scholarly journals Differential Pricing and Emission Reduction in Remanufacturing Supply Chains with Dual-Sale Channels under CCT-Mechanism

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 8150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaifu Yuan ◽  
Guangqiang Wu ◽  
Hui Dong ◽  
Bo He ◽  
Dafei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Emission Control ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Control Coefficient ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government

In order to make optimal decisions for pricing and emission reduction, a remanufacturing supply chain system with dual-sale channels is investigated. With regard to the preferences of consumers for different channels and carbon cap-and-trade mechanisms, profit-maximization models are developed on supply chain members and systems in decentralized and centralized cases. Based on a backward induction, the corresponding formulae for decision variables are obtained. Then the effect of the industry emission control coefficient is analyzed and the optimal decisions of two cases are compared. Finally, the coordination mechanism and numerical analysis are presented. The result indicates that: (1) As the free carbon allowances granted by the government to the manufacturer increases, the investment in carbon reduction from the manufacturer will increase. As the industry emission control coefficient increases, the carbon emissions per product and the prices of new and remanufactured products will decrease, while the demands of the new and remanufactured products and the profits of supply chain members and systems will increase. (2) As the direct sale channel preference coefficient increases, the profits of the manufacturer and the system will increase while the retailer’s profit will decrease. Correspondingly, the carbon emissions of unit product will decrease, and the sales of the direct sale channel will increase while the sales of the retail channel will decrease. (3) The decision in the coordinated case not only ensures emission reduction and system profit to reach the level of the centralized case, but also raises the profits of supply chain members in the decentralized case. Therefore, it is preferable to other decisions. (4) As the carbon trading price increases, the emission reduction investment from the manufacturer will increase while the profits of the supply chain and its members will increase.

scholarly journals Government Subsidies and Revenue Sharing Decisions for Port and Shipping Service Supply Chain in Emission Control Areas

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Bing Han ◽  
Xia Pan ◽  
Yu Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Emission Control ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
System Optimization ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
The Government

As the core of the port and shipping service supply chain system, the port and shipping companies must urgently solve the problem of how to balance emissions, costs, and benefits with the gradual extension of China’s emission control area (ECA) and the stringent emission requirements. From the perspective of system optimization, this research constructs a revenue sharing model of the port and shipping service supply chain and deals with the revenue sharing decision-making problem of the secondary service supply chain after port enterprises and shipping enterprises joining the government subsidy mechanism driven by ECA’s policy. Research shows that the government subsidy mechanism directly affects the profit of the port and shipping service supply chain, which is the key factor in implementing the ECA’s policy and promoting the emission reduction of the port and shipping enterprises. The revenue sharing of the port and shipping enterprises plays a decisive role in the revenue of the shipping enterprises. Cooperative emission reduction mechanism should be led by port enterprises to promote the balance between revenue and emission reduction in the supply chain system. Results provide a reference for the Chinese government to formulate corresponding incentives and subsidy policy under the new ECA’s regulations as well as solving the problems of how to balance emissions reduction and cost improvement for port and shipping enterprises.

scholarly journals Optimal Decisions for Two Risk-Averse Competitive Manufacturers under the Cap-and-Trade Policy and Uncertain Demand

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 1010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Jie Yang ◽  
Yang Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government

With the increasingly serious problem of environmental pollution, reducing carbon emissions has become an urgent task for all countries. The cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has gained international recognition and has been adopted by several countries. In this paper, considering the uncertainty of market demand, we discuss the carbon emission reduction and price policies of two risk-averse competitive manufacturers under the C&T policy. The two manufacturers have two competitive behaviors: simultaneous decision making and sequential decision making. Two models were constructed for these behaviors. The optimal decisions, carbon emission reduction rate, and price were obtained from these two models. Furthermore, in this paper the effects of some key parameters on the optimal decision are discussed, and some managerial insights are obtained. The results show that the lower the manufacturers’ risk aversion level is, the higher their carbon emission reduction rate and utilities. As the carbon quota increases, the manufacturers’ optimal carbon reduction rate and utilities increase. Considering consumers’ environmental awareness, it is more beneficial for the government to reduce the carbon quota and motivate manufacturers’ internal enthusiasm for emission reduction. The government can, through macro control of the market, make carbon trading prices increase appropriately and encourage manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions.

scholarly journals Self-Operated Store or Franchised Store? Optimal Decisions for Online-to-Offline Supply Chain with a Demand Shift

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Feng Wei ◽  
Yan Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
Demand Shifts

Mutual shifts in offline and online demand have become the norm in supply chain operations. The online-to-offline (O2O) supply chain system consists of a platform vendor, a physical store, and a product. The platform vendor sells the product directly online and governs either the centralized decision-making of a self-operated store or the decentralized decision-making of a franchised store offline. In this study, supply chain decision models with and without demand shifts are constructed to obtain optimal wholesale and selling prices and to maximize profit. The coordination mechanism under decentralized decision-making is designed to optimize the O2O supply chain, and the validity and applicability of the model are verified by numerical simulation. Results show that, regardless of whether a store is self-operated or franchised, the total profit of the system increases, and online and offline prices depend on a range of demand shifts. With an increased proportion of online demand shifts, the offline selling price and total profit of the system increase, whereas the online selling price and profit of the platform vendor decrease under decentralized decision-making. When the fixed transfer payment fee is within a certain range, a two-part-tariff contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain. This study not only contributes to the theoretical literature on O2O supply chain systems but also provides practical decision-making support for managers.

scholarly journals Carbon Emission Estimation of Assembled Composite Concrete Beams during Construction

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (7) ◽  
pp. 1810
Author(s):  
Kaitong Xu ◽  
Haibo Kang ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Ping Jiang ◽  
Na Li
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Composite Beams ◽  
Total Carbon ◽  
Construction Process ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
The Government

At present, the issue of carbon emissions from buildings has become a hot topic, and carbon emission reduction is also becoming a political and economic contest for countries. As a result, the government and researchers have gradually begun to attach great importance to the industrialization of low-carbon and energy-saving buildings. The rise of prefabricated buildings has promoted a major transformation of the construction methods in the construction industry, which is conducive to reducing the consumption of resources and energy, and of great significance in promoting the low-carbon emission reduction of industrial buildings. This article mainly studies the calculation model for carbon emissions of the three-stage life cycle of component production, logistics transportation, and on-site installation in the whole construction process of composite beams for prefabricated buildings. The construction of CG-2 composite beams in Fujian province, China, was taken as the example. Based on the life cycle assessment method, carbon emissions from the actual construction process of composite beams were evaluated, and that generated by the composite beam components during the transportation stage by using diesel, gasoline, and electric energy consumption methods were compared in detail. The results show that (1) the carbon emissions generated by composite beams during the production stage were relatively high, accounting for 80.8% of the total carbon emissions, while during the transport stage and installation stage, they only accounted for 7.6% and 11.6%, respectively; and (2) during the transportation stage with three different energy-consuming trucks, the carbon emissions from diesel fuel trucks were higher, reaching 186.05 kg, followed by gasoline trucks, which generated about 115.68 kg; electric trucks produced the lowest, only 12.24 kg.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

Advertising strategy and contract coordination for a supply chain system: immediate and delayed effects

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui Yu ◽  
Wei Yang ◽  
Na Xu ◽  
Yang Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Chain Structure ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Delayed Effects ◽  
Advertising Effect ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Advertising Strategy

PurposeAfter receiving advertising messages, most consumers rarely purchase the advertised products at once, which results in a delay between advertising exposure and its effect. This paper is devoted to exploring the advertising decision and coordination issues for a supply chain system subject to advertising immediate and delayed effects.Design/methodology/approachBy applying the game theory, the differential game models with delay are constructed for the supply chain to examine the equilibrium advertising efforts, brand goodwill and the optimal profits under the different cooperation situations. A class of transfer payment contracts is designed to achieve the best outcome of the supply chain. Illustrative examples are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of addressed results and provide some managerial perspectives.FindingsIt can be found that the complete cooperation situation can stimulate the advertising investment, drive the product demand and improve the economic profit. Also, a class of transfer payment contracts is designed in this paper, such that the supply chain can perfectly realize the profit maximization, and each member can achieve the Pareto improvement.Research limitations/implicationsThis work does not address the random market environment, which can be filled in the future. Furthermore, this paper has been done in a single supply chain structure. It is an interesting future line of research when taking competitive behavior (e.g. competition among manufacturers, retailers or supply chains) into account.Practical implicationsThis study will help managers make advertising strategies, advise an optimal cooperation way and design the coordination contracts to ensure the economic development of the supply chain. These obtained conclusions may provide a valuable decision-support for marketing management.Originality/valueFor a supply chain, the most previous literature about dynamic advertising models focused on a single advertising effect-immediate effect. This work explores advertising strategy with double advertising effects and investigates the coordinating power of new transfer payment contracts.

scholarly journals Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhou Xideng ◽  
Xu Bing ◽  
Xie Fei ◽  
Li Yu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Quality ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Reference Quality ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.

scholarly journals Strategies for Capital Constrained Timber and Carbon Sink Supply Chain under the Cap-and-Trade Scheme

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 4380
Author(s):  
Xinyue Yang ◽  
Ye Song ◽  
Mingjun Sun ◽  
Hongjun Peng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Sink ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Emission Rights ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Reduction Costs

We consider a capital constrained timber and carbon sink supply chain under the cap-and-trade scheme, where the forest company produces timber and carbon sink. We consider two subsidy modes: financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests and financing subsidy to the manufacturer’s emission reductions. We apply a Stackelberg model and mainly consider the impact of subsidies on the profits and the strategies of the supply chain members. The results show that when the government gives a financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests, it is conducive to promoting the expansion of carbon sink forests, as well as the enhancement of the forest company’s profit. However, a larger supply of carbon sinks generates a lower price, which leads to the manufacturer reducing the technical emission reduction level and purchasing more carbon emission rights instead. On the other hand, when the manufacturer receives a financing subsidy for the technical emission reduction costs, its production becomes cleaner than before, and the profits of the forest company and the manufacturer increase.

Impact of carbon permit allocation rules on incentive contracts for carbon emission reduction

Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1143-1167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinqin Li ◽  
Yujie Xiao ◽  
Yuzhuo Qiu ◽  
Xiaoling Xu ◽  
Caichun Chai
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Allocation Rules ◽  
Permit Allocation ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of carbon permit allocation rules (grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism) on incentive contracts provided by the retailer to encourage the manufacturer to invest more in reducing carbon emissions. Design/methodology/approach The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer offers three contracts (wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract) to the manufacturer. Based on the two carbon permit allocation rules, i.e. grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism, six scenarios are examined. The optimal price and carbon emission reduction decisions and members’ equilibrium profits under six scenarios are analyzed and compared. Findings The results suggest that the revenue-sharing contract can more effectively stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions compared to the cost-sharing contract. The cost-sharing contract can help to achieve the highest environmental performance, whereas the implementation of revenue-sharing contract can attain the highest social welfare. The benchmarking mechanism is more effective for the government to prompt the manufacturer to produce low-carbon products than the grandfathering mechanism. Although a loose carbon policy can expand the total emissions, it can improve the social welfare. Practical implications These results can provide operational insights for the retailer in how to use incentive contract to encourage the manufacturer to curb carbon emissions and offer managerial insights for the government to make policy decisions on carbon permit allocation rules. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature regarding to firm’s carbon emissions reduction decisions under cap-and-trade policy and highlights the importance of carbon permit allocation methods in curbing carbon emissions.

scholarly journals Decision Optimization and Interest Coordination of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Embedded by Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under the Dominance of Retailer

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Jianjun Zhang ◽  
Daning Xing
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

Taking the dual-channel supply chain embedded by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper studies the optimal decisions of each decision maker under the centralized and decentralized decision-making mode led by the retailer. Based on the decentralized decision-making mode, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed to realize the interest coordination, in which the bargaining power of all participants is fully considered. The results show that, under the decentralized decision-making mode, the profit of FLSP increases first and then decreases as the sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level increases, while the profits of other decision makers and the supply chain system decrease with the increase of sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level. The relative size of the price sensitivity coefficient of online and offline channel has an inconsistent impact on the profit of FLSP, while it has a consistent impact on the profits of other decision makers. The profit of FLSP fluctuates greatly with changes in the sensitivity coefficient, and it is difficult to be guaranteed in the entire supply chain system. On this basis, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed. The results show that, after the introduction of bargaining power coefficient of the Nash negotiation model, the variation coefficient of the profits of all decision makers is smaller after coordination, and the profit growth rates are more uniform.

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