scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Sustainable Cooperation Relationship of Collaborative Innovation Network in Strategic Emerging Industries

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiwei Liu ◽  
Jianing Yang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Emerging Industries ◽  
Research Institutes ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
Cooperation Relationship

Strategic emerging industries (SEIs) represent the future direction of industrial developments and are crucial in stimulating the overall and long-term development for economy and society. The government plays a key role in promoting the development of SEIs. This paper, for the first time, investigates the cooperation relationship among innovation members, such as enterprises, universities and research institutes in a collaborative innovation network of strategic emerging industries under government intervention. A three-population evolutionary game theory approach was employed under different scenarios for the government acting as the stakeholder, considering the non-profit, definite fit as well as uncertain profit when incentive and punishment policies are adopted. A novel evolutionary game model of the cooperation relationship among collaborative innovation network members under government’s intervention is established. The results of the simulation experiments show that government’s intervention significantly influences the cooperation relationship between enterprises, universities and research institutes. When the sum of financial incentives and punishments is greater than the total additional cost (TAC), enterprises, universities and research institutes should pay for collaborative innovation. Moreover, government’s financial intervention can effectively promote the cooperation between enterprises, universities and research institutes.

scholarly journals An Evolution Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Network considering Government Subsidies and Supervision

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yingying Xu ◽  
Liangqun Qi ◽  
Xichen Lyu ◽  
Xinyu Zang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Networks ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Scale Free Network ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Free Network ◽  
The Government

Collaborative innovation networks have the basic attributes of complex networks. The interaction of innovation network members has promoted the development of collaborative innovation networks. Using the game-based theory in the B-A scale-free network context, this paper builds an evolutionary game model of network members and explores the emergence mechanism from collaborative innovation behavior to the macroevolution of networks. The results show that revenue distribution, compensation of the betrayer, government subsidies, and supervision have positively contributed to the continued stability of collaborative innovation networks. However, the effect mechanisms are dissimilar for networks of different scales. In small networks, the rationality of the revenue distribution among members that have similar strengths should receive more attention, and the government should implement medium-intensity supervision measures. In large networks, however, compensation of the betrayer should be attached greater importance to, and financial support from the government can promote stable evolution more effectively.

scholarly journals Dynamic Evolution Model of a Collaborative Innovation Network from the Resource Perspective and an Application Considering Different Government Behaviors

Information ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wu ◽  
Shao ◽  
Feng
Keyword(s):  
Network Evolution ◽  
Evolution Model ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Transfer Policy ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Innovation Output ◽  
The Government ◽  
Small Change ◽  
Innovative Behaviors

The evolution of a collaborative innovation network depends on the interrelationships among the innovation subjects. Every single small change affects the network topology, which leads to different evolution results. A logical relationship exists between network evolution and innovative behaviors. An accurate understanding of the characteristics of the network structure can help the innovative subjects to adopt appropriate innovative behaviors. This paper summarizes the three characteristics of collaborative innovation networks, knowledge transfer, policy environment, and periodic cooperation, and it establishes a dynamic evolution model for a resource-priority connection mechanism based on innovation resource theory. The network subjects are not randomly testing all of the potential partners, but have a strong tendency to, which is, innovation resource. The evolution process of a collaborative innovation network is simulated with three different government behaviors as experimental objects. The evolution results show that the government should adopt the policy of supporting the enterprises that recently entered the network, which can maintain the innovation vitality of the network and benefit the innovation output. The results of this study also provide a reference for decision-making by the government and enterprises.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model of Collaborative Innovation Between Enterprises and Colleges Under Government Participation of China

SAGE Open ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 215824402199485
Author(s):  
Nina Su ◽  
Zhuqin Shi ◽  
Xianqi Zhu ◽  
Yunsheng Xin
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Higher Learning ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Institutions Of Higher Learning ◽  
Innovation Cost ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Reasonable Range ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Ideal

The three-party evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and institutions of higher learning is established, and the dynamic evolution process of collaborative innovation behavior is discussed under the two strategies of “incentive” and “non-incentive” chosen by the government. The results show that under the premise of stronger innovation consciousness of the government and institutions and smaller the innovation cost of enterprises, the system is easier to reach the ideal state. The incentive degree of government should be controlled within a reasonable range to prevent enterprises from falling into a bad state because of the temptation of economic interests.

scholarly journals Chain Innovation Mechanism of the Manufacturing Industry in the Yangtze River Delta of China Based on Evolutionary Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (17) ◽  
pp. 9729
Author(s):  
Na Yu ◽  
Chunfeng Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Yangtze River ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Yangtze River Delta ◽  
River Delta ◽  
Policy Support ◽  
The Yangtze River ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Yangtze River Delta

It is of great theoretical and practical significance to achieve high-quality development that promotes the transformation of digestion, absorption, and re-innovation to an independent innovation model, actively participating in the restructuring of the industrial chain, and enhancing the status of the Yangtze River Delta in the global innovation chain. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation led by the government, participated by upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises. Moreover, this article analyzes the strategic choices of the tripartite entities in the process of collaborative innovation, and the simulation analyzes the influencing factors of the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises’ collaborative innovation strategy selection. The results indicate that the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises have different degrees of influence on each other’s willingness to participate. In addition, the analysis proves that government policy support and financial support have different impacts on upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises.

scholarly journals Subject Behavior of Collaborative Innovation in Civil-Military Integration: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Xiaodi Xu ◽  
Zilong Wang ◽  
Yongfeng Zhu ◽  
Xiaochun Luo
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Absorption Capacity ◽  
Technology Spillover ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government

Based on the evolutionary game mode, this study constructs the evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration considering the reward-punishment mechanism of the government. The subject behavior of core enterprises and noncore enterprises in the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration is investigated from a microperspective. The results suggest that the key factors influencing the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation are the level of technology spillover, technology absorption capacity, the share of excess benefits, the reward for active participation in collaborative innovation, and the punishment for passive participation. The game evolution result of the two parties will converge to (actively participate in collaborative innovation, actively participate in collaborative innovation) when the government rewards obtained by the party actively participating in collaborative innovation exceed the technology spillover loss and the excess benefits exceed the difference between the acquired technology spillover and the penalty for passive participation. These findings may provide a decision-making reference for the government to formulate the strategy of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration.

scholarly journals Research on Green Collaborative Innovation Mechanism of Cloud Manufacturing Enterprises under Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Jiaqi Zhai ◽  
Xinliang Xu ◽  
Jianzhong Xu ◽  
Xichen Lyu
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Load Capacity ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Cloud Manufacturing ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government

With the rapid development of information technology, the sharing economy based on “Internet plus” cloud platforms has become a new collaborative innovation mode and a hot topic in recent years. Considering that government regulation restricts green innovation cooperation among cloud manufacturing enterprises, an evolutionary game model involving the government and cloud manufacturing enterprises A and B with potential differences in their technology knowledge is established using evolutionary game theory. A replication dynamic equation is established, the evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategy of the three parties is analysed, and the key factors affecting the cooperative selection strategy of the government and cloud manufacturing enterprises are discussed through a MATLAB-based numerical simulation. This research shows that when governmental incentives and punishments, the platform load capacity, the trust between enterprises, the technology loss coefficient, and the informatization degree are increased, the government will tend to choose supervision, and cloud manufacturing enterprises A and B will tend to choose the “collaborative innovation” strategy. These results provide a scientific basis suggesting that the government should not only formulate rules and regulations for cloud manufacturing enterprises but also promote green collaborative innovation among such enterprises and enhance their core competitiveness.

scholarly journals Research on the Influence of Government Regulation on Green Technological Innovation of Strategic Emerging Industry

2021 ◽  
Vol 292 ◽  
pp. 03009
Author(s):  
Jing Gao ◽  
Qiuhong Feng ◽  
Wanfei Zhan
Keyword(s):  
Technological Innovation ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Green Economy ◽  
Competitive Advantages ◽  
Negative Externalities ◽  
Emerging Industries ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In the green economy, strategic emerging industries to implement Class II green technological innovation keep critical to obtain competitive advantages. The government regulation could effectively make up for the shortcomings of the negative externalities of green technological innovation. In order to further explore the impact of government regulation on Class I, II and III green technological innovation of strategic emerging industries, this article utilizes the strategic emerging industries as the main experimental subject. Through constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of strategic emerging industries, the government and consumers, it reveals the process of the three-party discretionary selection in the process of green technology innovation, and acquires equilibrium strategies of the tripartite in the process of green technological innovation.

scholarly journals The Cooperative Stability Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Military-Civilian Collaborative Innovation for China’s Satellite Industry

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fang Wei ◽  
Wang Chan
Keyword(s):  
Primary Standard ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Information Communication ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Emerging Industries ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Liquidated Damages ◽  
Government Incentives ◽  
The Military

The military-civilian collaborative innovation is an implementation path for most countries to develop strategic emerging industries. The satellite industry is an important area in strategic emerging industries. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we build an evolutionary game model of China’s satellite industry military-civilian collaborative innovation with military enterprises and civil enterprises as the main participators under the bounded rationality. Then we analyze the long-term evolution of the system and the factors influencing cooperative stability and perform numerical simulation using Matlab. Our research shows that the cooperative stability of China’s satellite industry military-civilian collaborative innovation is positively related to the cooperation revenue, liquidated damages, and government incentives and negatively related to basic income, R&D costs, information communication costs, technology secondary conversion costs, risk costs, and betrayal income. The reasonable income distribution coefficient is conducive to the cooperative stability, and we give a primary standard for government incentives. Finally, corresponding management implications are put forward.

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