A decision framework for the analysis of green supply chain contracts: An evolutionary game approach

2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 2965-2976 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sikhar Barari ◽  
Gaurav Agarwal ◽  
W.J.(Chris) Zhang ◽  
Biswajit Mahanty ◽  
M.K. Tiwari
2014 ◽  
Vol 678 ◽  
pp. 697-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Qi ◽  
Meng Lin Bi

As the worsening global ecological environment, the effective implementation of green supply chain based on IOT is an inevitable trend of future development. Through combing and analyzing the domestic and foreign situations of green supply chain management under IOT, we found that the current research about the relation between consumer behaviors and core business in green supply chain is insufficient. In view of this, this paper systematically analyzes the intrinsic link between these two sides, and builds the relation model between core business and consumers. Furthermore, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model based on the evolutionary game theory, and derives an evolutionary stable strategy by solving replicated dynamics equation. At last, with the analysis of the results, we put forward some countermeasures and suggestions and provide a useful reference for the effective implementation of green supply chain under IOT.


Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiayang Xu ◽  
Jian Cao ◽  
Yunfei Wang ◽  
Xiangrong Shi ◽  
Jiayun Zeng

Sustainability issues have gained growing awareness in recent years. Governments play an important role in environment and resources problems since they can affect enterprises’ production activities by enacting policies and regulations. To promote green production in the long term associated with the consideration of financial intervention of governments, we establish a three-population model of suppliers, manufacturers and governments based on evolutionary game theory, and analyze the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of their unilateral and joint behaviors. Further, system dynamics (SD) is applied to empirical analysis for exploring the dynamic interaction of the populations’ strategy, and the key factors affecting ESS are also discussed in detail. The results show that: (1) the proportion of green suppliers and manufacturers in their groups determines whether the government implements regulation; (2) any party of the supplier and manufacturer that adopts green strategy could promote green behavior of the other; (3) the government is advised to supervise and implement reward and punishment mechanism under the low proportion of green supply chain; (4) government regulation could promote the corporations to adopt green behavior and should preferentially implements the mechanism on manufacturers. The results provide insights into the policy-making of governments and enterprises management on sustainable development.


2021 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 102716
Author(s):  
Ming-Hsiang Chen ◽  
Haixiang Wei ◽  
Min Wei ◽  
Haiyu Huang ◽  
Ching-Hui (Joan) Su

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 4306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianbo Zhu ◽  
Miao Fang ◽  
Qianqian Shi ◽  
Peng Wang ◽  
Qian Li

The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects.


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