scholarly journals Regulatory Issues Associated With Shipment of Small Quantities of Radioactive Material

Author(s):  
Allen C. Smith ◽  
Glenn A. Abramczyk ◽  
Stephen J. Nathan

Following decertification of the ubiquitous and simple Department of Transpsortaion (DOT) 6M specification package, radioactive materials package Shippers have been faced with the need to use Certified Type B packagings. Many Department of Energy (DOE), commercial and academic programs have a need to ship small masses of radioactive material, where the identity of the material or radionuclides is know but the individual activity of some may not be known. For quantities which are small enough to be fissile exempt and have adequate shielding to ensure low radiation levels, these materials could be transported in a package which provides the required containment level. Because their Chalfant type containment vessels meet the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N14.5 definition for leak-tight (≤ 1×10−7 ref cm3 air/sec), the 9975, 9977, and 9978 are capable of transporting contents requiring the highest standard of containment. The issues associated with certification of a high-integrity, general purpose package for shipping small quantities of such radioactive material are discussed and the logical basis for certification for such contents is described.

Author(s):  
Russell Wagner

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has provided set guidance that hydrogen concentrations in radioactive material packages be limited to 5 vol% unless the package is designed to withstand a bounding hydrogen deflagration or detonation. The NRC guidance further specifies that the expected shipping time for a package be limited to one-half the time to reach 5 vol% hydrogen. This guidance has presented logistical problems for transport of retrieved legacy waste packages on the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site that frequently contain greater than 5 vol% hydrogen due to their age and the lack of venting requirements at the time they were generated. Such packages do not meet the performance-based criteria for Type B packaging, and are considered risk-based packages. Duratek Technical Services (Duratek) has researched the true risk of hydrogen deflagration and detonation with closed packages, and has developed technical justification for elevated concentration limits of up to 15 vol% hydrogen in risk-based packages when transport is limited to the confines of the Hanford Site. Duratek has presented elevated hydrogen limit justification to the DOE Richland Operations Office and is awaiting approval for incorporation into the Hanford Site Transportation Safety Document. This paper details the technical justification methodology for the elevated hydrogen limits.


Author(s):  
Ronald B. Pope ◽  
Richard R. Rawl

The United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and active IAEA Donor States are working together to strengthen the security of nuclear and radioactive materials during transport to mitigate the risks of theft, diversion, or sabotage. International activities have included preparing and publishing the new IAEA guidance document Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material while ensuring that security recommendations do not conflict with requirements for safety during transport, and developing and providing training programs to assist other countries in implementing radioactive material transport security programs. This paper provides a brief update on the status of these transportation security efforts.


Author(s):  
Lawrence F. Gelder

Under the authorization of the Department of Transportation, per 49 CFR Part 173.7(d), Type B and fissile radioactive materials packagings made by or under the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) may be used for the transportation of Class 7 materials when evaluated, approved, and certified by DOE against packaging standards equivalent to those specified in 10 CFR Part 71. The DOE certificate is issued on the basis of a safety analysis report of the package design and application. The applicant must demonstrate to DOE the package meets the standards in the 10 CFR Part 71. Since the Type B and fissile radioactive materials packaging standards specified in 10 CFR Part 71 are performance based standards, guides and other tools are necessary to demonstrate how a package design meets the standards. Two essential tools used by packaging applicants and reviewers to quantify and demonstrate compliance with the safety standards/requirements of the CFR are the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code and ASME NQA-1. The DOE Packaging Certification Program develops and sponsors training courses for packaging applicants and reviewers. Many of these courses are required training by DOE for persons that manage or prepare safety analysis reports for package designs (i.e., applications) submitted to the DOE for certification. The ASME B&PV Code and NQA-1 are ubiquitous in the DOE core training courses. This paper provides an overview how the ASME B&PV Code and NQA-1 are implemented in DOE Packaging Certification Program training courses.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Nancy L. Osgood ◽  
Ronald B. Pope

The US regulations for certification of Type B packages are based in large part on those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the US has chosen to differ (or deviate) in some respects, from the IAEA regulations based on its national legislation, its technical experience, and efforts to minimize burden on shippers of radioactive materials in the US. This paper will provide a brief overview of some of the differences between 10 CFR Part 71 “Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”, as implemented January 2008, and IAEA TS-R-1 “Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material”, 2005 edition, discuss some of the differences between the two sets of regulations, and the reasons for those differences.


Author(s):  
Yung Liu ◽  
Steve Bellamy ◽  
James Shuler

Based on the U.S. Department of Transportation regulations in 49 CFR 173.7(d), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.1B codifies the authority of certification of Type-B and fissile material transportation packaging to the Office of Environmental Management (EM), except for materials of interest to national security, naval propulsion systems, and civilian radioactive waste management. DOE Order 460.1B also stipulates that the EM certification of Type B and fissile materials transportation packaging shall be in accordance with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety standards in 10 CFR Part 71. The Office of Licensing (EM-24) is supported by technical review teams at Argonne National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Savannah River National Laboratory. SAFESHIELD 2999A is a Type-B radioactive material transportation packaging designed for use by the DOE’s Isotope Program. The contents of the packaging consist of source capsules of Co-60, Cs-137, or Ir-192; solid and liquid-metal accelerator targets; ion exchange resins; and target processing wastes. No fissile materials are included. Protection against radiation and confinement of radioactivity are, therefore, the two major requirements for the safety performance of the SAFESHIELD 2999A packaging under both normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accidents. The Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) of SAFESHIELD 2999A underwent four revisions by the applicant during the entire certification review. This paper will highlight some of the technical issues in areas such as contents, shielding, and quality assurance, and will discuss how these issues interact and affect other areas such as structural, thermal, containment, operating procedures, and acceptance tests and maintenance. Also discussed in the paper is the use of an independent third party to facilitate resolution of the technical issues and move the process forward for certification of SAFESHIELD 2999A.


Author(s):  
Andri Setyorini ◽  
Niken Setyaningrum

Background: Elderly is the final stage of the human life cycle, that is part of the inevitable life process and will be experienced by every individual. At this stage the individual undergoes many changes both physically and mentally, especially setbacks in various functions and abilities he once had. Preliminary study in Social House Tresna Wreda Yogyakarta Budhi Luhur Units there are 16 elderly who experience physical immobilization. In the social house has done various activities for the elderly are still active, but the elderly who experienced muscle weakness is not able to follow the exercise, so it needs to do ROM (Range Of Motion) exercise.   Objective: The general purpose of this research is to know the effect of Range Of Motion (ROM) Active Assitif training to increase the range of motion of joints in elderly who experience physical immobility at Social House of Tresna Werdha Yogyakarta unit Budhi Luhur.   Methode: This study was included in the type of pre-experiment, using the One Group Pretest Posttest design in which the range of motion of the joints before (pretest) and posttest (ROM) was performed  ROM. Subjects in this study were all elderly with impaired physical mobility in Social House Tresna Wreda Yogyakarta Unit Budhi Luhur a number of 14 elderly people. Data analysis in this research use paired sample t-test statistic  Result: The result of this research shows that there is influence of ROM (Range of Motion) Active training to increase of range of motion of joints in elderly who experience physical immobility at Social House Tresna Wredha Yogyakarta Unit Budhi Luhur.  Conclusion: There is influence of ROM (Range of Motion) Active training to increase of range of motion of joints in elderly who experience physical immobility at Social House Tresna Wredha Yogyakarta Unit Budhi Luhur.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
LAYSCE ROCHA DE MOURA ◽  
SYLMARA LOPES FRANCELINO GONÇALVES DIAS ◽  
LUCIANO ANTONIO PRATES JUNQUEIRA

Abstract This study aims to identify articles focused on the waste picker’s health to support the construction of an analytical framework that considers the individual and the environment in the scope of their labor activity. For this purpose, it is intended to answer the following question: which aspects can be considered in the analysis of the waste picker’s health in their labor activity? Methodologically, it has an exploratory nature and use the Systematic Review of Literature. The results pointed out to four categories of analysis grouped into the following aspects: meanings, individual, activity and environment. The analytical framework proposed presents contributions for an extended understanding of waste picker’s health, its aspects and interrelationships. Finally, it is suggested that empirical studies could be carried out to validate the proposed structure.


1985 ◽  
Vol 29 (10) ◽  
pp. 987-987 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene Lynch

The American National Standard for Human Factors Engineering of Visual Display Terminal Workstations, the first standard sponsored by the Human Factors Society, is in the final stages of acceptance as an American National Standard. This standard addresses the physical and perceptual aspects of the visual display terminal workstation as used in text processing, data entry, and data inquiry. Standards take on many different forms and fill a variety of needs. Basically a standard provides a reference. Some standards are written so that two systems may be designed to complement each other or fit together. Lightbulbs and fixtures designed to the same standard will work together. In the case of human factors standards one half of the system is already designed, the human. The variety of the design of this part of the system requires that human factors standards identify the parameters to be considered and the corresponding measurement methods needed to insure that the equipment is designed to fit the individual human. A good solution needs to be based on the particular set of circumstances at hand. The voluntary standards method, known as the American National Standards, provides a vehicle for specifying the appropriate parameters and measurement methods while incorporating the necessary flexibility required to insure good designs for individuals. The purpose of this panel session is to provide the society with an interactive session with representatives of the standards drafting committee. A brief history of the committee and its activities will be presented. The panelists will then describe the approach taken in each of the major sections, the mandatory requirements, and the elements the panelists consider to be of particular interest


Author(s):  
Andrew Celovsky ◽  
Randy Lesco ◽  
Brian Gale ◽  
Jeffrey Sypes

Ten years ago Atomic Energy of Canada developed a Type B(U)-85 shipping container for the global transport of highly radioactive materials. This paper reviews the development of the container, including a summary of the design requirements, a review of the selected materials and key design elements, and the results of the major qualification tests (drop testing, fire test, leak tightness testing, and shielding integrity tests). As a result of the testing, improvements to the structural, thermal and containment design were made. Such improvements, and reasons thereof, are noted. Also provided is a summary of the additional analysis work required to upgrade the package from a Type B(U) to a Type B(F), i.e. essentially upgrading the container to include fissile radioisotopes to the authorized radioactive contents list. Having a certified shipping container is only one aspect governing the global shipments of radioactive material. By necessity the shipment of radioactive material is a highly regulated environment. This paper also explores the experiences with other key aspects of radioactive shipments, including the service procedures used to maintain the container certification, the associated compliance program for radioactive material shipments, and the shipping logistics involved in the transport.


Author(s):  
Matthew R. Feldman

Based on a recommendation from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Assistance (HS-21) has recently issued DOE Manual 441.1-1 entitled Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. This manual provides guidance regarding the use of non-engineered storage media for all special nuclear material throughout the DOE complex. As part of this development effort, HS-21 has funded the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Transportation Technologies Group (TTG) to develop and demonstrate testing protocols for such onsite containers. ORNL TTG to date has performed preliminary tests of representative onsite containers from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory. This paper will describe the testing processes that have been developed.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document