Dissecting Auditory Verbal Hallucinations into Two Components: Audibility (Gedankenlautwerden) and Alienation (Thought Insertion)

2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris E. Sommer ◽  
Jean-Paul Selten ◽  
Kelly M. Diederen ◽  
Jan Dirk Blom
2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-99
Author(s):  
Valentina Petrolini

Disorders of agency could be described as cases where people encounter difficulties in assessing their own degree of responsibility or involvement with respect to a relevant action or event. These disturbances in one’s sense of agency appear to be meaningfully connected with some mental disorders and with some symptoms in particular—i.e. auditory verbal hallucinations, thought insertion, pathological guilt. A deeper understanding of these experiences may thus contribute to better identification and possibly treatment of people affected by such disorders. In this paper I explore disorders of agency to flesh out their phenomenology in more detail as well as to introduce some theoretical distinctions between them. Specifically, I argue that we may better understand disorders of agency by characterizing them as dimensional. In §1 I explore the cases of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVH) and pathological guilt and I show that they lie at opposite ends of the agency spectrum (i.e. hypoagency versus hyperagency). In §2 I focus on two intermediate cases of hypo- and hyper- agency. These are situations that, despite being very similar to pathological ones, may be successfully distinguished from them in virtue of quantitative factors (e.g. duration, frequency, intensity). I first explore the phenomenon of mind wandering as an example of hypoagency, and I then discuss the phenomenon of false confessions as an example of hyperagency. While cases of hypoagency exemplify situations where people experience their own thoughts, bodies, or actions as something beyond their control, experiences of hyperagency provide an illusory sense of control over actions or events.


Author(s):  
Matthew Ratcliffe

Real Hallucinations is a philosophical study of the structure of human experience, its vulnerability to disruption, and how its integrity depends on interpersonal relations. It focuses on the beguilingly simple question of how we manage to routinely distinguish between our experiences of perceiving, remembering, imagining, and thinking. This question is addressed via a detailed philosophical study of auditory verbal hallucinations (usually defined as hearing a voice in the absence of a speaker) and thought insertion (somehow experiencing one’s own thoughts as someone else’s). The book shows how thought insertion, and also a substantial proportion of auditory verbal hallucinations, consist of disturbances in the structure of experience and –more specifically - in our sense of the various types of intentional state, such as believing, perceiving, remembering, and imagining, as distinct from one another. It is further argued that episodic and seemingly localized experiential disturbances such as these usually occur against a backdrop of less pronounced but much wider-ranging alterations in the structure of intentionality. To do so, the book addresses types of experience associated with trauma, schizophrenia, and profound grief. The outcome of this is a more generally applicable account of how the integrity of human experience, including the most basic sense of self, is inseparable from how we relate to other people and to the social world as a whole.


Author(s):  
Matthew Ratcliffe

This chapter outlines the overall argument of the book, emphasizing its two principal theses. First of all, it sketches the position that thought insertion, and also a substantial proportion of auditory verbal hallucinations, consist of disturbances in the sense of being in one or another kind of intentional state, in the modal structure of intentionality (meaning our grasp of the various modalities of intentionality, such as believing, perceiving, remembering, and imagining, as distinct from one another). Second, it introduces the view that the integrity of human experience, including what we might term the most basic experience of self, depends on ways of relating to other people and to the social world as a whole. The chapter concludes with summaries of the seven chapters that follow.


2003 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yesne Alici-Evcimen ◽  
Turan Ertan ◽  
Engin Eker

In this article we report the first series of Turkish inpatients with late-onset psychosis, and describe our 9-year experience at the only inpatient geriatric psychiatry department in Turkey. Among 420 patients hospitalized between 1993 and 2002, 27 were psychotic. In this group, eight patients were diagnosed as having late-onset schizophrenia (LOS) and six very-late-onset schizophrenia-like psychosis (VLOSLP). Five patients had early-onset schizophrenia and eight had delusional disorder. Females were more frequently seen in the group with LOS and the group with VLOSLP. Except for one patient with LOS, all patients with VLOSLP and LOS had paranoid psychosis. Nihilistic delusions, delusions of poverty or guilt, thought withdrawal, thought insertion, and thought broadcasting were not seen in any of the patients. Additionally, none of the LOS or VLOSLP patients showed erotomanic delusions. Grandiose and mystic delusions were not seen in those with VLOSLP. Treatment results and antipsychotic dosages at discharge were similar to those in previous reports from other cultures.


Author(s):  
Franz Knappik ◽  
Josef J. Bless ◽  
Frank Larøi

AbstractBoth in research on Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVHs) and in their clinical assessment, it is common to distinguish between voices that are experienced as ‘inner’ (or ‘internal’, ‘inside the head’, ‘inside the mind’, ...) and voices that are experienced as ‘outer’ (‘external’, ‘outside the head’, ‘outside the mind’, ...). This inner/outer-contrast is treated not only as an important phenomenological variable of AVHs, it is also often seen as having diagnostic value. In this article, we argue that the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ voices is ambiguous between different readings, and that lack of disambiguation in this regard has led to flaws in assessment tools, diagnostic debates and empirical studies. Such flaws, we argue furthermore, are often linked to misreadings of inner/outer-terminology in relevant 19th and early twentieth century work on AVHs, in particular, in connection with Kandinsky’s and Jaspers’s distinction between hallucinations and pseudo-hallucinations.


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