Leader Selection and Dynamics Analysis under Leader-Based Collective Bargaining for Buyers’ Alliance

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (10) ◽  
pp. 2150156
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Ma ◽  
Chunyu Bao ◽  
Niu Yu ◽  
Jing Xie
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Control Mechanism ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
System Stability ◽  
Delayed Feedback Control ◽  
Common Component ◽  
Adjustment Speed ◽  
Dynamic Bargaining ◽  
Leader Selection

This paper focuses on the leader selection from the leader-based collective bargaining system, where buyers form an alliance and designate one of them as the leader to bargain with the supplier for a lower wholesale price of their common component. We construct the dynamic bargaining system consisting of two heterogeneous buyers and one supplier to analyze the influence of the enterprise nature and bargaining power on the leader selection. It was proved that the buyer with stronger bargaining power should be the leader. However, we find that, when the buyers are heterogeneous, the result may be different. In order to explore which factor plays a more important role in the leader selection, we design two rounds of bargaining for comparison. The interesting results imply that whether the bargaining power will reverse the leader selection in the first round depends on its growth rate. The nonlinear dynamics theory is also introduced to analyze the complex behaviors in the dynamic bargaining system. We analyze the influence of adjustment speed on the dynamic bargaining system and obtain the conditions required to maintain system stability. Considering the significance of system stability, the delayed feedback control mechanism is adopted to drive chaos back to stability.

scholarly journals Inequality between capital and labour and among wage-earners: the role of collective bargaining and trade unions

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-46
Author(s):  
Maarten Keune
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Wage Inequality ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Union Density ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Union Bargaining Power ◽  
Wage Earners ◽  
The Relationship

In the context of rising inequality between capital and labour and among wage-earners in Europe, this state-of-the-art article reviews the literature concerning the relationship between collective bargaining and inequality. It focuses on two main questions: (i) what is the relationship between collective bargaining, union bargaining power and inequality between capital and labour? and (ii) what is the relationship between collective bargaining, union bargaining power and wage inequality among wage-earners? Both questions are discussed in general terms and for single- and multi-employer bargaining systems. It is argued that collective bargaining coverage and union density are negatively related to both types of inequality. These relationships are however qualified by four additional factors: who unions represent, the weight of union objectives other than wages, the statutory minimum wage, and extensions of collective agreements by governments.

Historical Limits on Neoclassical Strike Theories: Evidence from French Coal Mining, 1890–1935

ILR Review ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 649-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Cohn ◽  
Adrienne Eaton
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Coal Mining ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Economic Environment ◽  
Lack Of Information ◽  
Power Models ◽  
The Many ◽  
Simple Economic

This study analyzes the determinants of strikes in French coal mining over the period 1890–1935. The results indicate that factors emphasized by traditional bargaining power models were more important determinants of strikes in that setting than was economic variability. This finding supports the hypothesis that neoclassical theories of strikes—Hicksian theories that strikes are a function of the parties' lack of information about the economic environment in which bargaining takes place—are inappropriate in some historical and political contexts. Specifically, the authors argue that the many settings where (as in the case considered) strikes are politically motivated, firms have simple economic structures, and collective bargaining is poorly institutionalized should provide evidence discontinuing neoclassical predictions.

scholarly journals Dynamics of a Duopoly Game with Two Different Delay Structures

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shumin Jiang ◽  
Fei Xu ◽  
Zhanwen Ding ◽  
Chen Yang ◽  
Huanhuan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Time Delay ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Period Doubling ◽  
System Stability ◽  
Delayed Feedback Control ◽  
System Control ◽  
Heterogeneous Players ◽  
Cournot Game ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Time Delayed Feedback

Two different time delay structures for the dynamical Cournot game with two heterogeneous players are considered in this paper, in which a player is assumed to make decision via his marginal profit with time delay and another is assumed to adjust strategy according to the delayed price. The dynamics of both players output adjustments are analyzed and simulated. The time delay for the marginal profit has more influence on the dynamical behaviors of the system while the market price delay has less effect, and an intermediate level of the delay weight for the marginal profit can expand the stability region and thus promote the system stability. It is also shown that the system may lose stability due to either a period-doubling bifurcation or a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. Numerical simulations show that the chaotic behaviors can be stabilized by the time-delayed feedback control, and the two different delays play different roles on the system controllability: the delay of the marginal profit has more influence on the system control than the delay of the market price.

13. Collective bargaining

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roseanne Russell
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Trade Union ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Employment Relationship ◽  
Relationship Status ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
And Function ◽  
Additional Reading

The Q&A series offer the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, bullet-pointed answer plans and suggested answers, author commentary and illustrative diagrams and flowcharts. This chapter presents sample exam questions about collective bargaining. Through a mixture of problem questions and essays, students are guided through some of the key issues on the topic of collective bargaining including inequalities of bargaining power in the employment relationship, status and function of trade unions, time off for trade union members, and rights to information. Students are also introduced to the current key debates in the area and provided with suggestions for additional reading for those who want to take things further.

scholarly journals Dynamic Game and Coordination Strategy of Multichannel Supply Chain Based on Brand Competition

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Fang Zhang ◽  
Binshuo Bao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Tracking System ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Channel Competition ◽  
Brand Competition ◽  
Adjustment Speed

In is very important for the corresponding author to have a linked ORCID (Open Researcher and Contributor ID) account on MTS. To register a linked ORCID account, please go to the Account Update page (http://mts.hindawi.com/update/) in our Manuscript Tracking System and after you have logged in click on the ORCID link at the top of the page. This link will take you to the ORCID website where you will be able to create an account for yourself. Once you have done so, your new ORCID will be saved in our Manuscript Tracking System automatically.”"?>this paper, two noncooperative dynamic pricing strategies are used in a supply chain. Two dynamic Stackelberg game models have been built involving both a manufacturer and a retailer assumed to be the leader in order. In the two models, the manufacturer sells national-brand (NB) product to an independent retailer or directly to consumers through a direct channel. The retailers sell a store-brand (SB) product when they sell the NB product coming from the manufacturer. Thus, there is competition both in different channels and in products with different brands. To analyze the complexity of the model, parameter bifurcation diagrams and strange attractor diagrams have been therefore plotted. The results show that the game leader has advantages when the market is stable, but it turns disadvantageous if the state falls into unstable as the game follower can quickly adjust the strategy to seize the market. The wholesale price and the direct selling price are high that they incur larger profits if the manufacturer is dominant, but it gets worse when the adjustment speed increases. While in the model where the retailer plays a dominant role, the increase in the adjustment speed is unfavorable to retailer. By controlling the total cost of the direct channel and increasing channel competition strength and brand competition strength, the manufacturers can increase their profits in the game dominated by the retailer. In addition, the stable region within the system will be narrow since the market is sensitive to the channel competition, brand competition, and advertising indifference.

Simulation and Control of a Duopoly Model

2014 ◽  
Vol 472 ◽  
pp. 146-151
Author(s):  
Ya Li Lu
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Demand Function ◽  
Delayed Feedback Control ◽  
Control Scheme ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Adjustment Speed ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Boundary Fixed Points ◽  
And Control ◽  
Time Delayed Feedback

This paper studies the dynamics of a duopoly model with bounded rationality and nonlinear demand function. Based on the stability theorem and Jurys criterions, we prove that the model has two unstable boundary fixed points and a local stable Nash equilibrium. Then we depict the stability region of Nash equilibrium, and investigate the effects of output adjustment speed on the players profit respectively. Theoretical analysis and simulations show that higher output adjustment speed can result in chaotic variation of outputs, and that the Nash equilibrium is the optimal result of duopoly game. To improve the profitability of each player and achieve the optimal game result, we put forth a new scheme combined with the time-delayed feedback control and the limiter control to stabilize the output to Nash equilibrium. Finally, the numerical simulation is adopted to verify the effectiveness and feasibility of the above control scheme.

Study and Simulation on Dynamics of a Risk-Averse Supply Chain Pricing Model with Dual-Channel and Incomplete Information

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (09) ◽  
pp. 1650146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lijian Sun ◽  
Junhai Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Price Adjustment ◽  
Phase Portraits ◽  
Largest Lyapunov Exponent ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Adjustment Speed

Under the industrial background of dual-channel, volatility in demand of consumers, we use the theory of bifurcations and numerical simulation tools to investigate the dynamic pricing game in a dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse behavior and incomplete information. Due to volatility of demand of consumers, we consider all the players in the supply chain are risk-averse. We assume there exist Bertrand game and Manufacturers’ Stackelberg in the chain which are closer to reality. The main objective of the paper is to investigate the complex influence of the decision parameters such as wholesale price adjustment speed, risk preference and service value on stability of the risk-averse supply chain and average utilities of all the players. We lay emphasis on the influence of chaos on average utilities of all the players which did not appear in previous studies. The dynamic phenomena, such as the bifurcation, chaos and sensitivity to initial values are analyzed by 2D bifurcation phase portraits, Double Largest Lyapunov exponent, basins of attraction and so on. The study shows that the manufacturers should slow down their wholesale price adjustment speed to get more utilities, if the manufacturers are willing to take on more risk, they will get more profits, but they must keep their wholesale prices in a certain range in order to maintain the market stability.

scholarly journals The Importance of Unemployment Insurance in Underdeveloped Countries

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faruk Andaç
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Effects ◽  
Social Security ◽  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Population Increase ◽  
Underdeveloped Countries ◽  
Fiscal Support ◽  
The Unemployed ◽  
Good Number

In the absence of unemployment insurance, unemployment descends over like a nightmare on the personnel in business life and constitutes his/her utmost anxiety. Particularly in underdeveloped countries where population increase is rapid whereas speed of industrialization is back, unemployment introduces with itself a good number of adverse effects as well. On accounts of these reasons there is a substantial need for Unemployment Insurance which is a state-enforced social security in order to meet maintenance and living expenses of the dependant personnel whose active business life has been, due to socio-economic accounts, terminated against their will. Indeed, Unemployment Insurance not only provides fiscal support to the worker but it also guarantees future employment and gains collective bargaining power to the person. By means of an effective job-oriented training and effective operating job-placement system the insurance system also offers a chance of obtaining a new job to the unemployed. In other terms “it provides the power and opportunity to acquire in better conditions a new job with appropriate payment answering to the competency and skill of the unemployed”. Unemployment insurance that is desperately needed to make people live happy under the security of job must be, as it is the case for the rest of other countries as well, established in underdeveloped states as well.

scholarly journals The Complex Dynamics of Sharing Platform Competition Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Jianli Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Feedback Control ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
System Stability ◽  
Largest Lyapunov Exponent ◽  
Platform Competition ◽  
Chaotic State ◽  
Price Increases ◽  
Adjustment Speed

With the rapid development of Internet technologies and online sharing platforms, sharing economy has become a major trend in economy. The entry of sharing economy leads to profound impacts on incumbent industry. We build a dynamic sharing platform competition model with which agents are bounded rational, and consumer side is heterogeneous. Then, we present the fixed points and the stability conditions of the bifurcation of the dynamic model. We simulate the adjustment speed of sharing platform, sharing platform price, and costs of traditional firm effects on system stability, and we present stable area, bifurcation diagram, the largest Lyapunov exponent, and strange attractor of different parameters, and we give a feedback control method at last. Our main results are as follows: (1) when adjustment speed of sharing platform increases, the system becomes bifurcation, and finally, the system goes into a chaotic state; when the system is stable, price of traditional firm and fee decision of sharing platform are constant. (2) When price of sharing platform increases, sharing platform is more stable while traditional firm is more vulnerable. Suppose the system is in the stable state; when sharing platform price increases, traditional firm price increases, while sharing platform fees decreases. (3) When traditional firm cost is small, the system would be more stable. When the system is stable, with traditional firm cost increasing, traditional firm price increases quicker than sharing platform consumer fee, while sharing platform seller fee decreases. (4) Feedback control can alleviate the chaotic state of system. With feedback control parameter increases, the system becomes more stable.

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