scholarly journals Incentive Contract Design for Supply Chain Enterprise’s Pollution Abatement with Carbon Tax

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Jing Yu ◽  
Chi Zhou ◽  
Yixin Wang ◽  
Zhibing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Uncertain Variable ◽  
Equivalent Model ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Optimal Transfer ◽  
Emission Level ◽  
The Government

This paper applies mechanism design to the supply chain enterprise’s pollution abatement problem with carbon tax. To maximize the government’s expected utility, an uncertain contract model is presented in the framework of principal-agent theory, where the government’s assessment of the supply chain enterprise’s carbon emission level is described as an uncertain variable. Afterwards, the equivalent model is provided to obtain the optimal contract for the uncertain pollution abatement problem. The results demonstrate that the supply chain enterprise’s optimal output decreases with the carbon emission level. Furthermore, the government’s optimal transfer payment decreases with the carbon emission level if the carbon tax is low. In contrast, if the carbon tax is high, the optimal transfer payment increases with the carbon emission level. In addition, an increase in the carbon emission level decreases the optimal utilities of both the government and the supply chain enterprise and also leads to the supply chain enterprise’s incremental marginal utility. Finally, we provide a numerical example, which illustrates the effectiveness and practicability of the proposed model.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Su ◽  
Xiaojing Liu ◽  
Wenyi Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Emission Level ◽  
The Government

This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures.

scholarly journals Will Port Integration Help Reduce Carbon Emissions and Improve Social Welfare?

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhuoqi Teng ◽  
Xiaoli Li ◽  
Yuantao Fang ◽  
Hailing Fu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Emission Level ◽  
Subsidy Rate ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Government

In the context of competition between two ports in Cournot, we studied optimal decision-making processes for the government and the port in four different situations before and after the integration of the port based on the subsidy and carbon tax mechanism. We analyzed the impacts of the carbon tax rate and emission reduction subsidy rate on social welfare and determined the optimal carbon tax rate, the optimal emission reduction subsidy rate, the optimal carbon emission level, and the optimal social welfare level in different situations. We also compared the optimal social welfare level and the optimal carbon emission level of the four situations before and after the integration. This research can be used as a policy reference for the government for the formation of environmental policies based on the goal of maximizing social welfare, and it could also be used for the port’s internal decision-making when the environmental policy has been set.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Tax or Subsidy? Optimal Carbon Emission Policy: A Supply Chain Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1548 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xing Yin ◽  
Xiaolin Chen ◽  
Xiaolin Xu ◽  
Lianmin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Manufacturing Firm ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Government ◽  
Increasing Demand ◽  
The Cost

With a rigid requirement for environment protection, governments need to make appropriate policies to induce firms to adopt green technology in consideration of the rapidly increasing demand for environmentally friendly products. We investigated the government policy from the perspective of a supply chain, which consisted of the upstream government (she) and the downstream manufacturing firm (he). The government decided on the policy (tax or subsidy) to maximize the social welfare, while the firm decided on the greenness level of the product, which affects the consumers’ choice behavior and hence his own demand. Assuming else being equal, the government should adopt the tax policy if consumers are very sensitive to the greenness, the cost of greening is high, or the negative impact due to carbon emission is large, and subsidize the firm otherwise. We also conduct some numerical studies when price is endogenous. The main insights can be carried over.

scholarly journals Strategies for Capital Constrained Timber and Carbon Sink Supply Chain under the Cap-and-Trade Scheme

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 4380
Author(s):  
Xinyue Yang ◽  
Ye Song ◽  
Mingjun Sun ◽  
Hongjun Peng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Sink ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Emission Rights ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Reduction Costs

We consider a capital constrained timber and carbon sink supply chain under the cap-and-trade scheme, where the forest company produces timber and carbon sink. We consider two subsidy modes: financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests and financing subsidy to the manufacturer’s emission reductions. We apply a Stackelberg model and mainly consider the impact of subsidies on the profits and the strategies of the supply chain members. The results show that when the government gives a financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests, it is conducive to promoting the expansion of carbon sink forests, as well as the enhancement of the forest company’s profit. However, a larger supply of carbon sinks generates a lower price, which leads to the manufacturer reducing the technical emission reduction level and purchasing more carbon emission rights instead. On the other hand, when the manufacturer receives a financing subsidy for the technical emission reduction costs, its production becomes cleaner than before, and the profits of the forest company and the manufacturer increase.

Incentive contract design for internet referral services: cost per click vs cost per sale

Kybernetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 601-626
Author(s):  
Chi Zhou ◽  
Geni Xu ◽  
Zhibing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Uncertain Variable ◽  
Online Marketing ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Sales Volume ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Optimal Transfer ◽  
Referral Service ◽  
Service Capability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Click Through Rate

Purpose Internet referral services are a common form of online marketing operating activities. To incentivize infomediaries and improve referral performance, brand retailers typically apply the cost-per-click (CPC) or the cost-per-sale (CPS) payments. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of referral services on the optimal contract with CPC or CPS payments. Design/methodology/approach This paper studies a mechanism design problem for internet referral services. To maximize the expected utility of the brand retailer, an uncertain contract model is established in which the brand retailer's assessment of the infomediary's referral service capability is characterized as an uncertain variable. Then equivalent models under CPC and CPS payments are presented to obtain the optimal solutions. Findings The results demonstrate that under CPC payments, as the referral service capability increases, the optimal sales volume is increasing, and the optimal transfer payment first shows a declining and then a rising trend. The brand retailer is less likely to raise the optimal transfer payment for the infomediary given a higher CPC revenue-sharing fee percentage, which is counterintuitive. Under CPS payments, the optimal sales volume and transfer payment are also increasing in the referral service capability. In addition, an increase in the click-through rate leads to the infomediary's incremental marginal utility. Originality/value The value of this research is its application of incentive contracts to the internet referral services considering CPC or CPS payments. The results of this research can serve as a guide for retailers and infomediaries in their decision-making around online retailing.

scholarly journals The Farmers’ Channel Selection and Sustainable Analysis under Carbon Tax Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 2765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Zheng ◽  
Quangui Pang ◽  
Tianpei Li ◽  
Guizheng Wang ◽  
Yiji Cai ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Product Yield ◽  
Channel Selection ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Deterioration Rate ◽  
Dual Channels ◽  
The Government

This paper examines a farmer’s channel selection in a supply chain led by a retailer, considering carbon emissions and products’ deterioration. Three channels—online channels, retail channels, and dual channels—are proposed. The inventory model of perishable products and the two-stage Stackelberg game model are used to illustrate the operational process. To compare performances of the three channel structures, we further determine the critical points consisting of the profits and the carbon emissions among these channels. The results provide useful insights for supply chain members and the government. Farmers can choose a channel to optimize profit with respect to deterioration rate and product yield, but it might conflict with the aim of least carbon emissions. When the deterioration rate is high, the online channel is not a suitable choice. For the government, the carbon tax contributes to the reduction of carbon emissions, but it also leads to the loss of the farmer’s profit. Additionally, numerical results further illustrate that, from the perspective of the government, transporting and inventory processes are two major sources of emissions, and it is essential to implement carbon tax and exploit low-carbon transportation.

scholarly journals Green Innovation Mode under Carbon Tax and Innovation Subsidy: An Evolutionary Game Analysis for Portfolio Policies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengzhong Zhang ◽  
Yingmin Yu ◽  
Qihong Zhu ◽  
Chun Martin Qiu ◽  
Aixuan Tian
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Reduce Carbon Emission ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Mode

Previous literature has shown that manufacturers’ choices between radical and incremental green innovation modes can greatly impact the tradeoff between industry growth and carbon emission reduction. Yet, how the government can motivate manufacturers to implement radical green innovations to reduce carbon emission is unclear. In this paper, the researchers construct an evolutionary game model to analyze the joint impacts of carbon tax and innovation subsidy on manufacturers’ choices of green innovation mode. We derive the conditions for manufacturers’ stable strategies. Based on those results, we find that four factors—carbon tax, innovation subsidy, consumer green preference, and manufacturers’ capabilities of absorbing and adopting new technologies—may facilitate the choice of radical innovation. Furthermore, we conduct numerical simulations to verify the theoretical results, and further illustrate how the synergy of carbon tax rate and subsidy level affects the evolution of the green innovation mode choices. Specifically, we demonstrate the superiority of portfolio policy in the early stage of green innovation over single policy. In contrast, in the later stage, it is carbon tax but not innovation subsidy that remains effective. We discuss the insights for the government to formulate appropriate environmental policies to effectively promote the adoption of green innovation and reduce carbon emission.

scholarly journals The Impact of Different Government Subsidy Methods on Low-Carbon Emission Reduction Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Zhihong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Direct Sales ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Low Carbon Emission

With the implementation of national carbon emission reduction policies and the development of online shopping, manufacturers are making low-carbon efforts and selling products through dual channels. This paper constructs a dual-channel supply chain decision-making model composed of low-carbon emission reduction manufacturers and retailers and studies the optimal decision-making problem of the supply chain under subsidies by the government based on emission reduction R&D and per unit product emission reduction. The research results show the following: (1) when the government subsidizes emission reduction R&D, the emission reduction will have an impact on retailers’ optimal prices, manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices, and optimal direct sales channel sales prices. The profit of the manufacturer increases with the increase in carbon emissions, and the profit of the manufacturer increases to a certain level and then appears to decline. (2) When the government adopts a subsidy method based on the emission reduction per unit product, the manufacturer’s wholesale price and the selling price of direct sales channels, as well as the retailer’s own optimal price, will increase with the increase in emission reductions. Retailers’ profits will increase linearly with the increase in carbon emissions. Manufacturers’ profits will first increase in a straight line and then increase in a curve.

scholarly journals Carbon Emission Reduction Decision and Revenue-Sharing Contract with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference and CER Cost under Carbon Tax

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chao-qun Han ◽  
Hua-ying Gu ◽  
Li-hui Sui ◽  
Chang-peng Shao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Theoretical And Numerical Analysis ◽  
The Impact

Since the tax of carbon emission is popular and consumers are exhibiting low-carbon preference, the green manufactures have to spend more extra cost on investing carbon emission reduction (CER) technology to decrease the carbon emission. To encourage the manufacture’s CER investment efforts, this paper explores the impact of carbon tax, CER cost, and consumers’ low-carbon preference on low-carbon decision-making and designs a revenue-sharing contract (RS) by constructing Stackelberg models. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, this paper finds that the supply chain would benefit from the increment of consumer’s environmental awareness but be depressed by the increase of the CER investment cost factor. Additionally, there exists a unique optimal carbon tax to make CER degree the maximum. Furthermore, RS can effectively promote manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions and also improve the supply chain efficiency.

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