  
Svitlana NAUMENKOVA ◽  
Svitlana MISHCHENKO ◽  
◽  
...  

The purpose of the article is to reveal the essence and features of the introduction of digital currency of central banks and their impact on the conditions of monetary policy, financial stability, as well as institutional transformations in the development of national banking systems. The study is based on an analysis of projects of issuance and use of digital currencies of the ECB and central banks of leading countries, as well as the results of pilot projects of the National Bank of China on the use of the digital yuan and NBU on the e-hryvnia circulation. It is proved that digital currency of the central bank should be considered as a new dematerialized form of national currency in addition to cash and non-cash forms. Particular attention is paid to the study of the impact of the use of digital currency by central banks on the main parameters of economic policy. The main directions of potential influence of digital currency use on transformation of mechanisms of realization of monetary, budgetary and tax, macroprudential policy, maintenance of financial stability, activization of action of channels of the monetary transmission mechanism, and also on reforming of system of the state financial monitoring and bank supervision are substantiated. It is determined that one of the consequences of the use of digital currency will be the ability to ensure full control over all monetary transactions, which will help reduce the shadow economy and corruption. Structural and logical schemes of centralized and decentralized models of issuance and circulation of digital currency of central bank have been developed, directions of changes in the structure and functions of commercial and central banks, as well as in the structure of the financial and credit system in general have been substantiated.


2019 ◽  
pp. 94-100
Author(s):  
T.S. Hudima ◽  
V.A. Ustymenko

The article is devoted to identifying the peculiarities of the central bank digital currency (CBDC), explaining their impact on the monetary policy of the state, and identifying the prospects for the transformation of domestic banking legislation in connection with the implementation of the CBDC. It is noted that the scope of competence of the Central Bank and the legal basis for the issuance of the CBDC will depend on the economic and legal features of the digital currency, the degree of its impact on the monetary policy, the financial stability of the country’s economy and so on. In the process of forming the appropriate legal field and defining the conceptual apparatus in the sphere of emission and circulation of the CBDC, the peculiarities of the use of the latter in economic transactions and the specific functions not inherent in ordinary means of payment should be taken. СBDC initiatives will help: 1) progressively narrow the banking system at the level of the Central Banks (such as the Chicago Plan) by allowing individuals and businesses to deposit directly into the accounts of the Central Banks; 2) increasing confidence of economic entities and individuals in the financial system; 3) strengthening the financial stability of the economy (both domestically and globally). Granting business entities or individuals the right to store digital money directly with the Central Bank can give rise to two main directions of influence on monetary policy: first, to strengthen its transmission mechanism; secondly, lead to banks being disrupted. This may lead to some legal issues regarding (1) the NBU’s area of competence; (2) the constitutional foundations of the legal economic order (Article 5 of the ECU). In particular, it cannot be ruled out that centralization of the production, servicing, and management of the СBDC turnover may violate the principles of competition in business activities, prevent abuse of monopoly position in the market, etc. Keywords: monetary policy, central bank digital currency, financial stability, competence, legal framework, economic operations, issue.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-60
Author(s):  
Jacob Stevens ◽  

This paper models a representative bank, and uses this model to explore the assumptions and implications of a selection of money-creation theories. It is shown that the money-supply process tends toward the logic of exogeneity as banks' fears about liquidity stress increases. At present, banks do not fear liquidity stress because central banks are operating under a floor system with a superabundance of reserves following unsterilized quantitative easing. Secondly, a role for a ‘central-bank digital currency’ is suggested as a useful complement to reserves policy in an economy with large or collusive banks.


Author(s):  
E. Myasnikova ◽  
L. Voskresenskaya

The article is devoted to the discussion of the prospect of issuing in Russia the digital currency of the Central Bank - the digital ruble. The properties and characteristics of the digital ruble, models of the functioning of the digital currency are considered. The place of the Central Bank in the process of functioning of the platform for the production of digital rudders shown. The main stages of development and implementation of the digital ruble are presented. Expert assessments of the possibilities and consequences of the introduction of the digital ruble are discussed. The impact of the digital ruble of the Central Bank on the financial system and the potential risks of introducing a digital currency are assessed. A comparative analysis of technologies for creating a digital ruble platform been carried out. The strategies of the central banks of various countries in creating models and mechanisms for issuing digital currencies into circulation are considered. Conclusions are made about the prospects for the introduction of the digital ruble in Russia. It noted that the problem of choosing the organization of the circulation of digital currency remains unresolved. Model C creates an excessive load of settlements on the Central Bank; Model D distributes the settlement load among commercial banks, which greatly increases the risks of clients – legal entities and individuals.


2014 ◽  
pp. 1284-1302
Author(s):  
Yıldız Özkök

Today, Central Banks' primary target is to maintain the price stability. In that context, through their monetary policy, they intervene in the money market with different tools. The Analytical Balance Sheet was created upon summing up and offsetting Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) in order to represent specific monetary aggregates. By means of that, CBRT aims to make the balance sheet more understandable and simple. In this chapter, firstly the sub items of the Analytical Balance Sheet are explained; secondly, the economic crises of Turkey during 2000-2009 is mentioned; finally, effects of these crises on the CBRT's Analytical Balance Sheet, changes in monetary aggregates which are Currency Issued, Reserve Money, Monetary Base, and Central Bank's Money, and in this context structure of the monetary policy of the CBRT in this period is analyzed.


Author(s):  
Ranald C. Michie

By the 1990s the combination of internal deregulation and globalization led to a spectacular growth in the value of financial transactions both inside countries and across borders. There was a commensurate increase in pressure on payment and settlement systems to cope with the huge volume and variety of transactions. All this was of concern to those who regulated financial systems around the world. The speed and extent of the changes taking place, assisted by the advances made in the technology of communication and data handling, forced regulators to search for new ways of coping with the consequences, as the methods of the past were becoming inadequate. Globalization meant that national boundaries could no longer define the parameters within which financial systems operated, as all became integrated into international flows of short-term money and long-term finance. The complexities arose not only from the process of globalization and technological change but also from the disappearance of the barriers that had long separated different components within national financial systems. Rather than serving separate communities banks and financial markets increasingly competed with each other. In the face of these enormous changes regulators turned to the megabanks as a safe and secure way of monitoring and policing global financial markets. There was an implicit belief that the size and sophistication of these megabanks had made them to big to fail or even require the central banks to play a role as lenders of last resort.


Cryptoassets ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 307-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli ◽  
Maria Soledad Martinez Peria ◽  
Itai Agur ◽  
Anil Ari ◽  
John Kiff ◽  
...  

Several central banks have begun actively investigating the possibility of issuing central bank digital currency (CBDC). This new central bank liability would be a widely accessible digital form of fiat money, intended as legal tender. This chapter aims to answer a simple question: Does CBDC offer benefits? On the demand side, would it satisfy end user needs better than other forms of money? And on the supply side, would issuing CBDC allow central banks to more effectively satisfy public policy goals, including financial inclusion, operational efficiency, financial stability, monetary policy effectiveness, and financial integrity? In short, is CBDC a desirable form of money given existing and rapidly evolving alternatives? The chapter includes a summary of pilot projects and studies from central banks exploring the possibility of issuing CBDC. The analysis is based on publicly issued materials and discussions with staff members at central banks and technology providers around the world.


Significance Expectations that the Fed will refrain from hiking its benchmark rates from its target range of 0.25-0.5% and that the Japanese central bank will provide further stimulus are suppressing volatility in financial markets and fuelling demand for risk assets. However, evidence that "overburdened" monetary policy is losing its efficacy triggered a sell-off in bonds and equities on September 9, increasing the scope for sharper price falls as investors worry that central banks have run out of ammunition. Impacts Services expanded in August at their slowest pace since 2010, making it less likely that the Fed will raise interest rates this month. EM bond and equity mutual funds have enjoyed a surge in inflows since the Brexit vote as yield-hungry investors pour money into risk assets Oil, a key determinant of investor sentiment, will stay below 50 dollars/barrel unless major producers agree measures to stabilise prices.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Ivanović

Abstract The main reason for central bank independence lies in the fact that it is necessary to clearly distinguish spending money from the ability of making money. Independence of central banks is now a characteristic of almost all developed and highly industrialized countries. In this respect, it represents an essential part of the overall economic reality of these countries. Over the past decade or somewhat earlier, the issue of importance of central bank independence has been raised in developing countries, making the institutional, functional, personal and financial independence of central banks current topics for consideration. The key reason for the growing attention to financial independence of central banks is due to the effects of the global financial crisis on their balance sheets and therefore the challenges related to achieving the basic goals of the functioning of central banks - financial stability and price stability. Financial strength and independence of central banks must be developed relative to the policy and tasks that are carried out and risks they face in carrying out of these tasks. Financial independence represents a key base for credibility of a central bank. On one hand, the degree of credibility is associated with the ability of central banks to carry out their tasks without external financial assistance. In order to enhance the credibility of central bank in this regard, it must have sufficient financial strength to absorb potential losses and that power must be continuously strengthened by increasing capital and rearranging profit allocation arrangements. This is particularly important in times of crisis.


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