Norms, Heresthetics, and the End of the Cold War

2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Evangelista
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
External Pressure ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
Economic Decline ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
Ideational Change ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Constructivist Approaches ◽  
Policy Proposals ◽  
Academic Debate

The academic debate about the end of the Cold War has reached an impasse. Realists draw on evidence of economic decline and external pressure to explain the Soviet Union's retrenchment. Constructivists emphasize ideational change and Mikhail Gorbachev's “new thinking” as the source of accommodation. Neither approach sufficiently accounts for the fact that many powerful Soviet institutions did not support Gorbachev's approach from early on, well before his decisions contributed to the disintegration of the country. Even so, Gorbachev persuaded influential people who disagreed with him to accept his policy proposals. William Riker's concept of heresthetics—the use of language to manipulate the political agenda—goes a long way toward explaining Gorbachev's success. Heresthetics could be a way to bridge the gap between realist and constructivist approaches to international relations.

Russia and Peaceful Change

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrej Krickovic
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Russian Foreign Policy ◽  
Unmet Expectations ◽  
Soviet Empire ◽  
Communist Movement ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Over Time

Over the last four decades, Russia has been at the very center of peaceful change in international relations. Gorbachev’s conciliatory New Thinking (NT) fundamentally transformed international relations, ending the Cold War struggle and dismantling the Soviet empire and world communist movement. Contemporary Russia is at the forefront of the transition away from American unipolarity and toward what is believed will be a more equitable and just multipolar order. Over time, Russia has moved away from the idealism that characterized Gorbachev’s NT and toward a more hard-nosed and confrontational approach toward peaceful change. The chapter traces this evolution with a particular emphasis on the role that Russia’s unmet expectations of reciprocity and elevated status have played in the process. If they are to be successful, future efforts at peaceful change will have to find ways to address these issues of reciprocity and status, especially under circumstances where there are power asymmetries between the side making concessions and the side receiving them. Nevertheless, despite its disappointments, Russia’s approach to change remains (largely) peaceful. Elements of NT, including its emphasis on interdependence, collective/mutual security, and faith in the possibility of positive transformation, continue to be present in modern Russian foreign policy thinking.

The Development of the United Nations Law Concerning Peace-Keeping Operations

1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-281
Author(s):  
Robert Siekmann
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Central America ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The Cold War

Especially as a consequence of the termination of the Cold War, the détente in the relations between East en West (Gorbachev's ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy matters) and, finally, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the number of UN peace-keeping operations substantially increased in recent years. One could even speak of a ‘proliferation’. Until 1988 the number of operations was twelve (seven peace-keeping forces: UNEF ‘I’ and ‘II’, ONUC, UNHCYP, UNSF (West New Guinea), UNDOF AND UNIFIL; and five military observer missions: UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, UNYOM and UNIPOM). Now, three forces and seven observer missions can be added. The forces are MINURSO (West Sahara), UNTAC (Cambodia) and UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia); the observer groups: UNGOMAP (Afghanistan/Pakistan), UNIIMOG (Iran/Iraq), UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’ (Angola), ONUCA (Central America), UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait) and ONUSAL (El Salvador). UNTAG (Namibia), which was established in 1978, could not become operational until 1989 as a result of the new political circumstances in the world. So, a total of twenty-three operations have been undertaken, of which almost fifty percent was established in the last five years, whereas the other half was the result of decisions taken by the United Nations in the preceding forty years (UNTSO dates back to 1949). In the meantime, some ‘classic’ operations are being continued (UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, and UNIFIL), whereas some ‘modern’ operations already have been terminated as planned (UNTAG, UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG, UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’, and ONUCA). At the moment (July 1992) eleven operations are in action – the greatest number in the UN history ever.

Developments in African Governance since the Cold War: Beyond Cassandra and Pollyanna

2010 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hazel McFerson
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
External Pressure ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Ethnic Conflicts ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Institutional Capacity Building ◽  
Better Than

Abstract:Twenty years ago, most African countries seemed permanently mired in malgovernance and repression. The end of the Cold War triggered two contrasting developments: governance improvement associated with the end of superpower competition, and deterioration caused by the resurgence of suppressed ethnic conflicts. Based on a variety of evidence, three subperiods can be identified: fragile governance progress from 1989 to 1995; backsliding associated largely with civil conflict between 1996 and 2002; and resumption of progress in recent years. These broad trends mask major intercountry differences—with Ghana the best-known case of improvement and Zimbabwe the worst case of reversal. Overall, African governance is now somewhat better than it was two decades ago. However, the progress is fragile, and improvements in administrative and economic governance have lagged behind those on the political front. Consolidating democracy will thus require institutional capacity building through a combination of appropriate civil society efforts and constructive external pressure to strengthen accountability.

SOCIAL POLITICS IN A TRANSOCEANIC WORLD IN THE EARLY COLD WAR YEARS

2010 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONATHAN BELL
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
New Deal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Welfare States ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The New Deal

ABSTRACTThis article argues that those termed ‘liberals’ in the United States had the opportunity in the late 1940s to use overseas case studies to reshape the ramshackle political agenda of the New Deal along more specifically social democratic lines, but that they found it impossible to match interest in the wider world with a concrete programme to overcome tension between left-wing politics and the emerging anti-totalitarianism of the Cold War. The American right, by contrast, conducted a highly organized publicity drive to provide new meaning for their anti-statist ideology in a post-New Deal, post-isolationist United States by using perceived failures of welfare states overseas as domestic propaganda. The examples of Labour Britain after 1945 and Labour New Zealand both provided important case studies for American liberals and conservatives, but in the Cold War it was the American right who would benefit most from an ideologically driven repackaging of overseas social policy for an American audience.

The Sociology of New Thinking: Elites, Identity Change, and the End of the Cold War

2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert English
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Identity Change ◽  
The West ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Gorbachev Era ◽  
General Secretary

This article recounts the origins of Soviet “new thinking” as a case study of how Soviet intellectuals sought to redefine national identity in response to the West. It demonstrates that new thinking was fundamentally normative, not instrumental, insofar as it was developed in a period (1950s–1960s) when “socialism” was thought to be materially outperforming capitalism. It also demonstrates that new thinking decisively affected Soviet policy in the second half of the 1980s. Putting forth a socialization argument to show how newthinking ideas originated in the post-Stalin period within a community of intellectuals, the article charts the growing influence of these intellectuals through the 1970s and 1980s. In the mid-1980s, when Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party and empowered many of the new thinkers as advisers, their liberal, Westernizing ideas played an indispensable role in shaping his reforms. The analysis focuses on mechanisms of identity change at two levels: that of the community of reformist intellectuals, and that of the Soviet Union itself. The analysis challenges realist and rationalist views that new thinking was largely instrumental. Until the Gorbachev era, Soviet reformers advocated new-thinking ideas often at the risk of their personal, professional, and institutional interests.

The Triumph of Diplomacy and Leadership

2019 ◽  
pp. 129-146
Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Moral Leadership ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Mutual Interest ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
Security Concerns ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Arms

Triumphalism not only claims to explain the surprising end of the Cold War, it also stipulates how to cope with current conflicts. But triumphalism is a series of myths. President Reagan did not seek to destroy the USSR; rather, he sought to improve superpower relations so as to eliminate nuclear arsenals. Moreover, his initial hard-line policies did not compel the USSR to disarm, reform, and collapse. They strengthened the position of Soviet hard-liners who opposed disarmament, made it more difficult for Gorbachev to implement New Thinking, and brought the superpowers to the brink of war. In short, compellence failed miserably. The Cold War was resolved through diplomacy, not threats. President Reagan eventually engaged in meaningful dialogue so as to ease Moscow’s security concerns, build trust, and focus on the superpowers’ mutual interest in eliminating nuclear arms. For his part, Gorbachev sought to end the arms race so as to divert resources to democratization. He too sought dialogue and trust. The ending of the Cold War demonstrates the importance of moral leadership. Reagan and Gorbachev both rose above their differences and introduced new ideas about nuclear security. Consequently, both encountered serious domestic opposition. Each persevered, however, leading their nations toward a safer, more humane future.

New Departures

2020 ◽  
pp. 106-129
Author(s):  
Simon Miles
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
East West

This chapter covers Ronald Reagan's first meeting with Mikhail Gorbache in Geneva in November 1985, exploring the internal and external roots of the nascent new thinking in Soviet foreign-policy and its impact on East–West relations. It recounts how superpower relations over a five-year period became messy and contradictory as Moscow and Washington exchanged harsh words and engaged in more dialogue than is commonly thought. It also mentions how the process of ending the Cold War had begun as US policymakers regained confidence in their place in the world and their Soviet counterparts took drastic measures to deal with a deteriorating situation. The chapter refers to policymakers in Washington and Moscow who struggled with the dualities of the Cold War. It describes that the policymakers witnessed a strong and rising United States and a Soviet Union that was on a grim downward trajectory.

Transcending rationalism and constructivism: Chinese leaders’ operational codes, socialization processes, and multilateralism after the Cold War

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai He ◽  
Huiyun Feng
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Chinese Foreign Policy ◽  
Code Analysis ◽  
Socialization Theory ◽  
Operational Code ◽  
Multilateral Institutions ◽  
Chinese Policy ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Constructivist Approaches

This paper challenges both rationalist and constructivist approaches in explaining China’s foreign policy behavior toward multilateral institutions after the Cold War. Borrowing insights from socialization theory and operational code analysis, this paper suggests a ‘superficial socialization’ argument to explain China’s pro-multilateralist diplomacy after the Cold War. Using operational code analysis to examine belief changes across three generations of Chinese leadership and on different occasions, we argue that China’s pro-multilateralist behavior is a product of ‘superficial socialization’, in which Chinese foreign policy elites change their beliefs about the outside world and regarding the future realization of their political goals in multilateral institutions. However, Chinese policy makers have not changed their instrumental beliefs regarding strategies even in multilateral institutions. China is indeed socialized through multilateral institutions, but its scope is still far from the ‘fundamental socialization’ stage when states’ interests, preferences, and even identities change.

scholarly journals India, Latin America, and the Caribbean during the Cold War

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-44
Author(s):  
Cesar Ross
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Regional Policy ◽  
Chain Structure ◽  
Explanatory Factors ◽  
The Caribbean ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Academic Debate

In this period, the key to the relationship between India and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) was based in the political nature of this liaison: it was a "uni-multilateral" relationship, centered in India, where LAC countries operated as a group of autonomous entities (an "island chain" structure), and not as a unit of a supranational character with unified international conduct (an island structure). As we will see, faced with uniform and consistent Indian policies, LAC had national policies which make it impossible to discuss a regional policy towards India. The goal of this work is to form a general characterization of the bilateral policies during the period of the Cold War with the intent of identifying the key explanatory factors of the process. While this may be a limited objective, it addresses the non-existence of an academic debate surrounding the topic. We intend to contribute an analysis which in this phase is primarily descriptive.

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