scholarly journals Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Coal Mining ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Safe Production ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reward And Punishment

In recent years, although coal mine accidents in China have decreased, they still occur frequently. Most previous studies on the evolutionary game of safety mining are limited to a focus on system dynamics and two-party game problems and lack a spatial graphic analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, local governments, and central governments. As our method, a payment matrix of participants and replicated dynamic equations is established, and we also implement parameter simulation in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in safe coal mining. Specifically, (1) intensifying rewards and penalties for coal mining enterprises and local governments will help encourage coal mining enterprises to implement safe production measures and local governments to implement central government safety supervision policies. However, increased rewards will reduce central government’s willingness to adopt incentive strategies. (2) The central government’s reward for coal mining enterprises’ safe production must be greater than the increased cost of safe production to encourage enterprises to implement such production. Economic incentives for local governments must be greater than the benefits of rent-seeking; only then will local governments choose to strictly implement supervision policies. (3) Increasing sales revenue and rent-seeking costs of coal mining enterprises can also encourage them to implement safe production. Therefore, a well-designed reward and punishment mechanism will change the behaviour of coal enterprises and improve the probability of safe production. The research presented in this paper further works on improving safe coal mining production and designing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

scholarly journals Study on Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game of Emergency Management of Public Health Emergencies Based on Dynamic Rewards and Punishments

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (16) ◽  
pp. 8278
Author(s):  
Ruguo Fan ◽  
Yibo Wang ◽  
Jinchai Lin
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Emergency Management ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
And Control ◽  
Reward And Punishment

In the context of public health emergency management, it is worth studying ways to mobilize the enthusiasm of government, community, and residents. This paper adopts the method of combining evolutionary game and system dynamics to conduct a theoretical modeling and simulation analysis on the interactions of the behavioral strategies of the three participants. In response to opportunistic behavior and inadequate supervision in the static reward and punishment mechanism, we introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism that considers changes in the social environment and the situation of epidemic prevention and control. This paper proves that the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuation problem in the evolutionary game process under static scenarios and achieve better supervision results through scenario analysis and simulation experiments.

scholarly journals How to Alleviate Rent-Seeking Behaviour in Performance Appraisal of Government-Paid PPP Projects? Tripartite Evolutionary Game Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Junna Lv ◽  
Tong An ◽  
Xi-ya Tan ◽  
Qing Zou
Keyword(s):  
Performance Appraisal ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Private Investor ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Overall Performance ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Performance appraisal is a key link in the performance payment mechanism of government-paid Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. As the performance appraisal of PPP projects is highly professional and complex, it is usually necessary to introduce a third-party performance appraisal institution to evaluate the project outputs of the private investor. However, driven by economic rent, the private investor has the incentive to seek rent from the third party in the performance appraisal process, leading to the low overall performance level of PPP projects and the inability to achieve the PPP performance appraisal goal effectively. To explore how to avoid rent-seeking in performance appraisal and improve the overall performance of government-paid PPP projects, a tripartite evolutionary game model between the behaviour, third party, and the public sector has been constructed. Based on the evolutionary game model, this study analyses the evolutionary stability of each player's strategy, discusses the influence of various factors on the strategy selection of the three-party, and further analyses the stability of the equilibrium point of the three-party game system. The findings reveal that the public sector can slow down the rent-seeking behaviour of the private sector by setting up a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism. The design of a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism must meet the following conditions: (1) the sum of the reward and punishment of all parties is greater than the speculative income; (2) the amount of performance fee withheld for the private investor is greater than the difference between the project operating cost saved and the speculation cost. The research provides technical support for the design of the performance appraisal mechanism of government-paid PPP projects.

scholarly journals The Role of Social Media in Promoting Information Disclosure on Environmental Incidents: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuang Ling ◽  
Shan Gao ◽  
Wenhui Liu
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Media Use ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Media Influence ◽  
Social Media Use ◽  
The Public

Despite the expectation that social media use in the public sector contributes to enhancing government's transparency, few studies have been investigated whether social media use actually leads to more disclosure during environmental incidents in practice and how social media influence local governments and their officials' information disclosure. In this article, we model information disclosure during environmental incidents as an evolutionary game process between the central government and local government in social media context, and examine the internal mechanism that how social media influence the progress of information disclosure during environmental incidents. The findings indicate that social media plays an active constructive role in central-local government game relations. Specific- ally, social media can provides an efficient information channels for the central government supervise regional officials in environmental incidents, and thus improves its supervision efficiency, and it also provides an important means for internet mobilization and online-offline interaction by encouraging the public exchange information and express their views, and in turn forces local governments and their officials tend to disclosure ahead.

scholarly journals Will Third-Party Treatment Effectively Solve Issues Related to Industrial Pollution in China?

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (18) ◽  
pp. 7685
Author(s):  
Qiao Peng ◽  
Yao Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Environmental Services ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Trial Basis ◽  
Local Levels

China expanded the application of the third-party treatment model (TPTM) in 2017 for effectively tackling the issues related to industrial pollution on a trial basis, and the model could diversify the government’s toolbox for addressing industrial pollution. With multiple players such as local governments, polluters, and environmental services providers (ESP) involved in the TPTM, appropriate guidance and coordination among the three players are critical to the success of the TPTM. This study constructs an evolutionary game model for the three players to capture their interaction mechanisms and simulates the three-player evolutionary game dynamics with the replicator dynamics equation. The simulation results show that heavier penalties for pollution and lower regulatory costs incurred by local governments could effectively improve the performance of the TPTM. Moreover, although environmental incentives provided by the central government to local levels do not affect the ultimate performance of the TPTM, they do shorten the time needed for the effect of the TPTM to emerge. The study concludes by proposing policy recommendations based on these results.

scholarly journals The Role of Social Media in Promoting Information Disclosure on Environmental Incidents: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shan Gao ◽  
Shuang Ling ◽  
Wenhui Liu
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Local Officials ◽  
Efficient Information

In recent years, social media has had a crucial role in promoting governments to act more responsibly. However, few studies have investigated whether social media use actually leads to increased disclosure during environmental incidents, or how social media influences regional governments’ information disclosure, even though delayed and insufficient disclosure on relevant incidents is often widespread in China. In this article, we model information disclosure during environmental incidents as an evolutionary game process between the central government and local governments, and examine the role of social media on game participants’ strategy selections in the information disclosure game. The results indicate that social media plays an active role in promoting the regional government to proactively disclose information during environmental incidents through two mechanisms: the top–down intervention mechanism, and the bottom–up reputation mechanism. More specifically, social media can provide efficient information channels for the central government to supervise local officials’ limited disclosure during environmental incidents, essentially sharing the central government’s supervision costs, and thus improving its supervision and intervention efficiency. Social media helps focus the public’s attention on the limited disclosure of local officials in environmental incidents, and actively mobilizes citizens to protest to maintain their interests, placing considerable pressure on the reputation of local governments.

scholarly journals Game Analysis of Endowment Insurance Collection and Supervision Behavior under the Background of Price Reduction

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-152
Author(s):  
Jin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Compliance Rate ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Endowment Insurance ◽  
Contribution Rate ◽  
Behavioral Decision ◽  
Symmetric Information

The Central government issued several consecutive articles stressing the need to reduce the contribution rate of endowment insurance and adjust the base of social security contributions. However, can we effectively improve the compliance rate of endowment insurance, and thus increase the actual collection income of endowment insurance through the reform of the fee reduction? What changes will be made to the behavioral decision-making methods among the various subjects, and will it affect the income from the collection of pensions? What kind of supervision is adopted by the central and local governments to promote the increase in the collection of endowment insurance? Based on these problems, this paper adopts the principal-agent game and the three-party evolutionary game model under non-completely symmetric information, analyzes the behavioral decisions of each subject in the process of collection after the fee reduction, and analyzes the influencing factors of dynamic stability and equilibrium. Analysis, and finally, in the context of the endowment insurance fee reduction, the action plan that can effectively increase the income of the endowment insurance collection. The empirical results show that the contribution rate and contribution base of endowment insurance are inversely related to the intensity of local endowment insurance collection, and the reduction of fees can effectively promote the enthusiasm of local governments for collection. When the burden of endowment insurance contributions declines, the enthusiasm of corporate payment has also increased. At the same time, improve the overall level of pensions, promote the openness and transparency of endowment insurance contributions, and strengthen the reward and punishment mechanism in the process of collecting endowment insurance premiums, which can effectively increase the income from endowment insurance collection.

scholarly journals Analysis of Farmland Abandonment and Government Supervision Traps in China

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 1815
Author(s):  
Yemei Li ◽  
Yanfei Shan ◽  
Ying Chen
Keyword(s):  
Food Security ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Rural Households ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Security Risk ◽  
Farmland Abandonment ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government

Farmland abandonment has become relatively common in rural China. In the context of food security, the Chinese government has introduced policies for farmland abandonment supervision, but the effect of these policies has proven to be marginal. By constructing an evolutionary game model, our research explores the evolutionary logic during the supervision of farmland abandonment by governments and rural households. The results indicate that low food yield and high opportunity costs are the leading causes of farmland abandonment. The probable punishment administered by the central government for dereliction is a major motivation for the local government to practice farmland abandonment supervision. The low supervision avoidance cost for rural households leads local governments and households to form collaborations to jointly cope with central government supervision. When this occurs, local governments’ supervision of farmland abandonment falls into a trap, as it leads to continued supervision practices that are costly and ineffective. Food security risk comes from the contradictory population and land resources demands. To improve food security while managing these contradictory demands, it is both necessary and feasible for the government to control population growth and focus on farmland protection, whereas it is unnecessary and unfeasible for the government to supervise whether or not farmland should be abandoned.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Reward And Punishment

AbstractThis paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

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