scholarly journals Enhanced Cooperation among Stakeholders in PPP Mega-Infrastructure Projects: A China Study

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 2791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Long Li ◽  
Zhongfu Li ◽  
Lei Jiang ◽  
Guangdong Wu ◽  
Daojin Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Simulation Method ◽  
Infrastructure Projects ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Benefit Allocation

Despite the consensus that enhanced cooperation among stakeholders is critical to the successful delivery of public-private partnership (PPP) mega-infrastructure projects, there has been a limited utilization of the quantitative approach to explore the cooperation mechanism. Drawing on research and the actual practice of PPP projects in China, a quantitative mathematical model using evolutionary game theory is constructed to explore the internal cooperation mechanism. Numerical simulation is implemented to investigate the impact of the punitive mechanism and allocation mechanism on the enhanced cooperation. The simulation result indicates that reasonable benefit allocation and a strong punitive mechanism are crucial to enhanced cooperation. Action research supported by a case study in Dalian was conducted to verify the scientific practicalities of the simulation method. An enhanced cooperation framework was proposed. The role conversion of the government and the private sectors makes the enhanced cooperation feasible. This evolution model and cooperation framework can facilitate enhanced cooperation in PPP mega-infrastructure projects.

scholarly journals Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tongyao Feng ◽  
Shuangliang Tai ◽  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Qingpeng Man
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Initial Cost ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Evolution Trend

Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.

Study on Participant Behavior Game of Electronic Products Reverse Supply Chain Based on ECP

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 411-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingbao Wang ◽  
Zhiping Du ◽  
Hong Duan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Simulation Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Electronic Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
Differential Equation Method ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Abstract In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile reverse supply chain based on ECP; an evolutionary equilibrium model is to be sought for by utilizing the replication dynamic differential equation method; and the trilateral game strategy’s revolutionary trend and consistency have been analyzed by means of SD simulation method when government implements the static or dynamic reward and punishment strategy. The finding results reveal that, under the static reward and punishment strategy, the revolutionary process of trilateral game strategy is always unstable whether the initial behavior strategy is unitary or mixed. Therefore, it is more reasonable for the government to adopt the strategy of dynamic reward and punishment, and it is also stable and reciprocal for all the stakeholders when implementing this strategy.

Prinsip Kearifan Lokal dalam Pengembangan Strategi Kehumasan pada Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten Bandung

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-248
Author(s):  
Betty Tresnawaty
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Local Knowledge ◽  
Case Study Approach ◽  
West Java ◽  
Study Approach ◽  
Positive Image ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Public Relations Strategy

Public Relations of the Bandung Regency Government realizes that its area has a lot of potential for various local wisdom and has a heterogeneous society. This study aims to explore and analyze the values of local knowledge in developing public relations strategies in the government of Bandung Regency, West Java province. This study uses a constructivist interpretive (subjective) paradigm through a case study approach. The results showed that the Bandung Regency Government runs its government based on local wisdom. Bandung Regency Public Relations utilizes local insight and the region's potential to develop a public relations strategy to build and maintain a positive image of Bandung Regency. The impact of this research is expected to become a source of new scientific references in the development of public relations strategies in every region of Indonesia, which is very rich with various philosophies.Humas Pemerintah Kabupaten Bandung menyadari wilayahnya memiliki banyak potensi kearifan lokal yang beragam, serta memiliki masyarakatnya yang heterogen. Penelitian ini bertujuan menggali dan menganalisis nilai-nilai kearifan lokal dalam pengembangan strategi kehumasan di pemerintahan Kabupaten Bandung provinsi Jawa Barat.  Penelitian ini menggunakan paradigma interpretif (subjektif) konstruktivis melalui pendekatan studi kasus. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Pemerintah Kabupaten (Pemkab) Bandung menjalankan pemerintahannya berlandaskan pada kearifal lokal. Humas Pemkab Bandung memanfaatkan kearifan lokal dan potensi wilayahnya untuk mengembangkan strategi humas dalam membangun dan mempertahankan citra positif Kabupaten Bandung.Dampak penelitian ini diharapkan menjadi sumber rujukan ilmiah baru dalam pengembangan strategi kehumasan di setiap daerah Indonesia yang sangat kaya dengan beragam filosofi. 

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

scholarly journals How Do Political Features Influence the Co-Production of Government Projects? A Case Study of a Medium-Sized Chinese City

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (14) ◽  
pp. 7600
Author(s):  
Wenting Ma ◽  
Rui Mu ◽  
Martin de Jong
Keyword(s):  
Performance Measurement ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Chinese City ◽  
Production Stages ◽  
Political Background ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Western Experience ◽  
The Impact

Co-production is a solution by which the government provides public services. Co-production theory is built upon Western experience and currently focuses on the types of co-production in different policy stages, the barriers and governance strategies for co-production. However, little attention is paid to how political background will influence the co-production process. To fill the gap, we analyzed a case of co-production that occurred in China, and we characterized the political background as consisting of three main political features: political mobility, central–local relations, and performance measurement. Based on an in-depth case study of a government project in a medium-sized Chinese city, the impact and the changes of political features affecting governmental projects in different co-production stages are analyzed and assessed. We find that political features play a critical role in the co-production of China’s large government projects and may separately and jointly affect co-production. Government performance measurement affects the co-design and co-implementation of projects. Political mobility and changes in local government and performance measurement also affect the co-implementation continuity of the project. Political focus affects the co-design of projects. Central-local relations influence the support from higher government and the actual practices of lower government in the co-implementation stage.

Increasing Competition for University and the Challenge of Access for Government School Students—A Case Study

2008 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Edwards
Keyword(s):  
School Students ◽  
Government School ◽  
Educationally Disadvantaged ◽  
University Campuses ◽  
University Courses ◽  
Education Degree ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The City

There is a wide variety of universities, university campuses and university courses in Australia available to those interested in pursuing a higher education degree. This paper examines the impact of increasing competition for entrance to university on the educational outcomes for students from the government school sector. Using Melbourne as a case study, the research shows that, over a four-year period of increased competition, entry to some of the more academically accessible university campuses in the city became more difficult and this disproportionately affected the opportunities for university entrance among some groups. Despite the fact that there was no noticeable change in the academic standards achieved by government school completers, the rate at which government school students gained access to these universities declined noticeably during this time. These findings show how changes in supply of university places from year to year can have a profound effect on the opportunities of secondary-school completers—particularly those in more educationally disadvantaged settings.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

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