Implementation of the ASME Code and NQA-1 in U.S. Department of Energy Packaging Certification Program Training Courses

Author(s):  
Lawrence F. Gelder

Under the authorization of the Department of Transportation, per 49 CFR Part 173.7(d), Type B and fissile radioactive materials packagings made by or under the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) may be used for the transportation of Class 7 materials when evaluated, approved, and certified by DOE against packaging standards equivalent to those specified in 10 CFR Part 71. The DOE certificate is issued on the basis of a safety analysis report of the package design and application. The applicant must demonstrate to DOE the package meets the standards in the 10 CFR Part 71. Since the Type B and fissile radioactive materials packaging standards specified in 10 CFR Part 71 are performance based standards, guides and other tools are necessary to demonstrate how a package design meets the standards. Two essential tools used by packaging applicants and reviewers to quantify and demonstrate compliance with the safety standards/requirements of the CFR are the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code and ASME NQA-1. The DOE Packaging Certification Program develops and sponsors training courses for packaging applicants and reviewers. Many of these courses are required training by DOE for persons that manage or prepare safety analysis reports for package designs (i.e., applications) submitted to the DOE for certification. The ASME B&PV Code and NQA-1 are ubiquitous in the DOE core training courses. This paper provides an overview how the ASME B&PV Code and NQA-1 are implemented in DOE Packaging Certification Program training courses.

Author(s):  
V. N. Shah ◽  
B. Shelton ◽  
R. Fabian ◽  
S. W. Tam ◽  
Y. Y. Liu ◽  
...  

The Department of Energy has established guidelines for the qualifications and training of technical experts preparing and reviewing the safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) and transportation of radioactive materials. One of the qualifications is a working knowledge of, and familiarity with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, referred to hereafter as the ASME Code. DOE is sponsoring a course on the application of the ASME Code to the transportation packaging of radioactive materials. The course addresses both ASME design requirements and the safety requirements in the federal regulations. The main objective of this paper is to describe the salient features of the course, with the focus on the application of Section III, Divisions 1 and 3, and Section VIII of the ASME Code to the design and construction of the containment vessel and other packaging components used for transportation (and storage) of radioactive materials, including spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The training course includes the ASME Code-related topics that are needed to satisfy all Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation Part 71 (10 CFR 71). Specifically, the topics include requirements for materials, design, fabrication, examination, testing, and quality assurance for containment vessels, bolted closures, components to maintain subcriticality, and other packaging components. The design addresses thermal and pressure loading, fatigue, nonductile fracture and buckling of these components during both normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions described in 10 CFR 71. Various examples are drawn from the review of certificate applications for Type B and fissile material transportation packagings.


Author(s):  
Allen C. Smith ◽  
Glenn A. Abramczyk ◽  
Stephen J. Nathan

Following decertification of the ubiquitous and simple Department of Transpsortaion (DOT) 6M specification package, radioactive materials package Shippers have been faced with the need to use Certified Type B packagings. Many Department of Energy (DOE), commercial and academic programs have a need to ship small masses of radioactive material, where the identity of the material or radionuclides is know but the individual activity of some may not be known. For quantities which are small enough to be fissile exempt and have adequate shielding to ensure low radiation levels, these materials could be transported in a package which provides the required containment level. Because their Chalfant type containment vessels meet the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N14.5 definition for leak-tight (≤ 1×10−7 ref cm3 air/sec), the 9975, 9977, and 9978 are capable of transporting contents requiring the highest standard of containment. The issues associated with certification of a high-integrity, general purpose package for shipping small quantities of such radioactive material are discussed and the logical basis for certification for such contents is described.


Author(s):  
Mikal A. McKinnon ◽  
Leroy Stewart

Abstract Research studies by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) established the technical and operational requirements necessary to enable the onsite cask-to-cask dry transfer of spent nuclear fuel. Use of the dry transfer system has the potential to permit shutdown reactor sites to decommission pools and provide the capability of transferring assemblies from storage casks or small transportation casks to sealed transportable canisters. Following an evaluation by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Academy of Sciences, a cooperative program was established between DOE and EPRI, which led to the cost-shared design of a dry transfer system (DTS). EPRI used Transnuclear, Inc., of Hawthorne, New York, to design the DTS in accordance with the technical and quality assurance requirements of the code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 72 (10CFR72). EPRI delivered the final design report to DOE in 1995 and the DTS topical safety analysis report (TSAR) in 1996. DOE submitted the TSAR to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for review under 10CFR72 and requested that the NRC staff evaluate the TSAR and issue a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) that could be used and referenced by an applicant seeking a site-specific license for the construction and operation of a DTS. DOE also initiated a cold demonstration of major subsystem prototypes in 1996. After careful assessment, the NRC agreed that the DTS concept has merit. However, because the TSAR was not site-specific and was lacking some detailed information required for a complete review, the NRC decided to issue an Assessment Report (AR) rather than a SER. This was issued in November 2000. Additional information that must be included in a future site-specific Safety Analysis Report for the DTS is identified in the AR. The DTS consists of three major sections: a Preparation Area, a Lower Access Area, and a Transfer Confinement Area. The Preparation Area is a sheet metal building where casks are prepared for loading, unloading, or shipment. The Preparation Area adjoins the Lower Access Area and is separated from the Lower Access Area by a large shielded door. The Lower Access Area and Transfer Confinement Area are contained within concrete walls approximately three feet thick. These are the areas where the casks are located and where the fuel is moved during transfer operations. A floor containing two portals separates the Lower Access Area and the Transfer Confinement Area. The casks are located below the floor, and the fuel transfer operation occurs above the floor. The cold demonstration of the DTS was successfully conducted at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) as a cooperative effort between the DOE and EPRI. The cold demonstration was limited to the fuel handling equipment, the cask lid handling equipment, and the cask interface system. The demonstration included recovery operations associated with loss of power or off-normal events. The demonstration did not include cask receiving and lid handling; cask transport and lifting; vacuum/inerting/leak test; canister welding; decontamination; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning; and radiation monitoring. The demonstration test was designed to deliberately challenge the system and determine whether any specific system operation could adversely impact or jeopardize the operation or safety of any other function or system. All known interlocks were challenged. As in all new systems, there were lessons learned during the operation of the system and a few minor modifications made to ease operations. System modifications were subsequently demonstrated. The demonstration showed that the system operated as expected and provided times for normal fuel transfer operations. The demonstration also showed that recovery could be made from off-normal events.


Author(s):  
Gary R. Cannell ◽  
Glenn J. Grant ◽  
Burton E. Hill

One of the activities associated with cleanup throughout the Department of Energy (DOE) complex is packaging radioactive materials into storage containers. Much of this work will be performed in high-radiation environments requiring fully remote operations for which existing, proven systems do not currently exist. These conditions require a process that is capable of producing acceptable (defect-free) welds on a consistent basis; the need to perform weld repair, under fully-remote operations can be extremely costly and time consuming. Current closure-welding technologies (fusion welding) are not well suited for this application and will present risk to cleanup cost and schedule. To address this risk, Fluor and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) are proposing that a new and emerging joining technology, Friction Stir Welding (FSW), be considered for this work. FSW technology has been demonstrated in other industries (aerospace and marine) to produce near flaw-free welds on a consistent basis. FSW is judged capable of providing the needed performance for fully-remote closure welding of containers for radioactive materials. The performance characteristics of FSW, i.e., high weld quality, simple machine-tool equipment and increased welding efficiency, suggest that this new technology should be considered for radioactive materials packaging campaigns. FSW technology will require some development/adaptation for this application, along with several activities needed for commercialization. One of these activities will be to obtain approval from the governing construction code to use the FSW technology. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME B&PVC) will govern this work; however, rules for the use of FSW are not currently addressed. A code case will be required to define appropriate process variables within prescribed limits for submittal to the Code for review/approval and incorporation.


Author(s):  
Russell Wagner

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has provided set guidance that hydrogen concentrations in radioactive material packages be limited to 5 vol% unless the package is designed to withstand a bounding hydrogen deflagration or detonation. The NRC guidance further specifies that the expected shipping time for a package be limited to one-half the time to reach 5 vol% hydrogen. This guidance has presented logistical problems for transport of retrieved legacy waste packages on the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site that frequently contain greater than 5 vol% hydrogen due to their age and the lack of venting requirements at the time they were generated. Such packages do not meet the performance-based criteria for Type B packaging, and are considered risk-based packages. Duratek Technical Services (Duratek) has researched the true risk of hydrogen deflagration and detonation with closed packages, and has developed technical justification for elevated concentration limits of up to 15 vol% hydrogen in risk-based packages when transport is limited to the confines of the Hanford Site. Duratek has presented elevated hydrogen limit justification to the DOE Richland Operations Office and is awaiting approval for incorporation into the Hanford Site Transportation Safety Document. This paper details the technical justification methodology for the elevated hydrogen limits.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Paul T. Mann

The Department of Energy (DOE) has been shipping university reactor fuels and other fissile materials in the 110-gallon Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M container for over 20 years. The DOT 6M container has been the workhorse for many DOE programs. However, packages designed and used according to the Specification 6M (U. S. Code of Federal Regulations, 49 CFR 178.354; 2003) do not conform to the latest package safety requirements in 10 CFR 71, especially performance under hypothetical accident conditions. For that reason, the 6M specification containers are being terminated by the DOT. Packages designed to the 6M specification will no longer be allowed for in-commerce shipments after October 1, 2008. To meet on-going transportation needs, DOE evaluated several different concepts for replacing the 110-gallon 6M. After this evaluation, DOE selected the Y-12 National Security Complex for the project. The new Y-12 container, designated the ES-4100 shipping container, will have a capacity of four times the current 6M and will be certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The ES-4100 project began in September 2006 and prototypes of the new container are now being fabricated. Details on the design features and the upcoming regulatory testing of this new container are discussed in this paper.


2013 ◽  
Vol 31 (31_suppl) ◽  
pp. 55-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne C. Chiang ◽  
Kristen McNiff ◽  
Pamela Kadlubek ◽  
Michael N. Neuss ◽  
Jacobson Joseph

55 Background: More than 600 practices have participated in ASCO’s QOPI since 2006. 192 have achieved certification through the QOPI Certification Program (QCP) since 2010. QOPI assesses greater than 150 performance metrics, organized into modules; QCP evaluates 20 chemotherapy-related standards. QI efforts resulting from QOPI/QCP participation have not been assessed, e.g. which measure areas or standards are preferentially selected by practices for local QI projects. Methods: A survey was sent to 1,450 participants at 850 practices to assess which measure modules/standards were selected by QOPI/QCP participants as the basis for local QI efforts and to understand the nature of the improvement initiatives. Results: 89 participants responded. 96% (85/89) respondents reported QOPI/QCP led to QI efforts. Respondents were asked to select module/s that spurred subsequent QI activities: core measures (57%; n=45), symptom/toxicity management (48%; n=38), end-of-life care (38%; n=29), breast cancer (13%; n=10), colorectal cancer (10%; n=8), NHL (6%; n=5) and NSCLC (4%; n=3). Related to the QCP structural safety standards, participants reported QI projects as follows: chemotherapy planning/chart documentation (39%; n=31), general chemotherapy standards (30%; n=24), monitoring and assessment (29%; n=23), chemotherapy administration (27%; n=21), chemotherapy orders (23%; n=18), staffing (16%; n=13), drug preparation (9%; n=7). Practices reported that QOPI measures improved in subsequent rounds as a result of specific projects (n=22/25, or 88%); 100% felt that these QI projects impacted their practices for the better. QI project results were presented primarily in practice meetings (74%; n=26), hospital or community forums (17%; n=6), ASCO Quality Symposium or other meeting (9%; n=3). No projects reached publication. Of note, 17 of 31 respondents who reported practice status indicated achieving QOPI certification. Conclusions: QOPI participants select improvement targets throughout QOPI modules and standards. QOPI and QCP have succeeded in spurring local QI efforts that have led to score improvements, increased discussion of quality and standards, and a positive impact on practices.


Author(s):  
James E. Laurinat ◽  
Matthew R. Kesterson ◽  
Jeffery L. England ◽  
Edward T. Ketusky ◽  
Charles A. McKeel ◽  
...  

The thermal aspects of a safety analysis for shipment of the West Valley melter are presented. The West Valley melter was used from 1996 to 2002 to vitrify regionally sourced high level radioactive waste. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) set up the West Valley Demonstration Project to encase this melter and grout it in low density cellular concrete, for disposal. DOE-West Valley requested the Savannah River National Laboratory to prepare a Safety Analysis Report. The thermal portion of the safety analysis covers Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accidents Conditions (HAC), as defined in the Code of Federal Regulations. For NCT, it is assumed that the encased melter is stored in either shade or direct sunlight at an ambient temperature of 311 K (100 °F). The defining HAC is exposure to a 1075 K (1475 °F) fire for 30 minutes. Finite element computer models were used to compute temperature profiles for NCT and HAC, given the thermal properties of the melter and its contents and tabulated radiolytic heating source concentrations. The resulting temperature conditions were used to estimate the pressurization due to evaporation of water from the concrete. The maximum calculated gauge pressures were determined to be 81 kPa (12 psig) for NCT and 580 kPa (84 psig) for HAC.


Author(s):  
Ronald B. Pope ◽  
Richard R. Rawl

The United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and active IAEA Donor States are working together to strengthen the security of nuclear and radioactive materials during transport to mitigate the risks of theft, diversion, or sabotage. International activities have included preparing and publishing the new IAEA guidance document Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material while ensuring that security recommendations do not conflict with requirements for safety during transport, and developing and providing training programs to assist other countries in implementing radioactive material transport security programs. This paper provides a brief update on the status of these transportation security efforts.


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