Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 1540006
Author(s):  
Omkar D. Palsule-Desai
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Efficient Technology ◽  
Sharing Rules ◽  
Coalition Stability ◽  
Partial Collusion ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Stability Of Coalitions ◽  
The Cost

In this paper, we develop a non-cooperative game theoretic model for our problem context in which the competing producers adopt one of the two alternate production and marketing technologies — efficient and inefficient. We examine stability related implications of the producers' decisions regarding the choices of (i) technologies, (ii) coalition formation, (iii) coalition form, (iv) intensity of collusion. The coalitions can adopt either complete collusion or partial collusion by determining intensity of collusion using endogenously determined sharing rules. The motivation for our study comes from the Costa Rican coffee industry and interesting findings presented in the existing literature focusing on a variety of competing-coalitions settings. Our results can be categorized as: (i) Nash equilibrium of the endogenously determined sharing rules, (ii) the equilibrium coalition forms, and (iii) stability of coalitions. They highlight the dynamics between the number of coalition producers and the cost of inefficiency. We show that the equilibrium sharing rules may have interior solutions and they are not necessarily (a)symmetric. We also show that both coalitions forming complete collusion of the respective producers in not always a Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium coalition forms need not be (a)symmetric. Our main contribution to existing literature rests in determining the situations in which (i) competing players form coalitions, and (ii) they adopt the coalition form of either complete or partial collusion. Moreover, we provide an alternate explanation to why competing producers horizontally merge in the presence of a competing coalition adopting partial collusion in spite of the merger paradox. We also show that none of the two types of producers considered in this paper have any incentives in not making the information on their coalition form public. Moreover, we establish that situations yielding stable coalitions always exist. Our results demonstrate that the cost advantage to the efficient producers decreases in the number of producers adopting the efficient technology, and the coalition stability related conditions need not imply better profitability for one type of producer vis-à-vis the other. Our model essentially provides a platform for future research in a variety of competing-coalitions settings adopting endogenously determined sharing rules.

Headings of UCAV Based on Nash Equilibrium

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-276
Author(s):  
Li Dai ◽  
Zheng Xie
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Linear Equations ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Bounded Curvature ◽  
Smooth Path ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategy Game ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Set Up

Abstract Given n vertices in a plane and UCAV going through each vertex once and only once and then coming back, the objective is to find the direction (heading) of motion in each vertex to minimize the smooth path of bounded curvature. This paper studies the headings of UCAV. First, the optimal headings for two vertices were given. On this basis, an n-player two-strategy game theoretic model was established. In addition, in order to obtain the mixed Nash equilibrium efficiently, n linear equations were set up. The simulation results demonstrated that the headings given in this paper are effective.

The Interrelationship between Estimated Tax Payments and Taxpayer Compliance

2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (s-1) ◽  
pp. 27-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenn D. Feltham ◽  
Suzanne M. Paquette
Keyword(s):  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
High Type ◽  
Compliance Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Audit Strategy ◽  
Tax Payments ◽  
The Cost

This paper examines taxpayers' compliance behavior and the tax agency's audit decision in a broader, more realistic, setting. Whereas prior research has taken the taxpayer's prepayment position as exogenous, this study extends the literature by incorporating the estimated tax payment decision into a tax compliance game. A two-period game-theoretic model is used to examine the effect that the estimated tax payment rules have on taxpayers' incentives to evade and on the tax agency's audit strategy. Our primary results are as follows. First, in equilibrium taxpayers' estimated tax payment decision will depend upon the uncertainty about their true tax liability, and the cost from overpayment (the taxpayer's cost of capital) or underpayment (penalty interest) of installments of estimated tax. Second, under reasonable assumptions, high-type taxpayers who make higher installments of estimated tax are less likely to lie about their level of income than those who make lower installments—that is, taxpayers who pay low are more likely to evade. Third, the tax agency audits taxpayers who have made low reports and low estimated tax payments with a higher probability than those who have made high estimated tax payments. The gain to the tax agency from auditing taxpayers who make lower payments and evade arises not only from the penalties charged for evasion, but also from the interest charged on deficient installments of estimated tax.

scholarly journals Sexual signaling and the persistence of alternative reproductive tactics: a test of game theoretic predictions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Courtney R. Garrison ◽  
Scott K. Sakaluk ◽  
Ned A. Dochtermann
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Variation ◽  
Individual Variation ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Relative Cost ◽  
Reproductive Tactics ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Fitness Value ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost

AbstractIn many species, males produce signals to attract females. However, in some species and populations, only some males produce these signals with other males competing for and “sneaking” reproductive opportunities. In these systems, at least three tactics are expected: always signal, signal only when others are not (assessors), and never signal. The representation of these tactics within a population is unknown in part because the costs of signaling (C) and the fitness value of a single reproductive bout (V) are unknown. Using a game-theoretic model we predict that the always signal strategy only persists if the fitness value of calling is greater than twice the cost. We also show that always signal males are apparently absent in decorated crickets (Gryllodes sigillatus). Moreover, males of this species were not strict assessors and instead signaled infrequently (30% of the time) when signaling by others was constant. Males also exhibited substantial among-individual variation in the propensity to call when other males were not signaling (τ = 0.3). Our results suggest a high relative cost of signaling (2C > V) in this species. The presence of among-individual variation is indicative of underlying genetic variation and a mixed evolutionary stable strategy.

Manufacturer’s “1-Up” from Used Games: Insights from the Secondhand Market for Video Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antino Kim ◽  
Rajib L. Saha ◽  
Warut Khern-am-nuai
Keyword(s):  
Video Game ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Information Goods ◽  
Gaming Industry ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Technological Means ◽  
Types Of Information ◽  
The Cost

In contrast to industries of other types of information goods, the video game industry still has a sizable secondhand market for games. This is particularly notable because some of the major gaming-console companies (e.g., Sony and Microsoft) actually possess the ability to annihilate the secondhand market altogether; it appears that those companies have given tacit approval to buying and selling used games. Naturally, the question is, what is the special ingredient in the gaming industry that gives a manufacturer incentive to keep a healthy secondhand market even when it has the technological means to shut it down? In this study, leveraging a game-theoretic model, we investigate the effect of gaming console on a manufacturer’s strategy in the presence of a secondhand market for games. We find that when the manufacturer offers a valuable console that provides utilities in addition to playing games, the secondhand market increases the manufacturer’s profit, and that is not at the cost of consumers; the consumers—as well as the society as a whole—also benefit from the secondhand market. This is in stark contrast with settings where there are no consoles involved or the consoles do not offer any intrinsic value; in such settings, the manufacturer would opt to shut down the secondhand market. In the case with a valuable console, however, the increasing appeal of the secondhand market to consumers may improve the manufacturer’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare, all at the same time. We discuss our findings along with managerial and welfare implications.

scholarly journals A game theoretic analysis of resource mining in blockchain

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 2035-2046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajani Singh ◽  
Ashutosh Dhar Dwivedi ◽  
Gautam Srivastava ◽  
Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel ◽  
Xiaochun Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mining System ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Digital World ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

Abstract Blockchain and cryptocurrency are a hot topic in today’s digital world. In this paper, we create a game theoretic model in continuous time. We consider a dynamic game model of the bitcoin market, where miners or players use mining systems to mine bitcoin by investing electricity into the mining system. Although this work is motivated by BTC, the work presented can be applicable to other mining systems similar to BTC. We propose three concepts of dynamic game theoretic solutions to the model: Social optimum, Nash equilibrium and myopic Nash equilibrium. Using the model that a player represents a single “miner” or a “mining pool”, we develop novel and interesting results for the cryptocurrency world.

Design for Repair: A Game Between Manufacturer and Independent Repair Service Provider

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mostafa Sabbaghi ◽  
Sara Behdad
Keyword(s):  
Efficient Solution ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Repair Service ◽  
Design Decisions ◽  
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Viable Solution ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost

Design for ease-of-repair is an efficient solution to effectively use resources by extending the lifespan of products. However, designing a repairable product may not be necessarily an economically viable solution for manufacturers. Repairable products enable independent repair businesses to compete with original manufacturers on offering repair services. On the other hand, although designing a less repairable product may dissuade competition, it increases the cost of repair for manufacturers at the same time, in addition to decreasing consumers’ satisfaction. In this paper, a game-theoretic model is developed to represent the competition between a manufacturer acting as a leader, and a coalition of independent repair service providers acting as a follower. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is derived, representing the optimal prices for repair services offered by the two service-providers based on the level of repairability. In addition, based on the information extracted from a repair-related survey, we provide insights about consumers’ attitudes towards repairability of products to help manufacturers make better design decisions.

scholarly journals When Does Mutualism Offer a Competitive Advantage? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Host-Host Competition in Mutualism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdel H Halloway ◽  
Katy D Heath ◽  
Gordon G McNickle
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Neighborhood Size ◽  
Net Benefit ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Local Neighborhood ◽  
Specific Direction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost

Questions: Can resource-resource trade mutualism offer a competitive advantage to plants? If so, what are the conditions that give mutualism an advantage especially with regard to the size of the neighborhood? Hypothesis: We hypothesized that mutualism could offer a competitive advantage if the benefits outweighed the costs. We also hypothesized that this competitive advantage could lead to coexistence between mutualist and non-mutualist strategies within the same population. We also hypothesize that local neighborhood size (the number of competitors at a given moment) would change this response, though the specific direction of change was unclear to us. Method: We created an evolutionary game theoretic model in which a plant could either be a mutualist or non-mutualist that incorporated nutrients freely available to the plant, nutrients obtained only through mutualism with microbes, the cost of producing roots, the cost of trade with microbes, and neighborhood size. We sought ESS solutions as defined by the Nash equilibrium criterion. Key Assumptions: 1) Costs and benefits are fixed for all plants. 2) Freely available nutrients are equally shared between all competing plants in a local neighborhood. 3) Microbially obtained nutrients are shared equally between mutualistic plants in the local neighborhood. Conclusion: We found that mutualism could offer a competitive advantage if the net benefit was positive. Coexistence between mutualist strategies in our model happens because of competition between mutualists over the microbially available nutrient. Coexistence was more likely with greater neighborhood size but at the expense of mutualist fixation.

scholarly journals A Game-Theoretic Model of Strategic Interaction Using Advertising: Simulating the Evolution of the Cournot Nash Equilibrium under Different Competitive Scenarios

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 85
Author(s):  
Malcolm Brady
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Analytical Model ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Advertising Effectiveness ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Competitive Disadvantage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Over Time

This paper examines the behaviour of two firms competing in a duopoly, where firms can influence demand through use of advertising. The paper simulates the strategic interaction of the two firms based on a game-theoretic Cournot analytical model. The evolution over time of the Nash equilibrium is graphically displayed for a number of different competitive scenarios. The results show that there exist threshold levels of advertising effectiveness at which duopoly behaviour bifurcates, that perfectly cooperative advertising can lead to competitive disadvantage, and that perfectly predatory advertising can lead to stagnation or losses.

scholarly journals Cost of cooperation for scheduling meetings

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alon Grubshtein ◽  
Amnon Meisels
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Distributed Optimization ◽  
Objective Functions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Global Objective

Scheduling meetings among agents can be represented as a game - the Meetings Scheduling Game (MSG). In its simplest form, the two-person MSG is shown to have a price of anarchy (PoA) which is bounded by 0.5. The PoA bound provides a measure on the efficiency of the worst Nash Equilibrium in social (or global) terms. The approach taken by the present paper introduces the Cost of Cooperation (CoC) for games. The CoC is defined with respect to different global objective functions and provides a measure on the efficiency of a solution for each participant (personal). Applying an ?egalitarian? objective, that maximizes the minimal gain among all participating agents, on our simple example results in a CoC which is non positive for all agents. This makes the MSG a cooperation game. The concepts are defined and examples are given within the context of the MSG. Although not all games are cooperation games, a game may be revised by adding a mediator (or with a slight change of its mechanism) so that it behaves as a cooperation game. Rational participants can cooperate (by taking part in a distributed optimization protocol) and receive a payoff which will be at least as high as the worst gain expected by a game theoretic equilibrium point.

scholarly journals Optimizing the Community’s Supports in Counter-Terrorism Operations: A Sticks – Carrots Game Theoretic Model

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-67
Author(s):  
M. O. Oladejo ◽  
I. J. Udoh ◽  
A. O. Abam
Keyword(s):  
Prevention And Control ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Operational Cost ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost ◽  
And Control ◽  
Terrorism Prevention

A terrorist group’s (TG) ability to withstand attacks and recovered from sudden high strength depreciation after a major counterterrorism operation, as well as the Security Agencies’ (SA) ability to execute successful credible counter-terrorism operation is a function of both their individual bureaucratic structures and the level of community’s supports each organization is able to optimize within the period of operation. To study the security implications of undermining a given community’s optimal supports, we present and analysed a two-person two-periods evolutionary game theoretic model for an interaction between the SA and the TG; each playing either the “Sticks” or the “Carrots” or mixed strategies to win the community’s optimal supports. In the symmetric game variant, the result of the analysis shows that if the operational cost drops by 80%, then the SA playing the “Stick” may enjoy 50:50 chance of winning the community’s optimal supports. But if the cost rises by at least 30%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would be at-most 33.3% advantageous, while the “Carrots” approach would yield at-least 66.7% advantage. In the asymmetric variant, if the operational cost drops by 80%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would enjoy 100% chance of winning the community’s optimal supports, while the “Carrots” would yield at most 20% advantage. But if the cost rises by at least 30%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would enjoy 50:50 advantage. Comparatively, the TG would enjoy 50:50 chance of winning the community’s optimal supports by playing the “Sticks” if the cost of operation drops by 90%. But if the cost rises by at least 20%, then TG playing the “Sticks” would enjoy at most 33.3% while the “Carrots” would yield at least 66.7% advantage. Thus, the cost of operation is the major determinant of either player’s strategic approach. Under the mixed strategy, if the benefit of operation exceeds its cost, then SA playing the “Sticks” is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), otherwise, combining the “Sticks and Carrots” simultaneously would yield an ESS. Summarily, the SAs’ stake in terrorism prevention and control using the “Sticks” approach is proportional to its operational cost and vice versa. Therefore, considering the capital intensive as well as the intelligence deficient characteristics of the “Sticks” approach, the SA cannot prevent/control terrorism using the “Stick” instruments only. Rather a viable “Carrots” approach or its combination with credible “Sticks” instruments would be necessary and sufficient to win the community’s optimal supports for effective terrorism prevention and control.

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