Over the past decade, the Chinese economy has grown at a faster pace (up to 8 % per year), which is a consequence of the unprecedented expansion of China in world markets. Such a competitive position presupposes the same significant (up to 15 %) growth in energy consumption, which is ensured by both an increase in domestic production (to a lesser extent) and imports of energy resources — oil, pipeline and liquefied natural gas and coal. In the context of aggravated competition between the leading economies of the world (China and the United States), the security of transporting energy resources from the Persian Gulf and other regions through the narrows of the Strait of Hormuz and Malacca, as well as through the regions of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait controlled by the United States, acquires a new sound for China. To solve this problem, China is building up its naval presence in the direction of the Southern Silk Road, but mainly in the waters of the Pacific Ocean seas — the Yellow, East China and South China, that is, in the operational zones of the three fleets of the Chinese Navy — the North, East and South, from the exits to the operational zone of the Russian Pacific Fleet in the waters of the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. Demonstration of strength and flag during joint sailing of the two fleets is carried out within the framework of the exercises of the “Maritime Interaction” format from 2012 to 2021 inclusive, except for 2020 due to the aggravation of the epidemiological situation in connection with COVID-19. The latent goal of these exercises is to practice coastal defense missions in the zone where China's strategic oil reserve is located.
Rethinking the Security Architecture of North East Asia
