scholarly journals A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (21) ◽  
pp. 11624
Author(s):  
Jida Liu ◽  
Yanan Guo ◽  
Shi An ◽  
Chenxi Lian
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Shared Resources ◽  
Cooperative Relationships ◽  
Selection Strategies ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
The Stability

Natural disasters have obvious cross-regional and compound characteristics. Cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters deepens the diversification of coordination relations and the complexity of interaction modes among emergency response organizations, including horizontal and vertical organizational interactions. In order to clarify the cooperation mechanism of emergency organizations during cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters and to explore the key factors that affect the cooperative relationships of emergency organizations, in this study, a game model is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, which is composed of local, neighboring, and central governments. Then, the stability of the emergency game strategy is analyzed. On this basis, a numerical simulation is used to simulate the dynamic evolution trajectory of the game system. The results show that there is an embedded mutual promotion mechanism that evolves towards a positive emergency strategy combination among the game subjects. The selection strategies of the game subjects show the characteristics of consistency and the following: enhanced cooperation efficiency between local and neighboring governments, emergency capital stock, and shared resources, therefore, guiding social emergency forces to actively participate in emergency operations. Strengthening the emergency dispatching strength of the central government and the effectiveness of central–local emergency dispatching, can support the performance of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. Furthermore, the efficiency of cooperation between local and neighboring governments will be enhanced.

Research on Organization Tacit Knowledge Transferring: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis

2013 ◽  
Vol 756-759 ◽  
pp. 2597-2601
Author(s):  
Dan Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Tacit Knowledge ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Stability

The transfer and the management of the tacit knowledge is one of the most important issues in the knowledge transferring context to create organizational competitive advantage in the fast growing competitive world. As we know, organization tacit knowledge transferring is a dynamic game process, this research applies evolutionary game theory to analyze the tacit knowledge transferring activities among organizations and the stability balance issue in organization knowledge transferring. Based on the theory of games, this paper constructs the evolutionary game process model for organization tacit knowledge transferring. And through the equilibrium point of the model, the different knowledge transferring bodies game replicated dynamics and stability are analyzed. With this model, the reason why tacit knowledge is hard to be transferred and the path of tacit knowledge transferring is analyzed.

scholarly journals Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tongyao Feng ◽  
Shuangliang Tai ◽  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Qingpeng Man
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Initial Cost ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Evolution Trend

Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.

Research on the Stability of Photovoltaic Industrial Chain under the Condition of Bounded Rationality

2011 ◽  
Vol 361-363 ◽  
pp. 1279-1284
Author(s):  
Wei Min Sun ◽  
Jin Sheng Shen
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Primary State ◽  
Industrial Chain ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Stable Development ◽  
Spontaneous Evolution

Under the condition of bounded rationality, make use of evolutionary game theory to analyze the stability between node enterprises of photovoltaic industrial chain. In the process of spontaneous evolution, the strategy of upstream and downstream enterprises of photovoltaic industrial chain depends on their primary state strongly. However, under the guidance of government policy, all upstream and downstream enterprises in photovoltaic industrial chain adopt cooperative strategy to guarantee its stable development, which reflects the important roles of government policy orientation in the development of emerging industrial chain.

scholarly journals SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY FOR QUALITY SUPERVISION AMONG CONSTRUCTION STAKEHOLDERS

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengyu Guo ◽  
Pan Zhang ◽  
Jianying Yang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
System Dynamics Model ◽  
Dynamics Model ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Impact

To address the gap, that is, few studies have explored the influence of the participants’ interactions with one another during construction quality supervision, this paper proposes a system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory to describe the complex and dynamic interactions among tripartite stakeholders in China, including the project owner (PO), construction supervising engineer (CSE), and construction contractor (CC). First, the replicated dynamic equation set is established in terms of expense targets. Second, the equilibrium solutions of the equation set are obtained to test strategy options. The trends of system fluctuations caused by penalty and reward changes are also analyzed. Finally, the stability of the proposed model is improved by integrating a dynamic penalty–reward scenario into the evolutionary strategy of the PO. Simulation results show that: 1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in initial interactions, 2) the degrees of penalty and reward considerably affect the CC’s rate variable, and 3) the dynamic penalty–reward scenario could effectively improve the stability of the proposed model. The unsteadiness of the quality supervision system and the stability control scenario could help in understanding the impact of interactions among stakeholders and provide suggestions for optimizing quality supervision procedures.

scholarly journals Cooperation Mechanism in Blockchain by Evolutionary Game Theory

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Jinxin Zhang ◽  
Meng Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Normal Growth ◽  
Network Games ◽  
Long Term Stability ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
Expected Benefits

In the blockchain network, to get rewards in the blockchain, blockchain participants pay for various forms of competition such as computing power, stakes, and other resources. Because of the need to pay a certain cost, individual participants cooperate to maintain the long-term stability of the blockchain jointly. In the course of such competition, the game between each other has appeared invisibly. To better understand the blockchain design of cooperation mechanisms, in this paper, we constructed a game framework between participants with different willingness, using evolutionary game theory, and complex network games. We analyzed how the behavior of participants potentially develops with cost and payoff. We consider the expected benefits of participants for the normal growth of the blockchain as the major factor. Considering the behavior of malicious betrayers, the blockchain needs to be maintained in the early stage. Numerical simulation supports our analysis.

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